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This dissertation argues that cognitive science emerges in the latter half of the 
nineteenth-century, transforming the relationship between aesthetic experience and 
political liberalism in the Victorian imagination.  New scientific theories of sensory 
perception and cognition opened an intractable conflict between two liberal principles 
underlying Victorian notions of aesthetic experience—the commitment to autonomous 
agency and the necessity of a shared set of agreements about the world for democratic 
deliberation and debate.  Through readings of literary and scientific texts, I argue that 
this conflict shapes Victorian conceptions of agency, ethics, and art, as well as several 
of the period’s most important texts, events, and movements. 
Chapters 2 and 3 are case studies of how cognitive science shapes the aesthetic 
theories governing two major late Victorian novels.  Chapter 2, “Raising National 
Unconsciousness: Neural Writing and Sympathy in Daniel Deronda,” argues that 
George Eliot draws from G.H. Lewes’ description of consciousness as a palimpsest of 
neural pathways in order to conceive of sympathy as a means of rewriting the mind by 
reflectively reinterpreting experience.  Chapter 3, “Reading in the Dark: Sensory 
Perception and Agency in The Return of the Native,” reads Hardy’s novel in the 
context of late Victorian psychological theories that characterize sensory perception as 
a form of interpretation analogous to reading.  
 Chapters 4 and 5 analyze the role of cognitive science in the theories, debates, 
and controversies that defined the British Aesthetic Movement.  Chapter 4, “Beautiful 
Graffiti: Vernon Lee, Wilhelm Dilthey, and the Democratization of Art” analyzes 
Lee’s and Dilthey’s parallel efforts to envision an aesthetic polity in which a 
perceptual sensus communis is forged and managed by the secret shaping hands of an 
artistic aristocracy.   Chapter 5, “Unchained Harmony: Walter Pater’s Ethics of 
Influence,” argues that Pater’s writings after The Renaissance attempt to accommodate 
the ethical imperatives of common sense without sacrificing the teeming, unique 
sensory details that escape the perceptual norms guiding common sense experience.   
“Uncommon Sense” thus demonstrates the crucial role of cognitive science in 
late Victorian literature and culture, arguing for renewed attention to the ongoing 
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The impotence of speculative reason, as Kant has demonstrated it, is perhaps at bottom 
only the impotence of an intellect enslaved to the necessities of bodily life and 
concerned with a matter which man has had to disorganize for the satisfaction of his 
wants.  Our knowledge of things would thus no longer be relative to the fundamental 
structure of our mind, but only to its superficial and acquired habits, to the contingent 
form which it derives from our bodily functions and from our lower needs.  The 
relativity of knowledge may not, then, be definitive.  By unmaking that which these 
needs have made, we may restore to intuition its original purity and so recover contact 
with the real. 
      —Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory 
 
 On October 18th, 1902, the Berlin newspaper Der Tag published a short story 
encapsulating the epistemological conflict that had animated European debates over 
the politics of aesthetics for the previous three decades.  Written by Hugo von 
Hofmannsthal, the wunderkind of the Young Vienna group, and titled simply “A 
Letter,” the story consists of an epistle from a fictional seventeenth-century poet, Lord 
Chandos, to one of the earliest Europeans to advocate scientific empiricism, Sir 
Francis Bacon.1  In the letter, Chandos explains why, to the incomprehension of 
                                                
1
 In English translation, the story is often titled “The Lord Chandos Letter.”  Bacon is often erroneously 
described as “the Father of Empiricism” for his early advocacy for the scientific method.  To give 
Bacon credit for founding empiricism, however, is to marginalize and ignore the much earlier iterations 
of the scientific method by Middle Eastern scientists, such as Ibn Al-Haythm, and perpetuate the racist 
ideologies of a European cultural parthenogenesis.  Hence Bacon is more accurately described as one of 
the first Europeans to advocate scientific empiricism.    
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friends such as Bacon, he has given up writing and retired to semi-seclusion on his 
estate while still a young man.  This social and literary paralysis has been brought on, 
he writes, by the progressive collapse of his relationship with language.  Chandos 
describes how he gradually found himself unable to discuss general matters because 
“the abstract words which the tongue must enlist as a matter of course in order to bring 
out an opinion disintegrated in [his] mouth like rotten mushrooms.”  He recounts his 
amazement when, while rebuking his daughter for telling a lie and trying to impress 
upon her the virtues of honesty, “the ideas flowing into [his] mouth suddenly took on 
such iridescent hues and merged into each other to such a degree that [he] had to make 
an effort to sputter to the end of [his] sentence, as if [he] had fallen ill” (121).  This 
condition has progressed so far, Chandos writes, that when seeing the title of one of 
his own books, he “did not even perceive [the title] right away as a familiar image 
made of words strung together, but was able to understand it only by taking it one 
word at a time,” as if he had never seen this combination of words before (118).   
 Chandos’ crisis of language, his inability to understand or assent even to basic 
propositions (such as “this matter turned out well or badly” or “Sheriff N. is a bad 
person”), is in fact a crisis of perception. 
Once I saw through a magnifying glass that an area of skin on my little finger 
looked like an open field with furrows and hollows.  That was how it was for 
me now with people and their affairs.  I could no longer grasp them with the 
simplifying gaze of habit.  Everything came to pieces, the pieces broke into 
more pieces, and nothing could be encompassed by one idea.  Isolated words 
swam about me; they turned into eyes that stared at me and into which I had to 
stare back, dizzying whirlpools which spun around and around and led into the 
void.  (122)   
  3 
What pitches Chandos into this void of perceptual disintegration is his loss of the 
“simplifying gaze of habit.”  Habit, in this case, means much more than mere routine.  
Charged with a half-century of use by the new sciences of consciousness, habit here 
denotes the semiotic norms of perception that shape and organize sense experience.  
Having lost these habits of perception, Chandos finds himself overwhelmed by the 
great blooming, buzzing confusion of sensations unordered and unmediated by social 
norms.  Consequently, he can neither write nor communicate his experiences to the 
people around him, for to do so requires assent to those social norms as the basis for 
communication in language.2  The absence of habit’s simplifying gaze socially isolates 
Chandos and begins to dissolve his identity in an ecstatic, involuntary, and 
incommunicable chaos of sensations.  Lord Chandos, in short, is condemned to 
wander alone among the vertiginous landscape of forces revealed by the emergence of 
cognitive science in the latter half of the nineteenth century.      
 
Confining Enlightenment 
 At the dawn of the nineteenth century, the grand vista of universal reason 
dreamt of in the Enlightenment was in the process of disintegrating into the cramped 
perspectives of particular, limited, and fragile ways of apprehending the world.  In 
part, this disintegration resulted from the powerful challenges to Enlightenment 
thought presented by Romanticism in philosophy and the arts as well as the 
catastrophic collapse of French Revolutionary efforts to erect a state on universal 
rational principles into the bloodshed and mass executions of the Terror.  Equally, 
however, the Enlightenment aspiration to the orderly explanation and description of 
                                                
2
 I pass over here the irony that he communicates this condition quite precisely and poetically in the 
letter itself.  As Kovach points out, Hofmannsthal slyly acknowledges this irony by having Chandos 
repeatedly declare that he can no longer write in Latin or English or Italian or Spanish while 
conspicuously leaving out German (Kovach 91).   
  4 
the world through the application of universal reason began to be undermined by the 
nineteenth-century scientific studies that sought to realize those ambitions.  By 
analyzing the dynamics of the body using new methods and techniques, these studies 
scientifically demonstrated the constraints of human sensory perception with 
unprecedented focus.  In 1800, for example, Wilhelm Herschel discovered the 
existence of light outside the spectrum visible to human sight. There soon followed an 
explosion of experiments on sense organs and the nervous system in the wake of this 
revolutionary demonstration of heretofore unimagined limits in human sensory 
apprehension.  In 1833, Johannes Müller began publishing his Elements of Physiology, 
which elaborated his theory of the law of specific nerve energies: the principle that 
different qualities of sensation result not from different types of stimuli but from the 
neural pathways through which a given stimulus is processed.
3
  In 1850, Müller’s 
student, Hermann von Helmholtz, made the astonishing discovery that the nervous 
system does not process stimuli simultaneously; on average, Helmholtz revealed, 
nervous tissue transmits impulses at the surprisingly slow pace of about 100 miles per 
hour (Boden 107).  Helmholtz followed up this discovery by devising the 
opthalmoscope in order to make the first detailed examination of the inside of the 
retina.  He found that the retina could be divided into two zones: a dense patchwork of 
photoreceptor cells grouped into the fovea—which processes a narrowly 
circumscribed area of a visual field into detailed, definitely colored images—and a 
much sparser set of cells grouped around the fovea—which produces our vague, 
washed-out but highly movement-sensitive peripheral vision.  As Jonathan Crary 
observes, Helmholtz’s discovery demolished classical perspective, suggesting that its 
conal-field of homogenous and stable clarity was in fact compounded of multiple, 
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 So, for example, electricity applied to the optic nerve will produce a sensation of light even in the 
absence of visible light.   
  5 
separate moments of vision, synthesized in the act of perception (290-1).  Similarly, 
Helmholtz’s next study, On the Sensations of Tone, revealed that most simple musical 
tones (with the exception of those produced by tuning forks) are in fact chords, 
composed of a fundamental tone and what Helmholtz called upper partials—
supplementary tones at higher frequencies whose distribution produces the timbre that 
defines a particular tone, its tendency to sound like a harp or human voice.  Taken 
together, these and similar studies revolutionized prevailing notions of sensation and 
perception.  In place of the understandings of sense experience as relatively stable in 
the Enlightenment era, nineteenth-century neuroscience substituted a set of theories 
suggesting that sensory perception was capable of apprehending only a narrow range 
of the forces at work in the world; that it produced a given type of sensation 
irrespective of the type of stimuli that caused it; that it was not simultaneous but rather 
subject to a time-lag; and that it was composed of fragmentary, compound sensations 
synthesized by consciousness.     
 As the physics of perception confronted Victorian scientists with the 
vertiginous prospect of the mind’s attenuated, contingent apprehension of the world, 
many of these scientists took up the task of what Crary calls “reality maintenance”: the 
effort to account for the apparent predictability and coherence of sensory perception 
and consciousness (15).  They did so by supplementing the physics of perception with 
a semiotics.  Helmholtz, for example, was only one of the many Victorian scientists 
arguing that consciousness treats sensations as signs.  According to Helmholtz’s 
theory of “unconscious inferences,” consciousness interprets sensations, 
unconsciously inferring whole objects or events from fragmentary sense data on the 
basis of the regularity of phenomena.
4
  Although the sense-data provided to 
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 Helmholtz specifically argues that these sensory signs are not images—if their relation to their 
objective-referents is not quite arbitrary, they are also emphatically non-mimetic.  Mimesis would imply 
  6 
consciousness are always partial and contingent, Helmholtz argues that the semiotics 
of perception enables us to obtain stable knowledge of the world.  Thus, he writes in 
“The Facts in Perception” that “even though our sensations are, in their quality, only 
signs whose special type depends completely on our organization, they are nonetheless 
not to be dismissed as empty appearance; rather, they are precisely signs of something, 
be it something that is enduring or occurring, and, what is most important, they can 
delineate for us the law of this occurring” (348).   
 More generally, Victorian scientists evolved semiotics of perception very 
similar to Helmholtz’ unconscious inferences by adapting the psychology of 
association.  The psychology of association—in which one conceives of objects and 
events by bundling similar or contiguously experienced sensations together—had been 
especially predominant in British studies of consciousness since David Hartley’s 
Observations on Man appeared in 1749.  Victorian associationism, however, differed 
from earlier models of association in two important respects.  First, while Hume had 
suggested in passing that the principle of association is at work in signification, 
Victorian associationists much more explicitly and emphatically conceived of 
association as a semiotics of perception (Hume 64-5).  C.S. Peirce, who evolved his 
argument that all thought proceeds by signs in reference to Victorian theories of 
semiotic perception, illustrates this shift nicely in “Some Consequences of the Four 
Incapacities.”  
The association of ideas is said to proceed according to three principles—those 
of resemblance, of contiguity, and of causality. But it would be equally true to 
say that signs denote what they do on the three principles of resemblance, 
contiguity, and causality. There can be no question that anything is a sign of 
                                                                                                                                       
that the world they signify can be apprehended in and by itself, whereas we can only know the world 
through the signs provided by our senses.  See Science and Culture 347.         
  7 
whatever is associated with it by resemblance, by contiguity, or by causality.  
(80, emphasis his)      
The second important difference between Victorian associationism and its earlier 
iterations concerns the nature of sensation.  Despite their interest in the volatility of 
relations between sensations, eighteenth- and even early nineteenth-century 
associationists (such as James Mill) assumed that sensations themselves were stable 
and more or less given.  After the explosion of neuroscientific research in the middle 
of the nineteenth century, such assumptions were no longer tenable.  Consequently, 
Victorian associationists typically characterized sensations as volatile, contingent, and 
constructed.  Drawing from physiological theories that built on Müller’s law of 
specific nerve energies, Victorian associationists held that sensations were the product 
of neural habits—pathways engraved in the nervous system by repeated experiences.  
These pathways, they claimed, constituted the physical basis of association: as a 
stimulus passed through a particular neural path and became sensation, it excited the 
adjacent pathways that had been created by the stimuli habitually experienced together 
with the present stimulus (see, for example, Carpenter 343-5 and James 563).  
Victorian associationists thus conceived of neural pathways as guiding sensory 
perception on the basis of past experience.  This marriage of association psychology 
with neuroscience proved extremely influential and deeply attractive for its capacity to 
reconcile the insights of neuroscience with an account of sensory perception as much 
more stable and predictable than the new physiology initially suggested.     
 In this way, the crisis of perception initiated by the revelations of neuroscience 
led to the emergence of a scientific psychology.  In addition to the reappraisal and 
adaptation of association in light of Victorian physiology, the efforts to account for the 
apparent stability of human sense experience despite its complexity and contingency 
became the chief problem of the new field of experimental psychology.  Wilhelm 
  8 
Wundt, one of Helmholtz’s students and the founder, in 1879, of one of the first two 
experimental psychology laboratories (the other was founded the same year by 
William James), devoted the bulk of his research to this effort.  Wundt held that the 
psychology of association insufficiently explained the dynamics of sensory perception.  
While association was an important element in perception, he argued, to identify it 
with perception is to assign too large a role to memory: in association, an isolated 
sensation launches a train of memories, and these memories effectively interpret the 
sensation into an objective cause.  Association therefore cannot explain how 
consciousness negotiates a complex sensory field by combining present sensations 
into unified perceptions.
5
  Wundt terms this synthesis apperception.  Nevertheless, 
Wundt’s apperception bears broad similarities to both Victorian associationism and 
Helmholtz’s theory of unconscious inference.  Like unconscious inference and 
association, Wundt’s apperception is a mode of filling out or interpreting contingently 
apprehended stimuli, a perceptual semiotics.   
 This dissertation argues that the birth and development of neuroscience and 
experimental psychology in the latter half of the nineteenth century constitute the 
emergence of cognitive science.  In dating the origins of cognitive science to the latter 
half of the nineteenth century, I am at odds with prevailing histories of the field that 
locate the beginnings of cognitive science in the late 1930s and early 1940s or later.  
There are two primary arguments supporting this later date.  First, historians argue that 
cognitive science only begins when explanatory paradigms from cybernetics and 
computer science are applied to the study of the mind.  Margaret Boden’s magisterial 
history of the field thus defines cognitive science as the interdisciplinary study of 
“mind as machine,” but she glosses machine as, in effect, the computer (9).  Modeling 
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 See An Introduction to Psychology 80-2.  Wundt’s main target is the older version of associationism, 
but his criticisms encompass its Victorian iteration as well.   
  9 
the study of mind on AI and control theory allows cognitive scientists to conceptualize 
consciousness as a complex set of interrelated mechanisms constantly engaged in 
establishing a form of dynamic equilibrium with that consciousness’ environment.  
Although Victorian scientists did conceive of consciousness as following mechanical 
laws—to the shock and dismay of many of their contemporaries—the models and 
concepts provided by twentieth-century computer science were unimaginable to 
them.
6
  The form of mechanical explanation to which most Victorian scientists 
subscribed was drawn from Newtonian physics, whose simpler, more 
straightforwardly linear models of cause and effect limited their efforts to understand 
and explain the complex economy of faculties, forces, and feedback at work in 
cognition.  Put another way, the steam engine could not offer suggestive analogies for 
the mind in the way that a computer can; Victorian machines were just not 
complicated enough.  Hence, Boden paradoxically claims that Victorian science 
conceived of “psychology as mechanism—but not as machine” (123).         
  The second reason that the beginnings of cognitive science are typically dated 
to the mid-twentieth century hinges on what is probably the most dramatic moment in 
the history of the field: Chomsky’s review of B.F. Skinner’s Verbal Behavior.  
Chomsky’s stinging, often hilarious exposure of the fallacies and amphibolies in 
Skinner’s book doubled as a devastating critique of behaviorism. “One would 
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 Most, but not all, Victorian neuroscientists and experimental psychologists held that consciousness is 
determined by mechanical processes.  When, for example, Helmholtz and three other students declared 
their intentions to attempt the explanation of all living processes as products of physical laws, Müller 
refused to endorse this scandalous project.  James remained agnostic on this point, and Bergson’s 
Matter and Memory relentlessly attacks purely mechanistic psychology.  Publicly advocating the 
mechanistic theory of mind could even be seen as politically dangerous.  Hence, when Ivan Sechenov 
called for a psychology based on physics in his 1868 essay, “The Reflexes of the Brain,” Tsarist censors 
deemed the essay subversive and refused to allow its republication in the widely read, non-specialist 
journal, Sovremennik (see Roger Smith 94-112).  By the latter part of the century, however, many 
scientists had become unabashed mechanists.  T. H. Huxley and William Kingdon Clifford, for 
example, argued not only that consciousness is subject to physical laws, but, notoriously, that 
consciousness itself is merely an accidental by-product of physical processes, an epiphenomenon.  See 
Huxley 199-250 and “Right and Wrong: The Scientific Grounds of Their Distinction” 300-339.          
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naturally expect,” he wrote, “that prediction of the behavior of a complex organism (or 
machine) would require, in addition to information about external stimulation, 
knowledge of the internal structure of the organism, the ways in which it processes 
input information and organizes its own behavior. These characteristics of the 
organism are in general a complicated product of inborn structure, the genetically 
determined course of maturation, and past experience” (Chomsky 49).  Behaviorism’s 
narrow focus on stimulus and response, Chomsky argued, paid far too little attention 
to the role of the organism’s innate structure, and consequently, its representation of 
the human mind was nothing less than a grotesque caricature.
7
 These charges helped 
form cognitive scientists’ sense of their field; this self-definition, therefore, 
incorporated the idea of a sharp break with behaviorist psychology.  Victorian 
neuroscience and scientific psychology—with their emphasis on the role played by 
habit in both sensory perception and language and their fascination with the power of 
environments to shape consciousness—laid the groundwork for the rise of 
behaviorism, which quickly came to dominate psychology in the first half of the 
twentieth century, at least within the United States.  Since the Victorian sciences of 
mind thus contributed to behaviorism, and also since behaviorism intervened between 
late nineteenth-century experimental psychology and twentieth-century cognitive 
psychology, a consensus emerged that cognitive science only comes into existence as 
a field of study in the middle of the twentieth century.    
   Nevertheless, Victorian neuroscience and psychology constitute the first 
systematic and experiment-driven attempts to study cognition scientifically in Europe 
and the United States.  If cybernetics and AI were still well beyond the horizon, three 
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 Behaviorists maintained that innate structure simply could not be studied satisfactorily given the 
limited technologies of observation available. Chomsky held that innate structure could be induced 
without comprehensive knowledge of that structure’s neurophysiological foundations, as in his theory 
of generative grammar.    
  11 
of the seven core disciplines in cognitive science—experimental psychology, 
philosophy, and neuroscience—were already in place.
8
  Moreover, these disciplines’ 
analyses tacitly suggested that a full account of cognition would require attention to 
the effects of language and culture; Victorian sciences of mind thus anticipated the 
inclusion of linguistics and anthropology as the remaining two core disciplines in 
twentieth-century cognitive science.  Further, if their physics remained broadly 
Newtonian, not all Victorian scientists conceived of cognition in the atomized, simple-
cause-and-effect terms of eighteenth-century associationism.  Wundt, we have seen, 
criticized associationism on just those grounds.  As I argue in more detail in chapters 
3-5, many Victorian writers and scientists conceived of sensory-perception as a 
dynamic process of exchange and transformation in ways that look forward to the 
feedback loops of twentieth-century control theory.  Indeed, Bergson, attacking the 
associationist figure of the train of thought, urged that the act of perception should be 
understood as a circuit (Matter and Memory 104).  Additionally, while Victorian 
neuroscientific psychology did evolve into behaviorism in the United States, it paid far 
more attention to innate structure.  While the emphasis on neural habits seemed to 
accord an enormous shaping power to environment and experience, these habits were 
also held to be inheritable, as I explain below.  In that sense, Victorian scientists 
understood neural habits as both the product of individual experience and an innate 
structure shaping that experience.  If the Victorian sciences of mind are not, strictly 
speaking, identical to modern cognitive science, they defined some of the basic 
parameters of the field; modern cognitive science is unthinkable without them.  I 
therefore use the term Victorian cognitive science throughout this dissertation.   
                                                
8
 Philosophy played a large role in Victorian neuroscience and psychology, before disciplinary 
boundaries began to harden under the pressure of the increasing professionalization of scientific and 
academic work.  Many neuroscientists and psychologists, such as Helmholtz and G.H. Lewes, saw their 
scientific work as a form of philosophy.  Wundt and James both held positions as professors of 
philosophy while working in psychology.   
  12 
 In many ways, Victorian cognitive science could be described as the scientific 
continuation of Kant’s philosophical project in the Critique of Pure Reason.  Kant’s 
epistemological gambit—to preserve the validity of science and Reason by ceding the 
unknowability of a noumenal realm of things-in-themselves in order to elaborate the 
rules structuring the phenomenal realm of human perception—paid off substantially in 
the nineteenth century, as neuroscience appeared to scientifically confirm just this 
distinction.  Many Victorian scientists saw their own projects as Kantian, or at least as 
building on Kantian arguments.  Helmholtz understood his and Müller’s scientific 
research as “the empirical exposition of the theoretical discussion of Kant on the 
nature of the intellectual process of the human mind” (Handbuch der Physiologischen 
Optik 249, quoted in Boden 98).  There were, however, important differences between 
Kant’s idealist philosophical project and this empirical exposition.  For Kant, sensory 
perception takes place in three stages of synthesis.  First, the synthesis of apprehension 
in intuition differentiates a perceptual field, fixing manifolds in time and space.  Then, 
the synthesis of reproduction in imagination organizes the manifold into an image and 
brings it into a tacit, unreflective relation to previous, associated images.  Finally, the 
synthesis of recognition applies a concept to the image, thus formalizing its relation to 
its associates and cognizing it.  These three stages of synthesis form the basis of what 
Kant calls the transcendental unity of apperception—the synthesis of appearances into 
one common experience according to universal laws by a unified consciousness.  As 
Victorian neuroscience began to examine perception empirically, it at once confirmed 
the bulk of Kant’s account of perception and subjected it to an important 
transformation.  The theory of neural habits that evolved from Müller’s law of specific 
nerve energy collapsed the three levels of synthesis in Kantian perception.  In this 
theory, as neural pathways process stimuli, they simultaneously differentiate a sensory 
field, organize the stimuli into sensations, revive the neural memory of those 
  13 
sensations’ associates, and interpret them into something like unified concepts.  
Helmholtz suggests in “The Facts in Perception” that the resolution of Kant’s a priori 
conditions of perception into identified and analyzed physical processes constituted 
the most important advance in nineteenth-century neuroscience.  As Helmholtz rightly 
discerns, however, this scientific advance radically undermined the transcendental 
unity of apperception and Kantian metaphysics (“The Facts in Perception” 364).    
 In effect, neuroscientific psychology demolished Kantian claims that there 
exists a universal form of perceptual experience.  By resolving Kant’s a priori 
conditions of perception into localized neural pathways created by experience, 
Victorian neuroscience implied that many aspects of perception are not universal but 
contingent and relative.  Kant himself recognized just this danger in defining the 
conditions of perception as the product of experience rather than as necessarily pre-
existing it.  
Unity of synthesis in accordance with empirical concepts would be entirely 
contingent, and were it not grounded on a transcendental ground of unity, it 
would be possible for a swarm of appearances to fill up our soul without 
experience ever being able to arise from it.  But in that case all relation of 
cognition to objects would also disappear, since the appearances would lack 
connection in accordance with universal and necessary laws, and would thus 
be intuition without thought, but never cognition, and would therefore be as 
good as nothing for us (Critique of Pure Reason 234).    
To open up the forms of perception to being defined by experience, Kant saw, would 
be to subject both perception and subjectivity to perpetual, protean redefinition.  In 
Kant’s swarm of appearances, one can glimpse the void of Lord Chandos’ madness 
lying in wait.   
  14 
 In order to ward off the threat of cognitive incoherence—which became 
omnipresent for more than just theoretical reasons as nineteenth-century Europe was 
remade by industrial modernity—Victorian neuroscientific psychologists stressed the 
foundation of neural pathways in habits.  Repeated actions and feelings were 
understood to reshape the nervous system in a way that cemented those actions and 
feelings as dispositions to respond to stimuli in a certain way unreflectively.  
Conceiving of habits as both the source and outcome of neural processes allowed 
Victorian scientists to frame neural pathways as a sort of neural bildung in line with 
Aristotelian ethics.  Again and again, Victorian psychologists urged that neuroscience 
confirmed the need to inculcate strong habits as a central ethical duty and educational 
mission.  “The great thing, then, in all education,” wrote William James, “is to make 
our nervous system our ally instead of our enemy…For this we must make automatic 
and habitual, as early as possible, as many useful actions as we can, and guard against 
the growing into ways that are likely to be disadvantageous to us, as we should guard 
against the plague” (James 122, emphasis his).
9
  More importantly, however, Victorian 
psychologists, drawing from Lamarckian models of “soft inheritance,” also claimed 
that neural habits were passed on from one generation to the next (Carpenter 342).  
This claim suggested that the experiences of one’s forebears determined a vast portion 
of mental life.  “All sensations, perceptions, emotions, volitions,” wrote G.H. Lewes, 
“are partly connate, partly acquired; partly the evolved products of the accumulated 
experiences of ancestors, and partly of the accumulated experiences of the individual, 
when each of these have left residua in the modifications of the [nervous] structure” 
(Problems of Life and Mind 111).  Many Victorian writers and critics, eager to posit a 
foundation for the cultural coherence of European nations, seized on this claim that 
neural pathways are inheritable.  Walter Bagehot, for example, saw “the transmitted 
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nerve element” as “the ‘connective tissue’ of civilization…the continuous force which 
binds age to age” (Physics and Politics 8).  This transmitted nerve element thus 
substituted for Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception throughout the latter half of 
the nineteenth century, serving as the theoretical foundation for a shared sense of 
reality, even if that sense was only shared amongst a particular class, national, or racial 
group.   In effect, Victorian scientists and writers enlisted neural habits as a 
circumscribed sensus communis. 
 
The Politics of Cognitive Aesthetics 
 The neuroscientific theory of sensus communis radically redefined the politics 
of aesthetics in the late Victorian period.  Aesthetics in the nineteenth-century was 
already understood to play an indispensable role in the functioning of the modern 
liberal state precisely because of its capacity to strengthen and develop common sense 
as well as individual subjectivity.  In Culture and the State, Lloyd and Thomas trace 
the definitive emergence of this role back to Kant. 
For Kant, common sense, as the universal substrate of human reason, is the 
foundation equally of the aesthetic and the public sphere.  For this reason, 
aesthetic judgments, which both develop in themselves as taste develops and 
ground the ethical disinterest of the public sphere, constitute a kind of 
precursor to any possible politics, insofar as any social contract which will 
assume the participation of autonomous…citizens demands equally their prior 
ethical formation.  (5) 
Schiller built on these often tacit arguments in Kantian aesthetic theory to articulate 
the first formal manifesto of the arts’ ethico-political mission—to reaffirm full 
subjectivity and common sense in the face of the social and psychic fragmentation 
resulting from modernity by providing citizens with an aesthetic education.  In the 
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wake of the Hyde Park riots and the Second Reform Bill, Matthew Arnold’s Culture 
and Anarchy infused this mission with new urgency for Victorian culture, invoking the 
power of aesthetic culture to resist the accelerating atomization of British society by 
binding Britons together into a state reflecting their best selves.   
 As Linda Dowling has demonstrated, however, the nineteenth-century 
understandings of aesthetic education and the political crises it supposedly mitigates 
rehearse the earlier epistemological dilemma at the origins of the liberal state in 
Britain.  According to Dowling, Locke’s argument in the Essay that consciousness 
begins as a tabula rasa, awaiting the inscriptions of experience, constituted the 
epistemological concomitant of the foundational democratic principle of isonomia—
the proposition that all men are created equal and therefore are equal before the law.  
While Lockean epistemology thus provided crucial support for Whig governance after 
the Glorious Revolution of 1688, it also suggested that all social values are contingent, 
merely a matter of whatever happens to be inscribed on a particular mind’s blank slate.  
“According to Mr. Locke,” the Earl of Shaftesbury complained in a letter, virtue has 
“no other measure, law, or rule than fashion and custom…And thus neither right nor 
wrong, virtue nor vice, are anything in themselves; nor is there any trace or idea of 
them naturally imprinted on human minds.  Experience and our catechism teach us 
all!” (Shaftesbury 404).  While Locke’s account of consciousness was necessary to the 
emerging liberal state in Britain, it thus also appeared to unmoor that state from any 
traditions or values that might provide it with an enduring moral justification.  As 
Dowling explains, Shaftesbury attempted to resolve this dilemma by evolving a theory 
of a moral-aesthetic sensus communis—a set of innate moral feelings allowing us to 
make ethical judgments with all the immediacy of aesthetic response.  Shaftesbury’s 
theory of a moral-aesthetic sense, later taken up by Kant and Schiller and thence 
passed on to Victorian critics, became the implicit basis of what Dowling calls 
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aesthetic democracy—the complex set of nineteenth-century discourses and 
institutions founded on belief in the egalitarianism of taste and the efficacy of aesthetic 
education as a means of social reform (see Dowling 1-24).   
 The emergence of Victorian cognitive science transformed the underlying 
epistemological ground of aesthetic democracy.  Neuroscience convincingly 
demonstrated that sensory experience was neither immediate nor universal.  
Neuroscientists also claimed, however, that we do enter the world with some ideas 
“naturally imprinted” on our minds.  G.H. Lewes, for example, held that, because of 
the neural pathways we inherit from our forebears, Locke was wrong to claim that 
consciousness begins as a blank slate.       
The sensitive mechanism is not a simple mechanism, and as such constant, but 
a variable mechanism, which has a history.  What the senses inscribe on it, are 
not merely the changes of the external world, but these characters are 
commingled with those of preceding inscriptions.  The sensitive subject is no 
tabula rasa.  It is not a blank sheet of paper but a palimpsest.” (Problems of 
Life and Mind 149, emphasis in original) 
Victorian arguments that the mind is a palimpsest rather than a tabula rasa seemed to 
resolve Shaftesbury’s dilemma.  If consciousness is a palimpsest, social values—
common ways of apprehending and judging the world—are not the mere contingent 
product of individual experience but are in fact inscribed in the mind as neural 
pathways with which we begin life and which can never be entirely effaced.  Victorian 
neuroscience thus appeared to confirm Shaftesbury’s theory of a moral-aesthetic sense 
held in common.  Equally, however, it demolished the universality of the moral-
aesthetic sense.  If, as Lewes suggests, our sensory faculties are not constant but 
variable, if they have a history, then any moral-aesthetic common sense is 
conventional, a product of culture rather than its ground.   
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 Victorian cognitive science thus shaped nineteenth-century understandings of 
culture, in the sense of both the sphere and mission of the arts and the set of practices 
that define a given society or social group.  The theory of neural pathways suggested 
that sensory phenomena vary according to the arrangement of nervous channels that 
process stimuli.  Therefore, members of different groups, whose neural habits have 
resulted from different experiences and inherited pathways, actually experience the 
world in different ways.  Neural pathways were thus thought to define a community on 
the basis of common sensory responses and norms of perception that are re-shaped 
over time; in effect, Victorian cognitive scientists provided the foundation for a 
cognitive theory of culture.
10
  In The Long Revolution, Raymond Williams invokes 
very similar theories in order to argue for a more expansive definition of culture as 
encompassing sensory-perceptions, which are not given but constructed.    
The central fact of this new account of the activity of our brains is that each 
one of us has to learn to see…There is no reality of familiar shapes, colours, 
and sounds, to which we merely open our eyes.  The information that we 
receive through our senses from the material world around us has to be 
interpreted, according to certain human rules, before what we ordinarily call 
‘reality’ forms…The evolution of the human brain, and then the particular 
interpretations carried by particular cultures, give us certain ‘rules’ or 
‘models,’ without which no human being can ‘see’ in the ordinary sense at all.  
In each individual, the learning of these rules, through inheritance and culture, 
is a kind of creation, in that the distinctively human world, the ordinary 
‘reality’ that his culture defines, forms only as the rules are learned.  Particular 
cultures carry particular versions of reality, which they can be said to create, in 
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efforts underway in race science to theorize racial difference in the name of white supremacy.  Chapter 
2 deals with this overlap between Victorian cognitive and race sciences in more detail.    
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the sense that cultures carrying different rules (though on a common basis of 
the evolved human brain) create their own worlds which their bearers 
ordinarily experience.  (34, emphasis in original)        
Although Williams writes that these conclusions follow from “new” accounts of brain 
activity in 1961, the scientific claims he draws from and the conclusions about culture 
that follow are already fully developed in late Victorian cognitive science and 
literature.  All of the writers that I examine in this dissertation anticipate Williams’ 
understanding of culture as a shaping force at work in fundamental cognitive and 
sensory processes, and they likewise recognized that this common sense had to be 
made.     
 The relentless transformations of industrial modernity in nineteenth-century 
Europe—the explosive growth of cities and a deracinated laboring class; the 
intensification of imperialist colonization in the search for markets and raw materials; 
the expansion of voting rights and political liberalism; the increasing commodification 
of objects and relationships; the emergence of mass literacy and mass culture—
rendered this recognition that common sense must be made particularly acute and 
anxious in the late Victorian period.  “Today,” Wilhelm Dilthey intoned gloomily in 
1887, “a colorful mixture of forms from all periods and peoples is breaking in upon us 
and seems to undo every delimitation of literary genres and every rule…In this 
anarchy, the artist is forsaken by rules; the critic is thrown back upon his personal 
feeling as the only remaining standard of evaluation.  The public rules.  The masses 
throng into colossal exhibition halls, theaters of all shapes and sizes, and lending 
libraries…Thus today art is becoming democratic, like everything else around us” 
(“The Imagination of the Poet” 31-2).  Dilthey, along with all the other late Victorian 
writers and critics in this study, was keenly aware that aesthetic judgments are not 
universal; that they are instead shaped by environment and inheritance; and that the 
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differential operation of these forces in any given society gives rise to different and 
competing aesthetic standards of evaluation, to different forms of common sense.  
Late Victorian writers on aesthetics thus anticipate one of the central arguments in 
Pierre Bourdieu’s critique of Kantian aesthetic judgment—that aesthetic judgments are 
determined by and in turn reinforce prevailing social hierarchies.  Indeed, the 
Victorian focus on neural habits as the determining factors in aesthetic judgments 
uncannily prefigures Bourdieu’s use of the concept of “habitus”—the “categories of 
perception and appreciation…produced by an observable social condition” that mold 
and determine aesthetic experience (101).  As the pervasive calls for aesthetic 
education in the late Victorian period attest, however, most Victorian writers and 
critics were profoundly disturbed by the fragmentation of common sense and by the 
social divisions this absence of cohesion reflected.  Molding the neural habits of the 
public thus became a central preoccupation in late Victorian literature.  
 Late Victorian attempts at such cognitive-aesthetic education inevitably 
exacerbated one of the founding tensions in modern European aesthetic theory—that 
between beauty and freedom.  While the writers in this dissertation, like Shaftesbury 
himself, saw a stable sensus communis as bolstering the liberal democratic state, they 
also—often explicitly—elevated artists into something like an aristocracy, invested 
with the power to discreetly manage the cognitive-sensory bedrock of the polis.  At 
such moments, late Victorian writers seem to conceive of aesthetic democracy as built 
on just the kind of insidious indoctrination that Terry Eagleton charges has always 
been a central mission in aesthetic theory under liberal, capitalist modernity (The 
Ideology of the Aesthetic 20).  If late Victorian writers invested themselves with such a 
noblesse oblige to mold the public’s moral-aesthetic sense, at the same time, they saw 
that common sense as radically constraining their own agency and sensory experience, 
since artists and critics could no more exempt themselves from habits of perception 
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than could the public at large.  The cognitive common sense envisaged by late 
Victorian writers limited agency and experience in two ways inconceivable within 
earlier aesthetic theory.  First, the belief that common sense inhered in habit, rather 
than in simply given, universal human faculties, suggested that aesthetic response bore 
an uncomfortable resemblance to the mechanical rhythms and routinization of 
alienated industrial labor.  This resemblance became especially troubling insofar as 
post-Romantic critics in the nineteenth-century from Ruskin to Bergson defined the 
beautiful and other forms of “true” experience against such alienated, routinized labor.  
More importantly, as Victorian cognitive science redefined Shaftesbury’s universal 
moral-aesthetic sense as the contingent set of cultural norms of perception inscribed in 
consciousness, the ways of apprehending and interpreting the world making up this 
common sense were robbed of their inevitability.  Common sense became something 
that one could imagine as other than it was.   
 Cognitive science thus suggested to Victorian writers that there were other 
ways of experiencing the world, that other people might have access to a form of 
sensory experience utterly different from one’s own, and that one could, with the 
proper care, open up one’s own senses to such different forms of experience.  Indeed, 
if people outside one’s own social background did experience the world differently, 
then opening up one’s senses might even be an ethical duty with a claim equal to that 
of participating in the sensus communis defining one’s immediate social environment.  
No Victorian writer grasped these implications better than Walter Pater.  Pater, in the 
infamous conclusion to The Renaissance, argued that perceptual habits cause one to 
pass over the radical uniqueness of each moment of sensory experience and therefore 
declared that forming habits of perception amounted to a failure to grasp the aesthetic 
richness of life.  After his scandalized contemporaries charged that his aesthetic 
philosophy undermined the basis of ethics in habits and common sense, Pater, 
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defending his aesthetic program in Marius the Epicurean, appealed to the moral value 
of attending to other ways of experiencing the world; any prevailing common aesthetic 
standard, his protagonist Marius reflects, might be “but one form of poetic 
beauty…but one voice, in a world where there were many voices it would be a moral 
weakness not to listen to” (49).  Pater was not the only late Victorian to glimpse the 
fascinating possibility of a sensory experience outside the constraints of normative 
habits.  In my epigraph from Matter and Memory, for example, Bergson gives rein to a 
daring speculation that by evading or transcending those habits, we might be able to 
leap over the phenomenal world of appearances and apprehend the noumenal realm of 
things-in-themselves.  While they do not go as far as Bergson and Pater, George Eliot, 
Thomas Hardy, Wilhelm Dilthey, and Vernon Lee all envision similar possibilities of 
what this dissertation calls the negative liberty of perception.
11
  All of these writers 
also recognized, however, that to completely unmoor consciousness from the 
perceptual habits of common sense would be to give oneself over to a bewildering 
tumult of sensations that would become Lord Chandos’ madness in 1902. 
 Consequently, late Victorian aesthetic theory, as it wrestles with the theories 
and findings of cognitive science, is characterized by two contradictory efforts—to 
participate in and mold common sense as the foundation of an aesthetic democracy 
and to assert the negative liberty of perception.   I argue that without attention to these 
contradictory efforts, we cannot fully account for several of the most important literary 
texts, events, and movements of the late Victorian period, including Daniel Deronda, 
George Eliot’s aesthetics of sympathy and her late turn to Zionism; The Return of the 
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literary Romanticism to imagine a capacity for enriched perception.  Wordsworth, for example, writes 
in “Tintern Abbey” of “all the mighty world/ Of Eye and ear, both what they half-create,/ And what 
perceive” (134).  For Wordsworth, however, there remains a clear distinction between perception itself 
and the act of creation that transforms it by charging it with significance.  Victorian cognitive science 
rendered such a distinction meaningless—it convincingly demonstrated that all acts of perception, even 
those remaining within the norms of common sense, entail such creative mental supplementation.   
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Native and Thomas Hardy’s decision to stop writing novels after the scandals 
occasioned by his work in the 1890s; and, above all, the Aesthetic Movement, 
especially the outrage that greeted Walter Pater’s The Renaissance and his response in 
Marius the Epicurean.  In addition, I suggest that an analysis of this tension in the 
politics of aesthetics in the late Victorian period meaningfully contributes to recent 
critical efforts to reassess the dynamics and legacy of liberalism in Victorian literature 
and culture.  One of the central concerns in these efforts has been the Victorian 
concept of detachment—a form of agency that aspires to the transcendence or 
bracketing of a purely subjective or culturally determined perspective on the world in 
the service of criticism and reflection—and the ways in which critical detachment 
must always remain partly within the horizons of common institutions and forms of 
communication (see Anderson and Thomas).  By analyzing the tension between the 
negative liberty of perception and the imperatives of common sense in late Victorian 
understandings of aesthetic democracy, this study aims to provide a thickly described 
case study of liberalism and detachment in Victorian culture.    
Chapters 2 and 3 are case studies of how cognitive science shapes the aesthetic 
theories governing two major late Victorian novels.  Chapter 2, “Raising National 
Unconsciousness: Neural Writing and Sympathy in Daniel Deronda,” reads George 
Eliot’s ethic of sympathy as an attempt to resolve this conflict.  As she elaborates her 
concept of sympathy in her early novels, Eliot employs a trope of neural writing, 
where the meaning of a representation of another’s experience is “printed in the subtle 
fibers of our nerves.”  More than just a simple appeal to empiricism, Eliot’s trope 
refers to G. H. Lewes’ claims that consciousness is a palimpsest of neural channels 
inscribed in the body by individual and ancestral experiences.  While these neural 
habits delimit and determine cognitions and sensations, Eliot suggests that 
consciousness can be rewritten by sympathy, which reflectively reinterprets—and 
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thereby reshapes—experience.  Eliot therefore makes the expansion of her readers’ 
sympathy the primary aesthetic goal and ethical justification of her early novels.  
However, in the wake of the Second Reform Bill and the collapse of the first 
Gladstone ministry, Eliot came to believe that sympathy too easily altered the mind, 
eroding the foundations of culture and deliberate social and moral action.  
Consequently, Eliot’s final novel, Daniel Deronda, seeks to ground sympathy in a 
racial community defined by common neural traits inscribed deeply enough to 
withstand diaspora.  In striving to render neural habits less alterable, however, Eliot 
finds herself widening the psychic split between cognitive norms and volitional 
awareness, leading to the novel’s various forms of double consciousness.   
While sympathy initially makes possible the negative liberty of perception for 
Eliot, sympathy is made impossible for the negative liberty of perception as Thomas 
Hardy envisions it.  Chapter 3, “Reading in the Dark: Sensory Perception and Agency 
in The Return of the Native,” argues that Hardy’s novel draws from Victorian 
experimental psychology to elaborate a theory of what Hardy calls the beauty of 
association.  As opposed to the beauty of form, Hardy claims, the beauty of 
association accommodates the communal aesthetic values that spring from long-
established traditions of social life.  However, Hardy’s novel also identifies associative 
perception as a means of transfiguring conventional perceptions—an act of 
aesthetically re-envisioning accepted reality that, according to Hardy, distinguishes his 
own novels from “realism.”  Associative perception in Hardy’s novel thus widens the 
rift between the heath’s “natives”—who unreflectively respond to sensations in accord 
with long-established associations—and the more worldy figures, such as Clym 
Yeobright and Eustacia—who press association into the service of perceptual agency 
and autonomy.  Moreover, Hardy’s novel registers a deep anxiety that, while 
associative perception makes authorship possible for him, it also enables his readers to 
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transfigure his texts regardless of his intended meanings.  I argue that these concerns 
shape Hardy’s subsequent reactions to the critical and public uproar over Tess and 
Jude in the 1890s, and influence his decision to stop writing novels.   
Chapters 4 and 5 analyze the role of cognitive science in the theories, debates, 
and controversies that defined the British Aesthetic Movement.  Chapter 4, “Beautiful 
Graffiti: Vernon Lee, Wilhelm Dilthey, and the Democratization of Art,” argues that 
Lee and Dilthey undertake parallel efforts in the 1880s to elaborate a neuroscientific 
theory of aesthetic response.  Lee’s Belcaro and Juvenilia and Dilthey’s “The 
Imagination of the Poet” seek to contain chaotic, solipsistic forms of perception—
which they associate with modernization and mass culture—that, in the manner of 
graffiti, write-over art objects with private perceptual interpretations in defiance of 
common sense and artistic intention alike.  In opposition to these acts of aesthetic 
vandalism, Lee and Dilthey envision an aesthetic polity in which a stable sensus 
communis is forged and managed by the secret shaping hands of an artistic aristocracy, 
under whose tutelage the public receives an aesthetic education in common norms of 
feeling and perception without being aware of it.  In Lee’s essays, however, this vision 
of an aesthetic managed society is in tension with an alternative valorization of 
aesthetic graffiti as a means of resisting or deflecting the perceptual influence of 
artworks and thus retaining aesthetic autonomy and privacy.   
Chapter 5, “Unchained Harmony: Walter Pater’s Ethics of Influence,” argues 
that the public controversy incited by The Renaissance stemmed from that text’s 
apparent advocacy of an absolute negative liberty of perception, without reference to 
ethical norms or social repercussions.  Pater’s declaration that habit merely limits 
experience and is therefore a kind of failure in life shocked the broad Victorian 
consensus that perceptual habits formed the basis of shared moral and aesthetic values.  
Consequently, in “The School of Giorgione,” “The Child in the House,” and Marius 
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the Epicurean, Pater attempts to accommodate the ethical imperatives of common 
sense without sacrificing the aesthete’s commitment to give himself over to all the 
teeming, unique sensory details that escape the perceptual norms guiding common 
sense experience.  He does so, I argue, by drawing from neuroscientific studies of 
music and sound to develop a model of perceptual synthesis based on harmony, in 
which one spontaneously brings a particular sense experience into relation with 
common representations of that experience while also maintaining an awareness of its 
concretely distinct features.   
“Uncommon Sense” thus demonstrates the crucial role of cognitive science in 
late Victorian literature and culture, arguing for renewed attention to the ongoing 









RAISING NATIONAL UNCONSCIOUSNESS:  
NEURAL WRITING AND SYMPATHY IN DANIEL DERONDA 
 
 According to George Eliot, what elevates humanity above the narrow egotism 
of the “brutes” is the “sense of a corporate existence,” the modern form of which is 
national consciousness.  This sense of collective identity, she writes in “The Modern 
Hep! Hep! Hep!,” is a “humanizing, elevating habit of mind” that inspires sacrifices of 
self-centered ends for the sake of “spiritual ends, ends which consist not in immediate 
material possession, but in the satisfaction of a great feeling that animates the 
collective body as with one soul…It is this living force of sentiment in common which 
makes a national consciousness” (144, 156, 146-7).  The feeling of national belonging, 
Eliot suggests, is both the end of national consciousness—the object for which we 
make sacrifices—and the means by which national consciousness is made—what 
enables us to discern that there is something besides immediate gratification for us to 
set as our end in the first place.  At the same time, the choice of ends at the heart of 
national consciousness seems to depend on acts below the threshold of reflective 
volition: feelings and habits.  In fact, the relationship between national feeling and 
humanity in general here curiously echoes passages elsewhere in Eliot’s work that 
focus specifically on children and their affective relationships with the landscapes in 
which they grow up, affective relationships that are forged without “the labour of 
choice” (The Mill on the Floss 151).  Eliot’s “humanizing, elevating habit of mind” 
here recalls the famous passage in Daniel Deronda in which the narrator contends that 
a human life “should be well rooted in some spot of native land…a spot where the 
definiteness of early memories may be inwrought with affection, and kindly 
acquaintance with all neighbours, even to the dogs and donkeys, may spread not by 
 28 
sentimental effort and reflection, but as a sweet habit of the blood” (22).  Our “habit of 
mind” is of course a step up from the child’s “sweet habit of the blood,” but Eliot’s 
suggestion that national consciousness is constituted by a “habit,” an act that straddles 
the line between being conscious and being unconscious, raises the question of 
whether national consciousness is, in her thinking, properly conscious at all.   
 This tension in Eliot’s thought between a corporate identity based on a fully 
reflective volition and one based on semi-conscious feeling informs a broad swath of 
critical writing about the dynamics of collective belonging in Eliot’s work.  In 
Suzanne Graver’s literary sociological analysis, for example, community has a 
contradictory status in Eliot’s work as at once fact—the object of empirico-scientific 
cognition—and value—an affectively held ideal, while for Terry Eagleton, George 
Eliot’s communities represent the uneasy conjunction of collectivist Romantic 
ideologies of rural organicism with the individualist ideologies of liberalism, scientific 
rationalism, and “incipient feminism” (Criticism and Ideology 111-3).  Perhaps the 
most suggestive recent treatment of this tension is Amanda Anderson’s reading of 
Daniel Deronda as simultaneously both a sustained meditation on “the possibility and 
need for self-reflective and dialogical affirmations of cultural heritage” and an 
expression of “Eliot’s not fully relinquished dream of a reflective return to a kind of 
prereflective cultural embeddedness” that plays into ethnic nationalism, “the most 
dangerous doctrines of modern times” (138, 137).  Anderson’s reading here reflects 
the broad consensus that Eliot’s work, like her life, is marked by a strain between, on 
the one hand, her cosmopolitan affiliations and her defiant liberation from 
conventionality, emblematized by her common-law marriage with G.H. Lewes, and, 
on the other hand, her nostalgic, “not fully relinquished dream” of a return to the rural 
English midlands community of her youth.    
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 The tendentiousness of this distinction should by now be clear; it’s rarely to 
celebrate Eliot’s nostalgic feeling that critics distinguish between those feelings and 
her reflective distance.  The nearly unanimous critical privileging of Eliot’s emphasis 
on reflection over her emphasis on feeling stems from the vexed relation of feeling to 
consciousness and volition.  For Graver, Eagleton, and Anderson, the feeling of 
collective belonging in Eliot can be naïve, mystified, or prereflective, but it is always 
insufficiently conscious.  This critical position also reflects a preference for those 
aspects of Eliot’s thought generally perceived as more progressive, not the least 
important of which is the premium she places on the act of subjective detachment that 
makes critical thinking possible in the first place.   
 In this respect, contemporary critics avail themselves of a rough opposition 
between reflection and feeling in mid-Victorian culture that coded reflection as a 
mode of reform that subjects traditions to criticism and feeling as a conservative 
impulse that preserves allegiance to tradition. The most famous expression of this idea 
is, of course, Matthew Arnold’s Culture and Anarchy, which opposes Hellenism’s 
“disinterested play of consciousness upon…stock notions and habits” to a 
conservative Hebraism comprised of man’s “feeling and acting side” (165, 101).   
Eliot, like Arnold, sought to imagine an ideal balance of reflection and feeling as the 
basis for a vision of English political life that could accommodate itself to both reform 
and tradition.  Nonetheless, in Daniel Deronda, Eliot, perhaps more than Arnold, 
seems alive to the possibility that reflection and feeling, reform and tradition, might 
often prove incompatible.  The impasse that results from this incompatibility is the 
predicament in which Daniel Deronda finds himself at the beginning of Eliot’s last 
novel.  Drifting through his twenties without having discovered a social duty to give 
his life direction, Deronda suffers from the complaint of social and moral paralysis 
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typical of the mid-Victorian liberal.12  But Deronda’s penchant for liberal reflection 
threatens him not just with a loss of virility, but also with a loss of sensibility itself: 
“His imagination had so wrought itself to the habit of seeing things as they probably 
appeared to others, that a strong partisanship…had become an insincerity for him.  His 
plenteous, flexible sympathy had ended by falling into one current with that reflective 
analysis which tends to neutralize sympathy” (364).  It is hard to imagine an aspect of 
reflective analysis that would be more troubling for Eliot than a tendency to neutralize 
sympathy, the basis of her ethics, the moral justification of her writing, and an 
essential element of the feeling of collective belonging.  But if, as this passage implies, 
reflective analysis is also what enables Deronda to imagine how things probably 
appear to others, then it seems indistinguishable from sympathy.  In fact, Eliot implies 
here and elsewhere that sympathy is a version of what might be termed critical feeling.   
 This chapter explores the dynamics of feeling and reflection in Eliot’s work. I 
start by establishing the importance of Victorian physiology to Eliot’s thinking about 
the relationship between feeling and thought.  I argue that Eliot, especially in her early 
novels, constructs an ethic of sympathetic reflection by drawing from the 
neuroscientific theories of her husband, G.H. Lewes.  In a brief reading of The Mill on 
the Floss, I suggest that Eliot’s sympathetic reflection is influenced by Lewes’ ideal of 
a “vigorous thinker,” a figure who preserves her autonomy and the intensity of her 
feeling from the chaos of unregulated sensation, on the one hand, and the automation 
of thoroughly routinized feelings and acts on the other.  I then move on to Eliot’s last 
novel, Daniel Deronda, in which sympathetic reflection has become a dangerously 
abstract and universalizing force that undermines, rather than preserves, feeling.  I 
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argue that, in response to Eliot’s fears that England had become dangerously 
unmoored from its traditions in the wake of the Second Reform Bill and the collapse 
of the first Gladstone ministry, Deronda embraces a neuroscientific model of racial 
inheritance in an effort to salvage Eliot’s political ideal of liberal traditionalism.      
 
The Geography of Consciousness 
 
 In “The Natural History of German Life,” Eliot’s famous 1857 essay long read 
as an implicit manifesto for her own artistic practice, Eliot calls for “social novels” 
dedicated to tracing what she calls “the Natural History of social bodies.”  These 
social novels would undertake to represent the social groups based on the inductive 
method of direct observation, taking their subjects from “life” instead of “idyllic 
literature,” and thus teaching us “to feel, not for the heroic artisan or the sentimental 
peasant, but for the peasant in all his coarse apathy, and the artisan in all his suspicious 
selfishness” (290, 271).  Eliot suggests that this affective education through art is 
especially important for liberal social policies and reforms, whose appeals are 
“founded on generalizations and statistics” and thus are incapable of generating the 
moral sentiment required for systematic cooperation.  Further, the abstract ideals of 
liberalism—democratic representation, the rights of man, the rule of law—cannot by 
themselves elicit the feelings that make it possible to put, even provisionally, common 
welfare ahead of the egoistic pursuit of personal gain.  As Eliot writes in her essay on 
Young, “emotion links itself with particulars, and only in a faint and secondary 
manner with abstractions.”  Where this appears not to be the case and abstractions 
seem to be accompanied by powerful feelings, these feelings are either “humbug,” as 
in the case of Young himself, or an especially active intellect and powerful 
imagination have made it possible for the “abstract term rapidly and vividly [to call] 
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up the particulars it represents, these particulars being the true source of the emotion” 
(“Worldiness and Other-Worldliness” 371).  For Eliot, feelings must be accompanied 
by particulars acting as sources or anchors, in the form of concrete objects or that of 
particularized representations such as those that make up the Victorian novel.13   
 Eliot’s frequently voiced criticism of cosmopolitanism takes its force from this 
insistence that affect needs particular objects or representations.  She contends that 
despite the pretension of cosmopolitanism that the abstract concept of common 
humanity is sufficient to claim our emotional allegiance, affection and duty 
necessarily “radiate from a center,” and therefore “the time is not come for 
cosmopolitanism to be highly virtuous” (“The Modern Hep! Hep! Hep!” 147).  Eliot 
finds cosmopolitan childhoods, such as Gwendolyn Harleth’s in Daniel Deronda, 
particularly troubling because, in addition to cutting off the child from the objects 
accompanying the feeling of Englishness, an uprooted or excessively mobile 
childhood threatens the child’s capacity to experience feeling in general.  Unlike the 
situated child, the cosmopolitan child’s mobility prevents her from repeating her 
affective responses to the objects that surround her, and without this repetition she 
cannot develop what Eliot calls the “stored residues of passion” that are spontaneously 
accessed whenever the adult comes into contact with the same or similar objects 
(“How We Come to Give Ourselves False Testimonials and Believe in Them,” 110).  
The affective memories that make up these stores are crucial to any emotional 
encounter with a particular object since, Eliot contends in Adam Bede, “the secret of 
our emotions never lies in the bare object, but in its subtle relations to our own past” 
(Adam Bede 199).  I discuss the neuroscientific basis for Eliot’s concept of “stores” of 
                                                
13
 This alignment of the novel with the moral and affective apprehension of particulars is perhaps the 
fundamental axiom of  all Victorian fiction.   
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passion below.  I want to turn first to another repository of memory in Eliot’s writing: 
the landscape of particular objects itself. 
 The extended and detailed descriptions of the landscapes of the rural midlands 
in Eliot’s writing resemble Ruskin’s contemporary efforts to read England’s social 
history in its architecture.  Eliot’s debt to Ruskin is particularly apparent in, for 
example, the description of St. Oggs in The Mill on the Floss, whose buildings 
embody the various stages of English history like the growth of a “millennial tree” 
(115).  Eliot, however, reads English history not only in its architecture, its cathedrals 
and grand halls, but also in every place where “human labor has wrought itself into 
what one may call the speech of the landscape.”  As it turns out, this speech is 
exceptionally audible in England because England’s natural landscape lacks the 
monumental features that drown out human efforts elsewhere.  What, Eliot asks, “does 
it signify that a Lilliputian train passes over a viaduct amidst the abysses of the 
Apennines, or that a caravan laden with a nation’s offerings creeps across the 
unresting sameness of the desert, or that a petty cloud of steam sweeps for an instant 
over the face of an Egyptian colossus immovably submitting to its slow burial beneath 
the sand?”  In contrast to these monumental regions where human labor lacks 
meaning, “our woodlands and pastures, our hedge-parted corn fields and meadows, 
our bits of high common where we used to plant the windmills, our quiet little rivers 
here and there fit to turn a mill-wheel, our villages along the old coach roads, are all 
easily alterable lineaments that seem to make the face of our Motherland sympathetic 
with the laborious lives of her children.  She does not take their ploughs and wagons 
contemptuously, but rather makes every hovel and every sheepfold, every railed 
bridge or fallen-tree trunk an agreeably noticeable incident; not a mere speck in the 
midst of unmeasured vastness, but a piece of our social history in pictorial writing” 
(“Looking Backward” 24-5). 
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 Eliot seems to suggest here that social history engraves itself on the natural 
landscape like writing (or drawing) on a blank page.  Eliot would thus seem to view 
the natural landscape in England as what Jules Law has called “distributive space”: a 
“pure extension, over which particular patterns…may be traced” (113). The version of 
distributive space Law traces in Mary Kingsley’s work likewise depends on an 
analogy drawn between the landscape and language.  However, Eliot’s apparently 
natural landscapes already bear the marks of human labor.  In the passages above, not 
just deserts and mountains but also human monuments render human labor 
meaningless, while the features of the Motherland that are so amenable to 
transformation by work include villages and fields as well as woodlands and quiet 
rivers.  The Motherland in Eliot’s description finally seems less a blank page on which 
social history inscribes itself than a palimpsest, and its capacity for sympathy with 
human labor turns out to depend on a continual process of re-inscription.  And in this 
respect the landscape mirrors the theory of consciousness advanced by Eliot’s spouse, 
G.H. Lewes.   
 A polymath, Lewes attempted to explain the physiological processes 
underlying consciousness in his 1860 The Physiology of Common Life, and later used 
this analysis as the basis of a more general theory of consciousness in Problems of Life 
and Mind, the multi-volume, unfinished series in which he tried to establish a 
positivist method for metaphysical speculation.  Lewes framed The Physiology of 
Common Life as both a contribution to and a means of popularizing the burgeoning 
field of neural science.  There, Lewes argues that consciousness or mind, understood 
as encompassing thought, sensation, and volition, is not located only in the brain, but 
rather throughout the body in the nervous system.  The nervous system itself is made 
up of nerve fibers, which send out stimuli in response to received impressions, and 
nerve cells, concentrated in ganglionic centers that register and re-direct the stimuli 
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sent out by excited fibers.  Lewes treats the nervous system as an example of 
Newtonian economy; each excitation of the nerve fibers cannot terminate in itself, but 
passes along a series of nervous pathways via other Ganglia and nerve fibers and ends 
either in stimulating a muscular contraction, which Lewes calls “Reflex Action,” or in 
stimulating other, secondary sensations, which he calls “Reflex Feeling,” and most 
often in stimulating both reflex action and reflex feeling together.  Unlike reflex 
action, which absorbs the neural stimulus in a muscular contraction, reflex feeling 
passes the excitation along the pathways of the nervous systems in trains of secondary 
sensations that can ultimately reach the brain and arrest attention. Lewes emphasizes, 
however, that not all feeling is consciously experienced.  Or rather, he distinguishes 
between consciousness and attention: “to have a sensation, and to be conscious of it, 
are one and the same thing; but to have a sensation and to attend to it, are two different 
things.  Attention is the direction of the consciousness—not the consciousness itself” 
(Physiology of Common Life 52).   In fact, Lewes argues that we can only attend to one 
of a simultaneous crowd of sensations at a time.       
 While any act of perception is thus subject to these limitations of attention, 
however, our minds compensate for the inability to focus on more than one sensation 
at a time by drawing from prior experiences.  This argument is made implicitly in The 
Physiology of Common Life and directly in Problems of Life and Mind, where Lewes 
contends that when we attend to a neural excitation, we blend it in “the Perceptive 
Centre…with the residua of other excitations.”14  These residua are not deposits of 
material; rather, they are “modifications [in] the structure” of the nervous system 
produced by experience.  Residua, in other words, are the pathways of secondary 
                                                
14
 See Problems of Life and Mind, 122, 110.  Lewes argues that while we can only attend to our senses 
of an object successively, the act of perception synthesizes these successively experienced sensations.  
In this respect, perception is a miniature resolution of what Nicholas Dames has recently described as a 
crucial formal and political problem in Daniel Deronda: the need to “turn diachrony into synchrony, to 
make succession into accumulative, atemporal wholes.”  See Dames, 123-165.   
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sensation established by one’s sense of a particular object.  The neural pathways that 
are thus gradually carved out by experience become for Lewes the highways of 
sensation; once one’s sense of an object has taken a particular route, that route is an 
open channel to receive like impressions.  As these pathways accumulate and overlap 
with each other, consciousness is written and rewritten by experience, and here Lewes 
differs crucially from the classical Lockean account of consciousness insofar as for 
him, “the sensitive mechanism is not a simple mechanism, and as such constant, but a 
variable mechanism, which has a history.  What the senses inscribe on it, are not 
merely the changes of the external world, but these characters are commingled with 
those of preceding inscriptions.  The sensitive subject is no tabula rasa.  It is not a 
blank sheet of paper but a palimpsest”(149).15 
 The figure of the palimpsest evokes a non-teleological process of continual 
reinscription, but this figure is in tension with a progress narrative Lewes wants to tell 
about the development of consciousness, a narrative that also crystallizes some of the 
incoherence characterizing the Victorian opposition of feeling and reflection.  The 
growth and development of consciousness begins from a state of feeling nebulous, 
diffusive, and self-centered in the extreme.  In infancy, sensibility itself is a “chaos of 
vague sentience,” a massive and diffusive excitation without the qualitative 
distinctions made possible by defined pathways of sensation carved out within the 
nervous system.  As those pathways are established through repeated experiences, that 
chaos of sensation becomes more and more differentiated, and as consciousness makes 
those qualitative differentiations, it “projects” those defined feelings outside itself as 
objects. The development of neural pathways thus enables the simultaneous 
                                                
15
 The history of consciousness embraces more than personal experience, moreover.  Ancestral 
experiences are transmitted as a set of pathways that the infant passes through during development 
(Lewes’ account clearly draws from recapitulation theory, whose central claim was that ontogeny 
recapitulates phylogeny).  These ancestral pathways are the mental inscriptions we already bear before 
they are written over by personal experience.  See Problems of Life and Mind, 109-111 and 220-221.   
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emergence of an internal, affective order and an external, objective order, in which 
“the nebula of the external is condensed into objective phenomena, and the confused 
irradiation of Sensibility is grouped into feelings” (133, 169-70).  As the infant’s 
neural pathways are engraved, she gains mastery over the chaos of sensation and the 
object world mediated by sensation.  She also gains, according to Lewes, mastery over 
her feelings: “discriminations [of feelings and objects] are the germs of Intelligence, 
and when Intelligence itself becomes developed by the large accumulations of such 
discriminations, it reacts on the feelings, guiding them more and more, and converting 
blind Impulse into clear Volition” (128).   
 Lewes’ account of the development of neural pathways would thus seem to be 
a story of self-mastery, in which the appropriately happy ending is the arrival at 
awareness and control of one’s own feelings.  Yet if we push a bit past the point of 
narrative closure in this bildungsroman, we will find that this neat resolution undoes 
itself, as self-awareness and agency lapse back into semi-consciousness and 
unfreedom.  The culprits responsible for this narrative reversal are the very same 
neural pathways that seemed to be the route to self-mastery.  We can begin to grasp 
the reasons for this transformation by noting that Lewes’ account of the infant’s 
development of consciousness parallels his account in Problems of Life and Mind and 
The Physiology of Common Life of how one acquires new skills, such as learning to 
play a musical instrument, or to speak a new language, or simply to perform 
unaccustomed movements of any kind.  What makes these activities difficult initially 
is the same absence of defined neural pathways resulting in the chaos of vague 
sentience that defines consciousness in infancy.  Just as an infant’s repeated 
experiences establish neural pathways that differentiate massively diffuse sensation 
into defined feelings, so does practice—the repetition of sensations and movements—
cut more and more defined paths through the nervous system that enable the faster 
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recall of the correct word, the more precise execution of the correct movement.  But as 
neural pathways enhance facility, they also undermine agency.  As pathways become 
more deeply engraved, sensation tracks along their smoothed grooves regardless of 
conscious intention.  Deliberate action becomes instinct or habit, and “what was 
facultative [becomes] fixed, what was voluntary [becomes] involuntary.”  Moreover, 
thoughts, especially what Lewes calls “intuitive judgments,” are also just as 
susceptible as sensations and actions to this transformation.  Since intuitive judgments 
are conclusions arrived at so rapidly that their premises are not consciously 
recognized, Lewes notes that “they are to the mind what automatic actions are to the 
body” (Problems of Life and Mind 130, 343).  While Lewes argues that the element of 
choice does not totally disappear when intentional actions or thoughts become 
automatic, his unease about this apparent loss of volition is plainly apparent in his 
figure of the “vigorous thinker.”  The thoughts of vigorous thinkers, Lewes writes, 
“are ever finding new pathways instead of moving amid old associations.  The 
vigorous thinker thinks for himself; the vigorous writer expresses what he means, and 
does not suffer one phrase automatically to determine another” (Physiology of 
Common Life 57).  Defined above all by his autonomy and self-control, the vigorous 
thinker/writer is always in the middle of the process of creating new routes for thought 
and feeling.  The vigorous thinker thus negotiates a perilous space of self-mastery 
between a state of pre-rational paralysis where there is a total absence of any control, 
and a state of hyper-rational automation where feelings and thoughts become pre-
determined and deliberate consent disappears.     
 While deeply engraved neural pathways thus threaten to pre-determine both 
thoughts and feelings, Lewes also suggests that as neural pathways become more 
established they refine feeling into thought.  Neural pathways, as we have seen, 
restrict sensation, funneling it into the established channels of the nervous system.  In 
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doing so, pathways enable the differentiation and management of sensation, but Lewes 
contends that they also enable sensation to pass into representation.  In proportion as 
the “massiveness” and “intensity” of sensations decrease, “they become more and 
more Signs, and thus become fitted to enter into intellectual operations which are 
purely symbolical.  The least sensible of the Senses…is Sight, and therefore it is the 
most intellectual.  It is the most impersonal—that which draws with it the least amount 
of feeling” (Problems of Life and Mind 121).  Thought begins as personal feeling 
disappears.  Lewes takes the emergence of thought with the attenuation of feeling as 
the goal of human progress, a progress that closely parallels the development of 
consciousness.  He argues that progress consists of “an ever-increasing tendency 
towards more and more remote conceptions and indirect methods, detaching the mind 
more and more from sensible observation.”  He cites the example of contemporary 
trade, in which “the complicated processes of sowing, reaping, collecting, shipping, 
and delivering a quantity of wheat are condensed into the entry of a few words in a 
ledger.”  As neural pathways develop and more effectively channel sensation, the 
chaos of vague sentience is “condensed into objects,” and those sensible objects are in 
turn condensed into signs (Problems of Life and Mind 158, 93).  This progress 
narrative is for Lewes as much an ethical as an economic or philosophical triumph.   
As feelings are condensed into objects, attention is directed away from the self, which 
is thus led to a disinterested desire to understand persons and objects not only as 
means for satisfying a desire, and a capacity to bracket selfish desires for the sake of 
satisfying “sympathetic impulses” (153).   
 Lewes’ progress narrative of the emergence of “impersonal” thought attests to 
the premium placed on Arnoldian disinterestedness as a defining quality of thought 
and ethics in mid-Victorian liberal thought.  The power and pervasiveness of this 
argument is all the more in evidence in Lewes’ work in that he seems to take it for 
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granted despite the fact that it flatly contradicts one of his three first principles of 
psychology.16  Even apart from this contradiction, moreover, Lewes’ account of our 
arrival at disinterestedness is also problematic to the extent that disinterestedness 
depends on restricting sensation to neural pathways that thus become more and more 
set.  In this way, Lewes’ ideal of disinterestedness, no less than Arnold’s, is subject to 
the same widespread concern, identified by David Wayne Thomas, that the mid-
Victorian liberal ideal of many-sidedness could sap conviction and drain away vigor.  
But the terms Lewes uses to articulate this concern seem not to match exactly those 
terms more often used in this public debate as Thomas has characterized it.  In Culture 
and Anarchy, for example, a disinterested Hellenism is paralyzed in the sense that it is 
constitutionally incapable of accomplishing anything besides criticism, the free play of 
the faculties, and so requires the supplement of a more vigorous Hebraism comprised 
of feeling and acting.  On the other hand, Hebraistic feeling and acting undirected by 
Hellenistic thought is, Arnold argues, dangerous and destructive.  In Lewes’ work, in 
contrast, a chaotic paralysis is the result of a kind of overload of sensation.  Excessive 
thought, insofar as it is the product of ever-constricting neural pathways, undermines 
liberal agency by prompting unwilled activity, leading to a state in which certain 
feelings and thoughts become so efficiently routinized as to be automatic and coercive.  
Lewes thus seems to reverse the dangers entailed by this dual threat to liberal agency.  
The difference stems from the different roles assigned to reflection and feeling in each 
case.  For Arnold, feeling can be both conservative, when it is practiced by a narrow 
Hebraism that maintains an uncritical adherence to tradition, and nihilistically radical, 
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 Appropriately enough, Lewes defines the principle in question as “the law of interest.”  At times, he 
seems to restrict the definition of this law to the axiom that we can only recognize what is sufficiently 
like former experiences for our neural pathways to be able to process, but in both The Physiology of 
Common Life and Problems of Life and Mind, Lewes also broadens this restricted definition to contend 
that our emotions and sentiments—and the bodily sensations that contribute most directly to these—
actually dictate what we experience, perceive, and think.  See Physiology of Common Life, 64-5 and 
Problems of Life and Mind, 112, 123-4.   
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when it is understood as the solipsistic, working-class pleasure-seeking of “doing as 
one likes.”  The Philistinism of doing as one likes is a recognizable version of Lewes’ 
“chaos of vague sentience,” while Hebraism starts to look more like the performance 
of compulsive actions and thoughts.  Lewes suggests, however, that compulsive, 
Hebraistic action is not the result of uncritical feeling but of the attenuation of feeling.  
The physiological act of vigorous thinking, thinking that seeks out new pathways, 
must always be accompanied by new and un-attenuated sensation.  The vigorous 
thinker retains her vigor but also her capacity for reflection because she does not 
divide thought from feeling.  Moreover, if sympathy is feeling for others, feeling what 
one imagines the other is feeling, then human sympathy, no less than the sympathy of 
a landscape, depends on the continual creation of new and unaccustomed neural 
pathways.  The vigorous thinker, whose consciousness is a palimpsest open to the re-
inscription of new pathways, is capable of greater sympathy, and is therefore more 
ethical, as well as more reflective, than the person who seems to have passed beyond 
all personal feeling into disinterestedness.   
 
Impressing Minds  
 A similarly ambivalent relationship between feeling, reflection, and 
disinterestedness haunts Maggie Tulliver, the heroine of Eliot’s 1860 novel, The Mill 
on the Floss, which she completed just as Lewes finished the second volume of The 
Physiology of Common Life.   Maggie’s passionate sensibility draws her into conflict 
with the provincial community of St. Oggs, especially with her Puritanical brother 
Tom, and eventually with her own sense of right duty and ethical conduct when she 
falls in love and almost elopes with her cousin’s fiancé, Stephen Guest.  Maggie 
ultimately renounces her chance for a tainted happiness with Stephen, but this ethical 
victory is not a triumph of impersonal principle over personal feeling.  Rather, 
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Maggie’s dilemma rehearses that of Lewes’ vigorous thinker, torn between unruly 
feelings and desires and dry, affectless abstraction.  The Mill on the Floss, I argue, 
attempts to bridge disinterestedness and personal feeling in sympathy, and it does so 
by invoking the palimpsestic consciousness described by Lewes.   
 Maggie first learns to aspire to disinterestedness after a lawsuit bankrupts her 
family and she is pulled from school to help her mother perform the domestic labor in 
their newly impoverished household.  In her reduced circumstances, Maggie’s access 
to music and books is sharply curtailed, but when she is given a set of second-hand 
books by Bob Jakin, she discovers among them an old copy of Thomas a Kempis’ The 
Imitation of Christ and experiences something akin to a spiritual and moral 
awakening: “for the first time she saw the possibility of shifting the position from 
which she looked at the gratification of her own desires–of taking her stand out of 
herself, and looking at her own life as an insignificant part of a divinely guided 
whole…and, in the ardour of first discovery, renunciation seemed to her the entrance 
into that satisfaction which she had so long been craving in vain” (Mill on the Floss 
290-1).  What Maggie discovers here is the possibility of ekstasis, a self-transcendence 
through a “perfect renunciation” (385) of personal desire.  The irony, of course, is that 
Maggie initially thinks that this perfect renunciation is the gateway to ecstasy in both 
senses of the word—as, that is, both the transcendence of self and as an intensely 
pleasurable sensation centered in the person.   
 Even Maggie’s imperfect renunciation is jeopardized when she begins secretly 
meeting Philip Wakem on walks near her home in the Red Deeps.  Maggie is troubled 
by the necessity she is under to conceal her meetings with Philip from her family, but 
the significance of this deception pales, in her mind, compared to the danger that 
Philip, by lending her books and singing to her, is providing her with a “new interest” 
that will ultimately bring her under “the seductive guidance of illimitable wants” (303, 
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325).  The danger, in other words, is that Philip is stimulating and thus reinvigorating 
Maggie’s sensibility, which seems the seat of voracious desires.  Philip himself touts 
his ability to reinvigorate Maggie’s sensibility by restoring her access to books and 
music as one of the most important reasons Maggie should keep seeing him.  Maggie’s 
attempt at self-renunciation, Philip claims, is no more than a “narrow asceticism” that 
fearfully “seek[s] safety in negations” (306, 329).  Philip’s arguments against 
Maggie’s asceticism are prophetic, and often echoed or approved by the narrator, who 
only condemns his use of them as justifications of his secret meetings with Maggie.  
Philip contends that Maggie’s asceticism will undermine her self-mastery because her 
denial of “rational satisfactions” will weaken her capacity to exert control over her 
own desires and feelings, which will come to assault her in the form of “savage 
appetite[s]” (329).  If Maggie’s ascetic ambitions threaten ultimately to intensify her 
sensibility, in the interim her asceticism renders her insensible.  Her renunciations, 
according to Philip, amount only to “blinding and deafening [her]self to all but one 
train of impressions” (335).  Philip points out to Maggie not only the element of 
egoistic feeling in her desire for a perfect renunciation, but also the irony that this 
egoistic desire for “satisfaction” also lessens her capacity for feeling: “joy and peace 
are not resignation: resignation is the willing endurance of a pain that is not allayed—
that you don't expect to be allayed.  Stupefaction is not resignation: and it is 
stupefaction to remain in ignorance—to shut up all the avenues by which the life of 
your fellow-men might become known to you” (328).  Just as Maggie’s self-mastery 
through renunciation threatens to intensify her sensibility so that it becomes 
unmanageable, her egoistic desire for joy and peace through renunciation threatens to 
stupefy her and to render her insensible to her “fellow-men.”  Maggie’s desire for self-
transcendence through renunciation, in short, endangers her capacity for sympathy, 
and to that extent immures her in her own self that much more effectively.   
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  Faced with intensified and overmastering feeling on the one hand, and a 
stupefying, narrowly-restricted range of feeling on the other, Maggie’s dilemma 
rehearses the perils negotiated by Lewes’ vigorous thinker.  Like the vigorous thinker, 
she must retain a self-mastery beset by unpredictable and chaotic sensations and 
desires.  Her ambitions to achieve this mastery via disinterestedness, the bracketing or 
attenuating of personal feeling, likewise amount to a fantasy that would find freedom 
in determinism.17  This dilemma underlies Maggie’s moral conflict about her meetings 
with Philip and those meetings’ revival of her sensibility.  Maggie herself thinks of 
this moral problem as a conflict between heeding a voice that makes “sweet music” 
and a voice that makes “monotonous warnings”(304).  While Maggie’s susceptibility 
to music is an insistent emblem of her sensibility in the novel, the monotony of the 
other voice—which urges Maggie to confine herself to “one train of impressions”—
echoes a passage from the novel’s first half in which the narrator suggests that the 
aesthetic and affective charge of the landscapes amidst which she grew up  likewise 
derives from a monotony of experience:  
What novelty is worth that sweet monotony where everything is known, and 
loved because it is known?...what grove of tropic palms…could ever thrill such 
deep and delicate fibers within me as this home-scene?  These familiar flowers, 
these well-remembered bird notes, this sky, with its fitful brightness, these 
furrowed and grassy fields, each with a sort of personality given to it by the 
capricious hedgerows—such things as these are the mother tongue of our 
imagination, the language that is laden with all the subtle inextricable 
                                                
17
 See, for example, Maggie’s proclamation to Philip that “our life is determined for us—and it makes 
the mind very free when we give up wishing, and only think of bearing what is laud upon us, and doing 
what is given us to do” (302).  That Maggie Tulliver faces this dilemma provides a useful qualification 
to David Wayne Thomas’ account of Victorian worries that liberalism saps vigor.  Thomas argues that 
these worries reflect wider concerns about masculinity and the status of intellectual labor.  Maggie’s 
dilemma indicates that the threat that many-sidedness could undermine agency was not exclusively a 
man’s problem.  See Thomas, 13-4.   
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associations the fleeting hours of our childhood left behind them.  Our delight 
in the sunshine on the deep-bladed grass to-day, might be no more than the 
faint perception of wearied souls, if it were not for the sunshine and the grass 
in the far-off years which still live in us, and transform our perception into 
love.  (41-2)         
The monotony of these impressions accounts, in part, for their power.  Through sheer 
dint of repetition, they deepen perception by enabling any momentary sensation to 
recall the multilayered memories of prior such experiences, to reach, as Eliot puts it 
elsewhere, “stored residues of passion.”  These residues recall Lewes’ perceptual 
“residua”—the neural channels left behind by repeated experiences—an allusion to 
neural channels that Eliot also makes in the passage above by suggesting that the 
power of the home-scene lies in its capacity to thrill “deep and delicate fibers.”  Since 
consciousness is written by these pathways of sensation, bygone sunshine and grass 
do, physiologically speaking, continue to live in us as neural pathways that allow our 
perception of similar sunshine and grass to become sharper and more defined.  When 
we encounter landscapes similar to those in which we grew up, the sensations they 
stimulate in us track along the old neural pathways and excite the old trains of 
associations and secondary feeling.  The landscapes of our childhood therefore seem 
to concentrate in themselves our memories of the feelings and associations with which 
we experienced those landscapes as children.  In this way, those landscapes are like a 
language, a system of signs that act as a shorthand for a complex of sense experiences. 
 At the same time, Eliot’s narrator markedly distinguishes between the affective 
responses elicited by the immediate sense experience of a landscape and those that are 
elicited by language and representation.  In a similar passage describing Mr. Tulliver’s 
love for the mill, for example, the narrator explains that there “he knew the sound of 
every gate and door, and felt that the shape and colour of every roof and weather-stain 
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and broken hillock was good, because his growing senses had been fed on them.”  The 
narrator contrasts Mr. Tulliver’s intimate bond to the mill with a cosmopolitanism 
mediated by representation instead of by sense experience, which the narrator 
describes as “our instructed vagrancy…which is nourished on books of travel, and 
stretches the theater of its imagination to the Zambesi” (263).  In another passage 
describing Tom’s first homecoming after being sent away to school, the narrator 
celebrates “the ease we feel in those scenes where we were born, where objects 
became dear to us before we had known the labour of choice and where the outer 
world seemed only an extension of our personality.”  In a proto-Arnoldian vein, the 
narrator claims that such affection for imperfect, even homely things acts as a crucial 
and necessary check on the tendency to reform and “improvement,” and defends those 
attachments against “those severely regulated minds” whose attachments are based 
only on “the demonstrable superiority of qualities” (151-2).   In these passages, which 
are echoed throughout Eliot’s writings, the narrator implicitly draws on familiar 
Victorian polemics against the balefully inhuman and tyrannical effects of an 
ungrounded commitment to rationalism and abstraction, typically emblematized in the 
French Revolution.  As we have seen, Eliot elsewhere denies that abstraction—under 
which heading she classes signs and representation—could elicit affection at all and 
she therefore claimed that cosmopolitanism is an insufficient basis for ethical conduct.  
Eliot also, however, consistently figured the landscape as a set of signs, whether as 
“social history in pictorial writing” or as concentrated abstractions of our childhood 
memories and associations.  The latter set of signs—those that make up the landscapes 
of our childhood—might  seem to be qualitatively different from other abstractions 
because, rather than representations of objects with which we have never had any 
contact, they are the concentrated forms of our own sense experiences and can re-
produce those sense experiences by stimulating old neural pathways.  But Eliot, like 
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Lewes, worried that as those sense-experiences become more concentrated in memory, 
they also lose the capacity to be affecting.  “The recollections of the past,” observed 
Latimer, the protagonist of Eliot’s 1859 The Lifted Veil, “become contracted in the 
rapidity of thought till they sometimes bear hardly a more distinct resemblance to the 
external reality than the forms of an oriental alphabet to the objects that suggested 
them” (35).  While Latimer is thinking primarily of how our memories of events 
become distorted, it is hard not to hear in this passage an echo of Lewes’ argument 
that as our sensations and feelings contract into established neural pathways, feeling 
itself tends to disappear.   
 It is hard, too, not to hear the echo of the narrator’s “sweet monotony” in the 
decidedly sour “monotonous warning” that would have Maggie blind and deafen 
herself “to all but one train of impressions.”  During the year that she continues her 
secret meetings with Philip in the Red Deeps, Maggie has in her own family two vivid 
examples of such monotonous insensibility in her father and brother.  Under the sway 
of grief and shame over his bankruptcy and obsessed with revenging himself on 
Lawyer Wakem, Mr. Tulliver loses his capacity for “new feelings” and his mind 
seems given over to a mechanized repetition: “when uncultured minds, confined to a 
narrow range of personal experience, are under the pressure of continued misfortune, 
their inward life is apt to become a perpetually repeated round of sad and bitter 
thoughts…as if they were machines set to a recurrent series of movements”(294, 280).  
While Tom is capable of far greater self-control than his father, his mind seems 
likewise confined and resistant to new thought and feeling.  Though Culture and 
Anarchy would only appear in 1869, Tom reads like an Arnoldian Hebrew avant la 
lettre.  With his “deficient power of apprehending signs and abstractions” (169) and a 
mind holding only prejudices “to fill up the void of spontaneous ideas” (456) Tom 
bears a striking resemblance to the pre-modern German peasants Eliot describes in 
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“The Natural History of German Life” (Mill on the Floss 169, 456).  Tom is not only a 
lower-order thinker, however; in Tom’s case, as in the case of Eliot’s German 
peasants, but unlike that of Arnold’s Hebrew, customs and prejudices seem to fill in 
for sentiments and affections as well as for ideas.  Tom, the narrator remarks, “was a 
boy who adhered tenaciously to impressions once received; as with all minds in which 
mere perception predominates over thought and emotion, the external remained to him 
rigidly what it was in the first instance” (166).  The reliable monotony of Tom’s 
impressions of St. Oggs and the mill, along with the intimate bond with those 
landscapes that he shares with Maggie, here fail to supplement and affectively 
transform his perception.  Tom’s perception seems rather to keep his thought and 
emotion in check, and, in this sense, it is the predominance of a rigidly routinized 
perception in his mind that renders him, finally, pharisaical and unsympathetic.   
 The blunting of Maggie’s sensibility through renunciation endangers her 
capacity for sympathy, but her capacity for sympathy is no less vulnerable to her 
sensibility itself.  Eliot frames Maggie’s ethical crisis upon finding that she has fallen 
in love with Stephen Guest as a context between feeling and reflection.  
Notwithstanding Stephen’s facetious claims about the “predominance of the reflective 
powers” (416) in his nature or his special capacities for “stern reason” (431), he and 
Maggie share a tendency to suppress reflection and act without conscious intention 
during their shadow courtship, especially during its initial stages, when “neither of 
them had begun to reflect on the matter, or silently to ask, ‘To what does all this tend?’ 
Maggie only felt that life was revealing something quite new to her; and she was 
absorbed in the direct, immediate experience, without any energy left for taking 
account of it and reasoning about it” (403).  Even after it becomes impossible to 
ignore their growing feelings for each other, the continuation of their courtship 
depends on this tendency insofar as it conflicts with their deliberate resolution not to 
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pursue each other or reveal their feelings to Lucy or Philip.  In acting against this 
resolution, Stephen and Maggie thoughtlessly give themselves over to their passions.   
 The climax of Maggie’s dilemma is also the most emblematic instance of her 
uncritical absorption in “immediate experience.”  When circumstances lead to Stephen 
taking Philip’s place on a planned boat-trip with Maggie down the Floss, the two end 
up drifting with the current too far down-river to return to St. Oggs by that night.  In 
keeping with this heavy-handed metaphor, Maggie spends her boat-trip unable to 
recognize her surroundings, “dimly conscious,” and as if borne along “without any act 
of her own will” (464).  In this way, Maggie makes “the wayward choice of her own 
passion” (471).  But because she makes this choice without the participation of her 
waking reason, it is a choice made without deliberate consent, which is to say, not 
properly a choice at all.  When Maggie returns to herself after her reverie on the Floss, 
her deliberate choice is to refuse to elope with Stephen and return to St. Oggs.  
Stephen interprets her balancing and choosing in this regard as a sign of deficient 
feeling, and the narrator’s description of her departure from Stephen seems to 
reinforce his sense that this chosen renunciation has thrust Maggie back into the old 
round of insensible determinism: “Maggie was not conscious of a decision as she 
turned away from that gloomy averted face, and walked out of the room; it was like an 
automatic action that fulfils a forgotten intention” (479).  Unlike her earlier dream of a 
perfect renunciation, however, Maggie’s renunciation of Stephen rests on a qualified 
understanding of the ekstasis made possible by sympathy.  Sympathy offers Eliot’s 
characters the promise of self-transcendence by allowing them to experience indirectly 
the feelings of another person.  This capacity for an “enlarged life which grows and 
grows by appropriating the life of others” is sympathy’s positive affect, an affect that 
could be described as ecstatic insofar as it is independent of personal experience and, 
in Philip’s evocative phrase, “disembodied of selfish desire” (503).   
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 Eliot’s sympathetic ekstasis also seems to resemble disinterested reflection.  
Eliot, drawing from the theories of sympathy advanced in the eighteenth century by 
Hume and Smith, suggests that self-conception and self-criticism depend on 
sympathizing with a collective group or with others’ impressions of oneself.18  
Maggie’s sympathetic identification, inspired by Thomas á Kempis, with “a divinely 
guided whole” enables the act of self-distancing, the “taking her stand out of herself,” 
that is the basis of reflection and self-criticism.  There is a limit to this self-
transcendence, however, because Eliot insists that sympathy must be anchored in 
bodily experience, and such is especially the case for Maggie’s sympathy with Lucy 
and Philip.  Instead of finding “quiet ecstasy” (471) in a renunciation of personal 
desires, Maggie realizes that acts of renunciation motivated by sympathy bring not 
peace but a willing endurance of pain.  Moreover, a willed endurance of pain, such as 
Maggie experiences in giving up Stephen, seems necessary for the sympathetic 
investment in another’s feelings because to desire truly not to hurt another in a given 
way, one must have been thus hurt oneself.19  Maggie finally refuses to elope because, 
having suffered and suffering herself, she has experienced the pain she would give to 
Philip and Lucy by betraying them.  “I see—I feel their trouble now,” she explains to 
Stephen, “it is as if it were branded on my mind” (478).  Maggie’s language here 
echoes a remark by Latimer in The Lifted Veil that more explicitly declares Eliot’s 
conviction that the knowledge necessary for sympathy must be based on shared sense 
experience.  Describing his seven years of marital estrangement, Latimer worries that 
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 On Hume, see Pinch,17-50.  For Smith’s argument that sympathy with an imaginary “impartial 
spectator” is fundamental to conceptions of identity and to conscience, see Smith, 128-132 and 155-
182.  The preceding account of sympathy as self-criticism has parallels with work on sympathy in Eliot 
by Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth.  Ermarth, however, does not trace Eliot’s thinking back to Hume and 
Smith and her argument elides the instabilities that unsettle Eliot’s distinctions between sympathy and 
egoism, which I take up below.  See Deeds, 24-6.    
19
 Daniel Deronda, for example, remarks to Gwendolyn that “our keen feeling for ourselves might end 
in giving us a keen feeling for others, if, when we are suffering acutely, we were to consider that others 
go through the same sharp experience. That is a sort of remorse before commission”(Daniel Deronda 
450). 
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readers will fail to sympathize properly with his experience because they have only 
read his descriptions of it, and not lived through it: “we learn words by rote, but not 
their meaning; that must be paid for with our life-blood, and printed in the subtle 
fibers of our nerves”  (34).  
 Maggie’s confident assertion and Latimer’s skeptical complaint both hint at a 
problem unsettling the ethical work of sympathy in Eliot’s writing.  If sympathy 
requires, as Latimer and Maggie suggest, a shared sense experience, then the range of 
people with whom one can sympathize is radically circumscribed.  Even between 
those people whose experiences most closely resemble one another, sympathy would 
be necessarily vague and imperfect, because one’s knowledge of the other’s 
experience could never be exact.20  Moreover, Latimer’s assertion that representations 
are by themselves untrustworthy as guides to another person’s experience undercuts 
the moral justification that Eliot claims for her fiction: that art enlarges readers’ 
sympathies by “amplifying experience and extending our contact with our fellowmen 
beyond the bounds of our personal lot”(“Natural History of German Life” 271).  
Eliot’s attempts to enlarge readers’ sympathies seem hobbled by this epistemological 
problem.  Moreover, as Thomas Albrecht has recently argued, the fact that one’s 
sympathy with another person must always be based on verbal descriptions of the 
other’s experience—a fact obliquely acknowledged in Eliot’s writing—undermines 
the ethical value of sympathy itself.  In Albrecht’s account, any sympathetic insight 
into the other’s consciousness and experience is, in Eliot’s writing, only one possible 
interpretation of the cluster of signs that make up the other’s character to even the 
closest observer.  The sympathetic observer reads the other through metaphors, figures 
that “establish a relation between the other and something that is already familiar to 
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 Many critics have noted this problem with sympathy in Eliot’s writing.  For just one example, see 
Marshall, 214-9.   
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oneself in order to make the other more familiar” (Albrecht 450).  To make the other 
familiar through metaphor in this way, however, is to interpret the other’s experience 
only in relation to oneself, to what is familiar to oneself.  Proceeding through such acts 
of familiarization, sympathy is incapable of fulfilling Eliot’s ethical imperative to 
acknowledge the other as other, to see the other not egoistically, only in relation to 
oneself, but as an autonomous agent. Sympathy in Eliot’s writing, Albrecht argues, is 
not a means of transcending egoism.  The conflict Albrecht identifies in Eliot’s 
writing—between an ethical imperative to acknowledge alterity and a sympathetic 
ethics incapable of achieving that acknowledgement—rehearses a central dilemma in 
Victorian liberalism: the tension between the negative liberty of individuals and the 
imperatives of common sense--the shared values and assumptions, indispensable to 
the liberal polity, that fell to aesthetic culture to inculcate in the public (Lloyd and 
Thomas 1-30).  Eliot’s attempts to expand her readers’ sympathy participate in the 
larger political project of Victorian aesthetic culture to fashion a common sense.  
However, Eliot’s attempts to expand sympathy do not amount merely to a project of 
coercive consensus-building.  Rather, sympathy for Eliot functions equally to prevent 
common sense from ossifying and becoming unreflective by dialogically transforming 
established norms.          
 The dialogic transformation effected by Eliot’s sympathetic ethics is evident in 
the rhetorical figures she associates with sympathy.  Metaphor, for example, does 
work by making the strange familiar, but it is also the trope we use to shift between 
different languages or codes, thereby putting different language systems into dialogue 
with each other.21  Even more than metaphor, however, I argue that the rhetorical 
figure Eliot most closely associates with sympathy is palimpsest.  Both Maggie’s and 
Latimer’s metaphors for sympathetic feeling as written directly into the mind—as 
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  On this point, see Jakobson.   
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branded on the mind or written in the nerves—evoke this figure.  On the one hand, this 
image of a writing grounded directly in sense experience, a writing whose medium is 
the nervous system, seems like a fantastic, even grotesque, version of empiricism.  
But, especially in the context of Lewes’ The Physiology of Common Life, written 
concurrently with The Mill on the Floss and The Lifted Veil, this figure does not 
ground representation in sense experience so much as it unmoors sense experience.  
For if sense experience writes itself into the mind, sense experience is written in turn 
by the neural channels available to register and process it.  Sense experience itself, in 
other words, becomes no less a palimpsest than the mind it (re)writes.  In Latimer’s 
image of a meaning written into the nerves, the meaning of a word is not a verifiable 
impression beyond language but is itself like writing, with all the instabilities that such 
a comparison entails for Eliot.  One such instability that is crucial for sympathy is our 
inevitable recourse to metaphor whenever we attempt to define the meaning of a given 
sign.  Eliot points out this necessity in a famous passage in The Mill on the Floss, 
where she speculates that Aristotle, had he been a modern instead of an ancient, would 
have lamented the fact “that we can so seldom declare what a thing is, except by 
saying it is something else” (Mill on the Floss 140).  The lament is, obviously, 
somewhat facetious, but the acknowledgement—which Maggie makes and Tom 
denies—that meaning is indeterminate runs parallel to the novel’s depiction of 
sympathy as based on a capacity for perceptions and sensations that are similarly 
open-ended and malleable, rather than fixed and routinized.  Being thus open to 
differences in meaning, to indeterminacy in meaning, is, finally, to be open to the re-
inscriptions of the mind that allow for sympathy in The Mill on the Floss.   
 This sympathetic willingness to defamiliarize perception and recognize 
multiple, overlapping meanings is Eliot’s privileged mode of critical reflection.  
Sympathetic reflection for Eliot is intimately a matter of feeling, of shifts and mobility 
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in the registration of sensations, which are not fixed and unalterable but rather slide 
indeterminately, like language.  As a mode of agency, sympathetic reflection, like 
Lewes’ vigorous thinking, is built on the gambit of submitting to an imperfection of 
self-control in order to preserve volition more broadly.  Eliot’s depictions of moments 
of sympathetic understanding reflect the momentary loss of self-control in sympathetic 
reflection.  Such moments, when a character achieves sympathetic insight through a 
recognition of alternative meanings, are often described as surprising, even as 
shocking, and in The Mill on the Floss, the implicit analogue of these experiences is 
the flood.22  After, for example, Maggie rescues Tom from his flooding house, Eliot 
uses flood imagery to narrate Tom’s final awakening to sympathy with his sister when 
“the full meaning of what had happened rushed upon his mind.  It came with so 
overpowering a force—it was such a new revelation to his spirit, of the depths in life, 
that had lain beyond his vision which he had fancied so keen and clear—that he was 
unable to ask a question”(Mill on the Floss 520).  The violence and destruction of the 
flood that will shortly kill both siblings, along with the fact that Tom is rendered mute 
by sympathy, imply that Eliot’s gambit for agency may be more risky than it seems.  
As I argue in this chapter’s final section, Eliot herself eventually became unnerved by 
the potential violence and speed of alteration that her ideal of sympathy made 
possible, and attempted to circumscribe its effects in her final novel, Daniel Deronda.   
 
Spellbound Habit: Sympathy and National Consciousness    
 For Daniel Deronda, idling through his twenties unable to choose a career for 
lack of a defined social purpose, sympathy and reflection continue to pull together, but 
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 In “The Natural History of German Life,” for example, Eliot claims that the greatest social benefit of 
art is its capacity to extend sympathy by “surpris[ing] even the trivial and the selfish into that attention 
to what is apart from the themselves, which may be called the raw material of moral sentiment” (270).  
Flooding is also the metaphor undergirding Lewes’ descriptions of sensations diffusive enough to 
overflow established neural channels. 
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at the cost of sympathy’s strength and efficacy.  Deronda’s powers of reflection 
stimulate his sympathy into hyperactivity; always ready to try to imagine the other’s 
point of view, Deronda becomes too detached, too critically distant from his own 
subject-position.  He finds himself trapped in the endlessly reflective position of the 
critic, his “many-sided sympathy…hinder[ing] any persistent course of action” (364).  
Deronda’s limbo rehearses the crisis of virility common to mid-Victorian liberalism, 
animated by fears that many-sidedness might sap vigor, but in addition to undermining 
his agency, Deronda’s hyperactive sympathy initiates a crisis of feeling.  The fluidity 
with which Deronda can imaginatively move between different subject positions 
empties those positions of their specific content.  His powers of sympathetic reflection 
thus present him with the challenge of finding “some way of keeping emotion and its 
progeny of sentiments…substantial and strong in the face of a reflectiveness that 
threatened to nullify all differences” (365).  Locked in a feedback loop with his 
reflectiveness, Deronda’s sympathy undoes, or “neutralizes” itself by rendering 
different points of view (as he imagines them) so easily and glibly inhabitable that 
they lose their distinctiveness, and thus also the particularity that, for Eliot, must 
always accompany emotion.  His sympathy precipitates Deronda’s fall into a 
“meditative numbness” because it has become a version of what Amanda Anderson 
calls “false universalism.”  In Anderson’s reading of Daniel Deronda, Eliot is 
attempting to negotiate a stance between a hyper-modern false universalism and a 
hide-bound and monological nationalism.  The middle way embraced by the novel is a 
“cultivated partiality,” a reflective affirmation of a community grounded in tradition 
but open to reform.  Anderson describes this mode of allegiance as “passionate 
argumentation” (321).  Passionate argumentation nicely evokes the combination of 
feeling and criticism at work in Eliot’s political ideal, but Anderson’s reading focuses 
primarily on establishing the importance of critical distance to Eliot’s nationalist 
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project, and leaves largely unexplored the dynamic of passion and argumentation 
integral to this project.  Here, I will complicate Anderson’s reading by shifting the 
focus slightly to read Daniel Deronda in the context of the “feeling…mixed with 
criticism”(Daniel Deronda 178) that constitutes the privileged mode of agency for 
Eliot.  Attention to this dynamic will allow for a fuller portrait of reflective agency in 
Eliot’s writing, as well as provide needed nuance to the terms of Anderson’s analysis 
insofar as feeling and criticism were becoming more and more politically freighted 
during the 1870s in ways that brought pressure to bear on Eliot’s model of 
sympathetic reflectiveness.   
 Some of that political freight is evident in the passages describing Deronda’s 
crisis of feeling.  Deronda initially seems simply to share the innate balance between 
liberal and conservative impulses that, notwithstanding its hampering of directed 
action on Deronda’s part, defines Eliot’s political ideal of liberal traditionalism.  Here 
too, however, the balance seems to be tipped by Deronda’s hyperactive reflectiveness, 
which attenuates feeling by obliterating the traditions that properly facilitate it.  
Deronda’s crisis of feeling therefore has an explicit political dimension: “To pound the 
objects of sentiment into small dust, yet keep sentiment alive and active was 
something like the famous recipe for making cannon—to first take a round hole and 
then enclose it with iron; whatever you do keeping fast hold of your round hole.  Yet 
how distinguish what our will may wisely save in its completeness, from the heaping 
of cat-mummies and the expensive cult of enshrined putrefactions?” (365).  The 
necessity Deronda seems to be under to find a proper, cooperative balance between a 
critical reflectiveness that undermines tradition and a “practically energetic sentiment” 
energized by an attachment to tradition rehearses the problem of culture as Arnold 
articulates it in Culture and Anarchy.  For Arnold, too, culture depends on a balance 
(in his case not necessarily simultaneous) between Hellenism, the faculty of critical 
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reflection, and Hebraism, the faculty for feeling and acting.  In the passages above, 
Eliot seems to suggest, contrary to Arnold, that England’s young men have more need 
to cultivate practically energetic sentiment than they do a disinterested reflectiveness 
that, in Deronda’s case, has become worryingly hypertrophied.  As Terry Eagleton 
quips, in Daniel Deronda, the novel’s hero moves from Hellenism to Hebraism, 
literally (The English Novel 183). 
 Along with Arnold’s influential work, other elements of Daniel Deronda’s 
social and discursive context troubled the smooth cooperation of feeling and reflection 
at work in sympathy for Eliot.  Chief among these were the changes in the political 
landscape of England that were making old alliances untenable.  Writing in 1869, in 
the wake of the 1868 Liberal electoral triumph, Arnold’s insistence on the need for 
more devotion to disinterested criticism was in keeping with the focus on reform 
during the first Gladstone ministry.  By the mid-1870s, when Eliot wrote Daniel 
Deronda, Gladstone’s reforms had created fractures in the Liberal coalition that led to 
a Tory resurgence in 1874.  David Wayne Thomas identifies one of the major 
faultlines in the Liberal coalition as a conflict over the status of law, in which 
working-class populists responded to interventionist reforms by grounding certain 
rights as natural and therefore as possessing “a kind of impunity from interrogation 
through the traditional authority of the natural” (116).  Where these conflicts occurred, 
as in the Tichborne case that Thomas analyzes, Victorian liberals tended to dismiss 
working-class positions as reflecting merely the working class’ lack of “trained 
intellect.”  Unable to make considered judgments, they charged, working class 
subjects could only be guided in their convictions by “mere feeling” (100).  The likely 
effect of these conflicts within liberal discourse was, then, to harden already 
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sharpening divisions between liberal reflectiveness and a traditionalism whose 
dominant mode was feeling rather than reason.23  
 This hardening opposition between reflection and feeling rendered Eliot’s 
regulative ideal of reflective sympathy untenable, leaving Deronda in the peculiar 
situation of finding that his sympathy neutralizes itself.  This is a dilemma the novel 
seeks to resolve through the revelation of Deronda’s Jewish parentage.  This discovery 
frees his judgment from its “wandering in the mazes of impartial sympathy,” and 
makes it possible for him to “choos[e]…the closer fellowship that makes sympathy 
practical” over “that bird's-eye reasonableness which soars to avoid preference and 
loses all sense of quality” (745).  Impartial sympathy, then, not only attenuates feeling 
through a critical distance flattening out distinctions, but also endangers volition by 
making choice impossible.  Deronda’s wandering in the mazes of impartial sympathy 
echoes Gwendolen’s predicament when, constrained by her family’s fall in fortune 
and her legal status as a married woman and unable to determine any action that might 
mitigate the oppressiveness of her marriage with Grandcourt, she feels similarly 
condemned to wander over and over again through a “labyrinth of reflection, in which 
already the same succession of prospects had been repeated [and] the same fallacious 
outlets rejected” (602).   
 Gwendolen, the “spoiled child,” hardly seems like she shares Deronda’s 
sensitive, impartial sympathy, and her cowed and terrorized position as Grandcourt’s 
wife is, the title of Book IV informs us, “Gwendonlen Get[ting] Her Choice.”  Yet 
despite the fact that she initially seems so decidedly unsympathetic, Gwendolen’s 
yearning to gratify her “many-sided self” through the “reflected” pleasure of others’ 
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 See Thomas, 82-117.  This simple binary was complicated by class positions, as I noted in the section 
on Lewes.  Working-class feeling is not, like Arnold’s middle-class Hebraism, reliably anchored to 
tradition, but reflects the widespread Victorian characterization of the working-classes as unable to 
police their own desires and feelings and therefore as hopelessly immersed in the chaotic, undirected 
stream of their own sensations.    
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admiration is merely the bad, self-centered version of sympathetic self-objectification 
(586, 39).  Her “choice” to accept Grandcourt is less a deliberate decision than an 
attempt to put off decision, made first and foremost simply by declining to send 
Grandcourt away.  Though this deferral does not constitute a deliberate choice, it is the 
result of deliberation.  It is an effect of Gwendolen’s attempt, prompted by worldly 
motives, to “reason and balance” about the possible marriage against her earlier 
resolve to refuse it that had, after the revelation of Grandcourt’s illegitimate family, 
come “as the undoubting movement of her whole being” (311).  While she thus seems 
to herself to be, like Maggie Tulliver, drifting towards a decision, Gwendolen’s 
drifting is the result of her reflective hesitation, rather than its absence.  As the narrator 
remarks, “drifting depends on something besides the currents, when the sails have 
been set beforehand” (303).      
 Gwendolen’s reflective hesitation condemns her to a form of mental wandering 
in the labyrinths of reflection whose dominant quality is its repetitiveness.  Once she is 
unhappily married, she finds herself locked into an endless and impossible search for 
escapes in which “day after day the same pattern of thinking was repeated.  There 
came nothing to change the situation—no new elements in the sketch—only a 
recurrence which engraved it” (604).  Eliot here describes this reflectiveness that 
recurs without resolving itself into purposeful action by using a trope that itself recurs 
over and over again throughout Daniel Deronda: neural engraving or inscription.  
Here, the engraving of Gwendolen’s pattern of reflection evokes the mechanistic 
determinism that attended the overinscription of neural pathways in Lewes’s 
physiology and The Mill on the Floss.  The effect of this form of repetition in the 
novel is the creation of what Nicholas Dames calls alienated agency, “an activity so 
automatic that execution seems to take place outside the self, in some fully 
externalized space where the issue is less remembrance than preconscious reiteration” 
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(151).  In Daniel Deronda, however, the repetition that engraves a thought, feeling, or 
desire can intensify, rather than just attenuate, feeling.  For instance, Deronda’s advice 
to Gwendolen about channeling her fear into a dread of remorse recurs over and over 
again in her thought until, under her growing temptation to kill Grandcourt, his words 
gather such intensity that they seem “like a writing of fire within” (695).  Mordecai is 
aiming for a similar effect in his attempt to engrave his writing within Jacob Cohen.  
Despite the fact that the words Jacob memorizes are “unintelligible” to him, Mordecai 
is undeterred, heartening himself with the possibility that “my words may rule him 
some day.  Their meaning may flash out on him.  It is so with a nation—after many 
days”(476).  Mordecai hopes that Jacob’s initial insensibility to the meaning of his 
poetry will disappear in a flash of insight that closely resembles the surprise of 
sympathetic understanding in The Mill on the Floss, but meaning in Mordecai’s sense 
is both more univocal and more authoritarian.  For Jacob, sympathy with Mordecai, an 
understanding of his meaning, would leave him as dumbstruck and little able to 
question as Tom Tulliver.   
 While impartial sympathy undermines choice by endlessly deferring it, 
Mordecai is ultimately contented to do without choice altogether as long as he can 
create in Jacob a univocal sympathy with the text that has been engraved in him.24  
Mordecai, moreover, consistently figures the reinvigoration of national consciousness 
through this trope of neural writing.  In the poem he teaches Jacob, the national 
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 In his speech at the Philosophy Club, Mordecai does privilege choice and resolute action as the 
“divine principle” of his race, and his emphasis on feeling and style of “emotive argument” would seem 
to offer a template for the “passionate argumentation” that the novel endorses as the ideal mode of 
collective belonging.  In Mordecai’s Zionist project, however, choice is a one-time event, occurring 
only when an agent decides to embrace Zionism or to try to fade away through assimilation; choice 
does not serve as the basis for the continual negotiations of consent necessary for Deronda’s more 
dialogic civic ideal.  There is a similar dynamic at work in sympathy for Mordecai, who is, according to 
the narrator, “free…from the self-consciousness that has reference to others’ approbation”(399-400).  
This may seem like an admirable quality compared with Gwendolen’s love of the reflected pleasure of 
admiration, but to be so utterly indifferent to others’ approbation is also, within the theory of sympathy 
Eliot adapts from Smith, to refuse the critical reflection on one’s own acts—otherwise known as 
conscience—made possible by sympathy.  For Mordecai, in other words, sympathy is a one-way street.   
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consciousness hibernating in the breasts of diasporic Jews is a “buried ark,” each heart 
a tomb in which the “Law lies graven,” waiting for revivification (477).  This text 
engraved in the hearts of diasporic Jews is, according to Mordecai, the “heritage of 
Israel,” a racial inheritance that “lives in their veins as a power without understanding, 
like the morning exultation of herds; it is the inborn half of memory, moving as in a 
dream among writings on the walls, which it sees dimly but cannot divide into speech” 
(536).  In Mordecai’s Zionist project, Jews must articulate this writing and achieve an 
understanding of its meaning, which is, finally, a sentiment or feeling of collective 
belonging.  The meaning of racial inheritance here is thus, as Deronda thinks during 
his visit to the Frankfurt synagogue, “the sense of communion in a form,” a sense that 
is “independent of detailed verbal meaning” (367).  Deronda makes his visit to the 
synagogue before he learns of his parentage, and his powerful affective response to the 
Hebrew liturgy whose specific content and separate parts are completely opaque to 
him confirms Mordecai’s description of a Jewish inheritance that is, physiologically 
speaking, engraved within the nerves.  This model of Jewish inheritance, however, 
seems to render choice moot; if collective belonging is written into the nerves, then 
one might say of Jewish national identity that, like Mirah’s religion, it is “of one fibre 
with [the] affections…never present[ing] itself as a series of propositions” (363).    
 In contrast to Mordecai, Eliot attempts to preserve the freedom of choice 
within an open-ended racial inheritance by re-asserting some subjective agency within 
an inherited sensibility.  Cynthia Chase has famously argued that Deronda’s “choice” 
to embrace Judaism is a mystified illusion insofar as the formal and interpretive 
mechanics of narrative render it a foregone conclusion long before the moment of 
decision arrives.  Anderson faults this reading for its inattention to the reflective 
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dialogism through which Deronda constructs his national identity.25  My own reading 
is closer to Anderson’s, but I suggest that her analysis is incomplete without attention 
to the way Eliot attempts to construct, on the basis of Lewes’ physiological theory of 
inherited neural pathways, a model of open-ended racial identity based on the 
inheritance of sensibility.  Deronda himself figures his awakening to his national 
identity in these terms:  
Suppose the stolen offspring of some mountain tribe brought up in a city of the 
plain, or one with an inherited genius for painting, and born blind— the 
ancestral life would lie within them as a dim longing for unknown objects and 
sensations, and the spell-bound habit of their inherited frames would be like a 
cunningly-wrought musical instrument, never played on, but quivering 
throughout in uneasy mysterious meanings of its intricate structure that, under 
the right touch, gives music. Something like that, I think, has been my 
experience.  (750)  
Deronda here figures his neural inheritance as a habit of feeling.  “Habit” in Victorian 
Britain denoted both bodily constitution and a settled tendency, practice, or custom to 
act in a certain way, usually “acquired by frequent repetition of the same act until it 
becomes almost or quite involuntary” (OED).   A habit is an act of uncertain volition, 
but since a habit can be broken or altered, it allows for the exertion of conscious will 
where Mordecai’s insistence on being ruled by inherited feeling does not.   
 The text of Daniel Deronda is laced with habits; the word itself appears with 
almost obsessive recurrence in the novel.  Habit not only plays a crucial role in the 
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 See Chase, 215-227 and Anderson, 132.  Dames praises Chase’s article for its sensitivity to the 
novel’s temporal contortions—the “present causes of past effects”—, which he attributes to the 
“confrontation of an inescapably temporal procedure (elongated narrative) and an extra-temporal fact 
(racial and religious identity)”(155).  However, if racial identity for Eliot is, as I argue below, primarily 
a matter of habits of feeling, then racial identity is not extra-temporal, but requires progressively 
refined, and altered, repetitions. 
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novel’s theorization of racial inheritance, it is also, relatedly, the novel’s preferred 
method for regulating feeling.  Describing Grandcourt’s “intermittent, flickering” 
passions, the narrator remarks that his obstinately willful caprices may be due to “the 
want of regulated channels for the soul to move in—good and sufficient ducts of habit 
without which our nature easily turn to mere ooze and mud, and at any pressure yields 
nothing but a spurt or a puddle” (156-7).  “Ducts of habit” evokes the defined neural 
channels that conduct feeling and direct action, and suggests the importance of habit in 
regulating the flow between inward-directed feeling and outward-directed action.  
Unlike in Lewes’ physiology, where the absence of established channels allows the 
nervous system to be overwhelmed by massive and uncontrolled sensation, 
Grandcourt’s lack of habits to regulate feeling seems to render him incapable of 
feeling.  His passions are intermittent and his effect on others is “benumbing”—his 
“negative mind,” Gwendolen feels, is “as diffusive as fog, clinging to all objects and 
spoiling all contact” (587).  Yet Grandcourt’s negative mind works a transformation in 
his character comparable to the effects of uncontrollable feeling by making him so 
unpredictable that “there was no telling what might turn up in the slowly churning 
chances of his mind” (157).  The narrator observes that “the navvy waking from sleep 
and without malice heaving a stone to crush the life out of his still sleeping comrade, 
is understood to lack the trained motive which makes a character fairly calculable in 
its actions; but by a roundabout course even a gentleman may make of himself a 
chancy personage” (319).  In juxtaposing the navvy with the probable peer, Eliot 
draws from an available middle-class Victorian discourse in which the aristocrat and 
the proletarian share a similarly troubling relation to the modern—their unregulated 
feelings and desires are anarchic and associated with ooze and mud, figures of 
dissolution that are European master-tropes for the experience of modernity.26  But in 
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 That the middle-class discursively deployed their regulated sexuality, as a defining aspect of 
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her emphasis on the absence in both cases of “trained motive,” Eliot is purposefully 
revising the phrase “trained intellect,” a key term in the debates leading up to and 
succeeding the passage of the Second Reform Bill in 1867.   
 The extension of the franchise to more working-class men mandated in the 
Second Reform Bill reenergized the longstanding middle-class discussions of and 
projects for the education of Britain’s working classes.  Now that Britain’s lower 
orders had won a say in their own government, many in the middle and upper classes 
looked out on the roughly one million new voters and came to the conclusion 
expressed in the remark popularly attributed to MP Robert Lowe: “we must now 
educate our new masters.”  The goal of this education was to cultivate the “trained 
intellect” necessary for responsible political decision-making.  In the mind of Walter 
Bagehot, for instance, many of the newly enfranchised working men lacked trained 
intellect, and as a result they “[gave] anything that fasten[ed] on their emotions an 
altogether disproportionate significance” (“The Orton Demonstrations” 391).  In 
Daniel Deronda, trained intellect has become trained motive, and the intellect doesn’t 
stand opposed to and control potentially unruly emotion; rather, feelings, by being 
habitually exercised, regulate themselves.   
 Indeed, habitual feelings actually regulate thought in the novel.  The pattern of 
thinking that recurs until it engraves itself in Gwendolen’s mind beats such a relentless 
tattoo because it is “bound up with [her] passion.”  Because this pattern of thought is 
habitually stimulated by the shame, remorse, and anger that she feels over her 
marriage, “everything [becomes] porous to it—bows, smiles, conversation, repartee 
are mere honeycombs where such thought rushes freely” (602).  Habitual feeling is 
                                                                                                                                       
women’s domestic authority especially, against first the aristocracy and then the working classes in the 
fight for political hegemony is a major strand of Nancy Armstrong’s argument in her work on sexuality, 
politics, and the novel.  Armstrong is focused on sexuality, and hence misses the ways in which feelings 
and sensibility generally, not just sexual drives, is at issue in these contests. See Armstrong, 59-95 and 
161-202.    
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thus closely connected to those moments in the novel when Eliot seems to approach 
something like a concept of the unconscious, as when she famously describes 
Gwendolen’s continually recurring thoughts as “mov[ing] within her like ghosts, 
making no break in her more acknowledged consciousness and finding no obstruction 
in it: dark rays doing their work invisibly in the broad light” (606).  In this respect, 
habitual feeling is a form of what Dames calls “alienated agency.”  But habits of 
feeling are also potential objects of cultivation, as Deronda takes for granted in the 
advice he gives Gwendolen, advice that she repeats until it, too, becomes a kind of 
habit.  Recommending that she engage in “fixed meditation” to make acts that would 
add to her remorse the object of her fear and dread, Deronda explains that “we are not 
always in a state of strong emotion, and when we are calm we can use our memories 
and gradually change the bias of our fear, as we do our tastes…Try to take hold of 
your sensibility, and use it as if it were a faculty, like vision" (452).  To take hold of 
“habitual emotion” (453) as if it were a faculty is a project of cultivation that, Deronda 
here recognizes, bears broad similarities with projects of aesthetic education that 
proliferated in the nineteenth century. 
 Daniel Deronda itself offers its readers a peculiar version of aesthetic 
education, according to Nicholas Dames, who argues that, in Eliot’s understanding, 
the novel’s elongated form “school[s] its readers in the experience of duration.”  Eliot 
uses the patient experience of duration, what Dames calls the “full, deliberate 
consciousness” of the passage of time, as the basis for a “political/religious ethic of 
lastingness,” a practice of adhering to and maintaining traditions and customary 
institutions (164, 161).  In Dames’ argument, the novel teaches its readers to 
experience duration, to wait, by subjecting them to its extended narrative form—a 
form so elongated and capacious that Eliot herself seemed to worry that it might 
induce boredom and irritation and defy comprehension.  To aid memory and 
 66 
comprehension under the strenuous conditions of extended reading, Eliot, drawing 
from Wagner, incorporates in her narrative motivic elements, repetitions of symbolic 
objects, significant gestures, or lines of text.  If, as Dames argues, these motivic 
repetitions throughout the novel are Eliot’s means of jogging readers’ memories and 
prompting them to connect dispersed events and moments in the novel, her repetitions 
are also means for structuring readerly affect.27  In other words, the repetitions that are 
so salient in the text of the novel are, like the repetitions that engrave feelings within 
the novel’s characters, likewise a means of cultivating habits of feeling in its readers.    
 The participation of Daniel Deronda in a project of cultivating habits of 
feeling that resembles Mordecai’s “engraving” his poem in Jacob Cohen raises 
questions about the place of agency and consent in the reading and writing of the 
novel.  Does the novel itself cultivate only an alienated agency, the unwilled repetition 
of emotion, in its readers?  The danger to agency entailed by the novel’s repetitions, 
moreover, cuts both ways, applying to the author as well as the reader.  In the writing 
of the novel Eliot herself was subject to what Dames calls “a habit of verbatim 
reiteration,” whose excessiveness was so widely complained of and puzzled over in 
reviews of the 1876 serial edition that, embarrassed, she felt compelled to delete some 
of them for the 1878 Cabinet edition.28  Beyond the specific instance of Deronda, 
Eliot’s comments on form in art, from a set of her notes dated 1868, suggest that 
poetic form itself is the product of habits of feeling.  There, she writes that “emotion, 
by its tendency to repetition, i.e. rhythmic persistence in proportion as diversifying 
thought is absent, creates a form by its recurrence in adjustment with certain given 
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 Such an effect would be consistent with Eliot’s understanding of poetic form as both determined by 
the sequence of emotions in the poet and as expressing—that is, transmitting to an auditor/reader—that 
sequence of emotions.  Note that Eliot uses “poetic” here to denote the literary in general.  See “Notes 
on Form in Art,” 433-4. 
28
 The most famous of these reviews is by Henry James, who pointed out the obsessive recurrence of 
gestural tics in the novel, but James was far from alone in noting the novel’s stylistic peculiarities.  See 
Dames, 161, 124.   
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conditions of sound, language, action, or environment” (“Notes on Form in Art” 435).  
While poetic form thus seems to emerge spontaneously and unreflectively, through the 
repetition of feeling in the absence of “diversifying thought,” Eliot insists that the poet 
exercises reflective choice in the combination of elements—images, rhythms, tones, 
etc.—as the “accordant expression” of the repeating emotional state.  Literary form is 
thus for Eliot the product of reflection and feeling, deliberation and spontaneity, 
“diversifying thought” and emotional repetition.29        
 By the mid 1870s when she wrote Deronda, however, Eliot was sure of neither 
the efficacy or the stability of this cooperation of feeling and thought in poetic 
production.  Her uncertainty is crystallized in the novel’s treatment of Deronda’s 
mother, the Princess Leonora Halm-Elberstein, who has long and often been 
recognized as a surrogate for Eliot herself.  Like Eliot as she theorizes her own method 
of composition, Leonora’s artistic talents are expressed as a combination of 
spontaneous feeling and its conscious expression that Eliot, in a famous passage, 
describes as “a form of sincere acting.”  “This woman’s nature,” Eliot writes, “was 
one in which all feeling…immediately became matter of conscious representation: 
experience immediately passed into drama, and she acted her own emotions…It would 
not be true to say that she felt less because of this double consciousness: she felt—that 
is, her mind went through—all the more, but with a difference; each nucleus of pain or 
pleasure had a deep atmosphere of the excitement or spiritual intoxication which at 
once exalts and deadens” (629).  Sincere acting is an easily recognizable version of 
poetic production; by immediately casting her feelings into conscious representations, 
Leonora is constantly formalizing her own emotional experience.  In Leonora’s case, 
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 It is also subject to a trajectory similar to that of pathways of feeling in Lewes’ physiology: poetic 
form begins with the repetition and gradual definition of a feeling or emotional state, but through 
continued repetition, it is “starved into an ingenious pattern-work, in which tricks with vocables take the 
place of living words fed with the blood of relevant meaning, & made musical by the continual 
intercommunication of sensibility & thought” (436).   
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however, her sincere acting is described as a “double consciousness,” which suggests 
not a cooperative activity but merely simultaneous or adjacent ones.   
 A widely discussed and debated phenomenon in nineteenth-century 
psychology, “double consciousness” denotes a condition akin to dissociative identity 
disorder, in which two or more separate and independent consciousnesses exist within 
the same person.30  Leonora’s sudden shifts in manner and mood during her meeting 
with Deronda make plain that she is indeed experiencing double consciousness in this 
sense; marveling at one such display of volatility, the narrator remarks that “it was as 
if her mind were breaking into several, one jarring the other into impulsive action” 
(636).  This psychic fragmentation springs, fundamentally, from the double 
consciousness of her sincere acting, which splits Leonora’s psyche along the fault line 
between her spontaneous, emotional experience and her conscious, reflective 
representation of that experience.  This split runs parallel, moreover, to the fracturing 
of Leonora’s identity between her choice of an assimilated, cosmopolitan life and her 
identity as a Jewish woman that remains inscribed within her sensibility.  Both 
Leonora and Deronda describe this choice as, first and foremost, an act of will, which 
in the novel’s psychological lexicon is already implicitly aligned with negation and 
opposed to the “motives” that are properly the expression of regulated feeling.  As 
with Grandcourt, whose benumbing, negative mind transformed him into a version of 
the working class navvy lacking “trained motive,” Leonora’s choice to negate her 
racial and gender identity in order to live “the myriad lives in one” (626) of a 
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 Double consciousness is best known today from W.E.B. Du Bois’ influential use of the concept to 
theorize the effects of African-Americans’ oppressive marginalization in white-dominated U.S. society 
and culture, but the term was in extensive use in 19
th
 century psychology from at least 1817.  For Du 
Bois, as well as for Eliot, double consciousness is primarily a condition of self-alienation.  See Du Bois, 
194, and Bruce, 303.  In Eliot’s own work, double consciousness plays a significant role in The Lifted 
Veil.  There, Latimer uses it to describe his experience of second sight and especially to figure the 
contest between his passion for Bertha and his telepathic insight into her “barren, selfish soul,” a contest 
he compares to a conflict between impulses and ideas.      
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professional actress similarly consigns her to the chanciness of a disintegrated stream 
of sensation, unstructured by habit.  Leonora’s adherence to her own will in defiance 
of her gendered and racialized habit, in other words, produces a double consciousness 
that undermines her capacity for volition and fragments her consciousness so 
thoroughly that her illness seems nothing less than a literalization of her psychic 
disintegration.31   
 As a result of this convergence of the effects of unregulated feeling and 
attenuated feeling, the compulsive repetitions of alienated agency appear within the 
chanciness and fragmentation of unregulated feeling.  As Leonora’s psychic and 
physical disintegration worsen, the capacity for resistance that defined her act of will 
bleeds away.  As a result, her suppressed identity re-emerges as a “strange coercion,” a 
text from which she “quot[es] unwillingly” that, in a rehearsal of Gwendolen’s own 
repetition compulsion, “make[s] ghosts upon the daylight” (632, 662, 636).  Even 
before her illness weakens her capacity for resistance, however, Leonora’s double 
consciousness already presages this later moment insofar as the division in her 
consciousness makes even her willful acts of “conscious representation” seem less 
under her control and so closer to a form of alienated agency.  In this respect, then, 
Leonora, Deronda’s bad Jewish mother, resembles Lapidoth, Mordecai’s and Mirah’s 
deadbeat Jewish father, whose compulsive gambling and unregulated chanciness are, 
obviously, intertwined.  Lapidoth likewise possesses an enhanced mimetic ability, but 
he seems even more detached from the feelings he represents than Leonora.  He recalls 
the family he abandoned, for example, with “an unemotional memory, which was like 
the ocular perception of a touch to one who has lost the sense of touch, or like morsels 
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 Anderson reads Leonora as, due to her gender, the novel’s limit-case for Deronda’s ideal of reflective 
dialogism: “if raised to a higher level of consistency [consonant with this ideal of critical puralism], 
Eliot’s project should be better able to accommodate Leonora’s enactment of postconventionality” 
(143).  Eliot’s commitment to reflective dialogism in Daniel Deronda is, however, grounded in a theory 
of race that simply cannot accommodate Leonora’s repudiation of her Jewish identity.    
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on an untasting palate, having shape and grain, but no flavor” (742).  Yet Lapidoth 
combines this detached cunning with not only the compulsive repetitions of his 
gambling habit, but also with “hysterical excitability,” a medicalized condition that 
condenses manifold Victorian anxieties about unregulated feeling (777).   
 Neil Hertz has noted many of the parallels drawn in Daniel Deronda between 
Leonora, Grandcourt, Gwendolen, Lapidoth, and the novel’s author George Eliot 
through moments in which each suffers from irreducibly indeterminate relations to 
compulsive repetition, feeling, and agency.  Hertz argues that these moments are the 
effect of “the neutral”—the ground on which signifying oppositions deploy 
themselves, the original gap or emptiness between signifier and signified and between 
ego and object that allows for entry into the symbolic (112-137).  Hertz’s reading is 
rich and suggestive, but his psychoanalytic framework excludes attention to how the 
entanglements and parallels he notes are discursively determined by the overlapping 
political, philosophical, and physiological contexts within which Eliot’s novel 
elaborates the relations between feeling, agency, and compulsive repetition.   
 We have seen how Eliot’s 1860 novel, The Mill on the Floss, endorses an 
ethical practice of sympathy that is a kind of critical feeling.  Sympathy in The Mill on 
the Floss is a practice of attempting to feel what one imagines the other feels, a 
practice which therefore entails the reflective dialogism of recognizing the possibility 
of multiple and indeterminate meanings.  Since sympathy is thus open to a dialogism 
of feeling, it also prevents a routinization of feeling that attenuates it and compromises 
agency by rendering thoughts and feelings automatic.  By the mid 1870s, when Eliot 
wrote Daniel Deronda, troubling features had emerged in her regulative ideal of 
sympathy.  Developments within Victorian critical and political discourse, influenced 
especially by Arnold’s Culture and Anarchy, and by the passage of the Second 
Reform Bill in 1867 and the 1868 triumph and 1874 defeat of the first Gladstone 
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ministry, had stiffened the opposition between reflection and feeling, and loaded the 
two terms with heavier political associations.  Partly as a result of these developments, 
sympathy in Eliot’s last novel has become “impartial sympathy”; from a mode of 
critical feeling, sympathy has devolved into merely a mode of being critical.  Closely 
aligned with abstraction, impartial sympathy in Deronda creates a shifting of 
perspective so fluid and glib that it threatens to “nullify all differences,” and thereby to 
undermine feeling.  To head off this threat and salvage her liberal traditionalism, Eliot 
attempts in her last novel to ground sympathy and feeling in habit.  Whereas the 
figuring of the sympathetic consciousness as a palimpsest stresses openness to the 
potential re-writing of feelings, the emphasis on habits of feeling in Deronda calls 
attention to the difficulty, the necessary repetitions, that must go into such re-
inscriptions.  To describe a feeling as a habit, moreover, stresses the more ambiguous 
role of volition in its experience.  A habit can be cultivated, a feeling can be employed 
“as if it were a faculty,” but the effort required to reshape or alter an act whose 
performance has become involuntary guarantees cultural continuity due to the gradual 
pace of any reforms based on such a project of cultivation.  Moreover, Eliot’s habits of 
feeling are doubly resistant to rapid change because, for Eliot, such habits are the 
modes of feeling written in the neural pathways that one inherits.  Habits of feeling are 
a form of racial identity. 
 As James Buzard has recently argued, Eliot’s privileging of racial inheritance 
in Daniel Deronda sets the limits to the novel’s affirmation of criticism and negotiated 
consent as integral to national belonging.  In Buzard’s reading, however, Eliot’s novel 
privileges race in distinction from culture, which he assumes is more amenable to 
criticism and reform and therefore less stable: “Only in the always already-vanishing 
traditional rural community do ethnicity and acculturation—blood and habit—
supposedly go hand in hand and do not even have to be distinguished from one 
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another.  Self-consciously mobile groups…have a greater need to privilege race over 
culture as the defining element of group identity” (296).  In fact, Eliot’s novel seeks 
conceptually to rejoin blood with habit in its elaboration of habits of feeling as racial 
inheritance.   
 Although habits of feeling are cultivated in Daniel Deronda, they nonetheless 
overlap with other forms of alienated agency that are linked to the attenuation of 
feeling in Lewes’ physiology and in The Mill on the Floss.  In a sense, Deronda’s 
habits of feeling are a reconfiguration and partial reversal of the gambit for agency 
Lewes figures in the “vigorous thinker.”  Vigorous thinking seeks to preserve agency 
by sacrificing precision in feeling and acting in order to keep them from becoming so 
routinized that their performance becomes involuntary.  Eliot’s inherited habits of 
feeling, on the other hand, give up agency and control in order to preserve traditions 
and the feelings attaching to them from a reflectiveness that neutralizes feeling and 
cannot resolve itself into decision or action.  Yet the involuntary performance of 
actions or feelings that constitutes a habit is, in Lewes’ work, directly linked to the 
attenuation of feeling through its greater and greater restriction and frictionless flow 
through the neural channels that repetition inscribes ever more deeply in the nervous 
system.  In physiological terms, the longer a habit of feeling is repeated, the longer, 
that is, a feeling is a habit, the more the strength of that feeling dissipates.  A habit of 
feeling, even one that comprises the most cherished tradition, would thus lose its vigor 
by dint of repetition, implying the physiological necessity for the gradual alteration of 
habits through projects of cultivation.  This element of contradiction nonetheless 
seems to unsettle Daniel Deronda, and perhaps motivates Eliot’s treatment of 
Leonora, and especially Lapidoth, as bad Others in the novel.  Both combine versions 
of a critical detachment from feeling borne of mimetic ability with habits—the 
compulsive and involuntary repetitions of gambling and the performance of 
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emotion—that undermine each character’s capacity for feeling.  Eliot’s preoccupation 
with the question of how to preserve the vigor of a feeling or tradition from being 
blunted by repetition extends to the form of the novel as well.  As we have seen, the 
formal repetitions, I am tempted to call them habits of composition, that critics found 
so peculiar in Daniel Deronda raise questions about the reader’s relationship to these 
repeated emotional cues as well as about the degree of volition and the intensity of 
feeling involved in poetic production for the author, namely George Eliot.  That 
Eliot’s own theory of poetic production called for a sentimental effort—comprised of 
spontaneous emotion and deliberate reflection—that has in Daniel Deronda become a 
form of double consciousness suggests that, by the mid 1870s, these are questions that 
had become harder for her to answer.
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CHAPTER 3 
READING IN THE DARK: 
SENSORY PERCEPTION AND AGENCY IN THE RETURN OF THE NATIVE 
 
 
Let a person enter his room in the dark and grope among the objects there.  The touch 
of the matches will instantaneously recall their appearance.  If his hand comes in 
contact with an orange on the table, the golden yellow of the fruit, its savor and 
perfume will forthwith shoot through his mind.  In passing the hand over the sideboard 
or in jogging the coal-scuttle with the foot, the large glossy dark shape of the one and 
the irregular blackness of the other awaken like a flash and constitute what we call the 
recognition of the objects.  The voice of the violin faintly echoes through the mind as 
the hand is laid upon it in the dark, and the feeling of the garments or draperies which 
may hang about the room is not understood till the look correlative to the feeling has 
in each case been resuscitated. 
  —William James, The Principles of Psychology 
  
When Thomas Hardy decided to stop writing novels in the 1890s, he blamed 
his readers.  Reflecting on the notorious charges made by Mowbray Morris in The 
Quarterly Review that Tess of the D’Urbervilles was a “clumsy sordid tale of boorish 
brutality and lust,” Hardy remarked in a private note: “How strange that one may write 
a book without knowing what one puts into it—or rather, the reader reads into it! Well, 
if this sort of thing continues no more novel-writing for me.  A man must be a fool to 
deliberately stand up to be shot at” (Life and Work, 259).    This note has helped shape 
a critical mythology in which Hardy, a daring liberal crusader against unjust social 
conventions, is hounded out of fiction-writing by the hypocritically prurient over-
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interpretations of late Victorian readers.32  Among other things, this mythology 
obscures the fact that both long before and long after the scandals occasioned by Tess 
and Jude, Hardy’s writings betray a persistent unease about reading, often representing 
it as a solipsistic and unethical act.  This is especially true of Hardy’s 1878 novel, The 
Return of the Native.  Consider, for example, the disastrous mésalliances that comprise 
the plot of that novel.  Bad marriages are thoroughly typical of Hardy’s fiction, but in 
The Return of the Native they are directly precipitated by acts of reading.  Characters 
in that novel read each other, each regarding the other’s face “not as a picture, but…as 
a page,” and in doing so they misread each other, with catastrophic results (167).   The 
novel represents these acts of reading as forms of prosopopoeia, prefiguring Hardy’s 
later complaint that, in the furor over Jude the Obscure, “he underwent the strange 
experience of beholding a sinister lay figure of himself constructed by [readers and 
reviewers], which had no sort of resemblance to him as he was.”33  Yet the characters’ 
acts of reading in The Return of the Native also rehearse the instance of 
prosopopoeia—literally, to make a face—that famously opens that novel, in which the 
narrator figures Egdon Heath as “a face on which time makes but little impression” 
(9).  The novel suggests that the capacity for such acts of prosopopoeia, for treating 
phenomena as figures, is the defining characteristic of “the more thinking among 
mankind,” a group in which Hardy, naturally, included himself (11).    
The Return of the Native thus depicts reading as at once an empowering mode 
of understanding and a solipsistic mode of appropriating or misinterpreting others.  
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 Dale Kramer, for example, cites the note as evidence for his claim, in agreement with Hardy’s 
biographers, that “it is quite likely that…Hardy dedicated himself to Jude with the idea that this would 
be his last novel, and with every intention of having his full say in defiance of the convention-ridden 
reviewers who refused his fictional characters the kind of sympathy and tolerance that in most cases 
they would have granted their personal acquaintances.” See Kramer, 165.    
33
 See Life and Work, 288. Hardy’s autobiography was originally presented as a biography written by 
his wife, Florence. Therefore, Hardy refers to himself in the third-person throughout, except in the 
reprinted personal notes.   
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The novel’s most emblematic reader in this regard is Clym, whose combination of 
insight and fatal misunderstanding is literalized, in Hardy’s terms, when he goes blind 
from reading too much.  Reading and blindness.  For Hardy, they imply one another, 
but not strictly as cause and effect.  Hardy’s novel suggests that blindness is the effect 
of the inevitably partial and self-serving character of reading and, at the same time, the 
state that makes possible its interpretive activities.34  Reading is a narrowly focalized 
mode of perception in The Return of the Native.  Its concentrated cognitive activity 
depends on the subject’s ability to block out a larger field of stimuli.  Hardy figures 
this mental act of inattention required by reading as a mode of sensory deprivation 
whose most emblematic form is blindness.  Hence, Clym’s blindness is not only the 
consequence of reading but its precondition.  Clym blinds himself not just by reading 
per se but, quite specifically, by reading in the dark.     
The blindness of reading in The Return of the Native signals Hardy’s debt to 
late Victorian cognitive science, particularly to associationist psychology.  The 
fundamental tenet of the school was that any given idea or sensation automatically 
recalls to the mind other ideas and sensations connected to it by similarity and 
temporal or spatial contiguity.  Associationists held that all objects are bundles of 
contiguously experienced sensations, and that each sensation in the bundle, if 
experienced in isolation, stimulates the memory of its partners.  Association thus 
                                                
34
 Hardy’s allegory of reading in The Return of the Native anticipates many of the arguments in Paul de 
Man’s “The Rhetoric of Blindness.” Like Hardy, de Man argues that reading is made possible by a form 
of blindness. For de Man, this blindness is a confused or mystified attribution of presence—of literal 
meaning or authorial intention—to a literary text, the language of which is defined first of all by its 
rhetoricity, its figurative mode and discontinuity with a grounding authorial consciousness. This 
blindness is not only inevitable (at least to an extent) but enabling for the critical reader, who anchors 
her critical interpretations by composing an authorial intending subject standing behind the text. Thus 
the blindness of de Man’s reader, like the blindness of Hardy’s, operates partly through an uncritical act 
of prosopopoeia that nonetheless opens up the possibility of critical interpretive work. As I shall argue 
below, however, Hardy is even more radical than de Man in that, while de Man is elaborating a literary 
semiotics, Hardy’s novels and essays elaborate a semiotic phenomenology. In other words, while these 
conditions of blindness and insight apply exclusively to (especially literary) language for de Man, for 
Hardy they apply to language and sense perception alike. See de Man, 102-141.          
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transforms the entire field of objects into sensory signs, and perception itself into a 
mode of cognition analogous to reading.35  William James, for example, illustrates in 
my epigraph the principle that any given sensation serves as a sign for its associates 
(James 555-6).   The recognitions James describes there are instances of metonymic 
association—the recollection of the sensations that are usually experienced alongside 
the signifying sensation.  Early associationists, such as Hartley and James Mill, tended 
to emphasize contiguous association to the exclusion of association via resemblance.  
Led in part by the challenges to conventional concepts of cognitive agency in the 
burgeoning fields of physiology and experimental psychology, James and other late 
Victorian theorists of association shifted focus back to association via resemblance as 
the basis for a new psycho-physiological account of agency.  Operating through 
metaphoric leaps from the signifying sensation to others with which that sensation is 
less routinely linked, metaphoric association for these theorists became the means of 
an interpretive re-envisioning of experience, a way of breaking up and transfiguring 
the routinized perceptions of contiguous association.   
 Hardy’s novels and critical essays demonstrate an intense interest in these 
psycho-physiological theories and an abiding investment in a similar model of 
cognitive agency.   The Return of the Native suggests that blindness—or any other 
condition that obscures the sensations by which objects are routinely perceived—can 
stimulate the imaginative re-interpretation of experience that associationists identified 
with metaphoric association.  In his essays and notes, Hardy claims that this mode of 
associative cognition provides a model for the kind of widely interpretive 
perception—the “imaginative sense of fact”—that drives his own artistic practice.36  
                                                
35
 The link between association and reading was made as early as Hume’s Treatise, in which Hume 
suggests that association is the mental operation underlying signification. See Hume, 64-5. 
36
 I take this phrase, of course, from Walter Pater’s “Style,” published in 1888, ten years after The 
Return of the Native. I use Pater’s phrase despite its later publication because it encapsulates the notions 
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For both author and reader, Hardy suggests, associative interpretation is an embodied 
version of Matthew Arnold’s ideal of criticism: the spontaneous play of consciousness 
on stock notions and habits.  Like Arnold’s critical ideal, Hardy’s model of what we 
might term critical interpretation is a form of freedom, of aesthetic agency in the 
fullest sense, through which the subject imaginatively constructs his world at the level 
of sensory perception.  If association thus makes authorship possible, however, Hardy 
suggests that it does so by licensing a peculiar form of solipsism.  Moreover, Hardy’s 
writings evince a fear that, by investing such transformative agency in the act of 
interpretation, association also empowers the reader to displace the author—a 
misgiving that anticipates twentieth-century theories of the death of the author.  This 
essay analyzes the theory of critical interpretation elaborated in Hardy’s essays and in 
The Return of the Native.  I argue that interpretation for Hardy is a broadly aesthetic 
and affective act, encompassing modes of associative perception that operate on the 
full range of bodily sensations.  In doing so, I aim to correct the tendency in much 
scholarly work on Hardy to ascribe too much importance to vision and to reorient 
recent lines of inquiry on embodiment in Hardy’s writing towards his fascination with 
sensory perception and materialist epistemologies.37  It is ultimately this fascination, I 
argue, that gives rise to Hardy’s lasting ambivalence towards reading, and shapes his 
indignant response to the critical attacks on his later novels.    
                                                                                                                                       
of authorship that emerged among writers attentive to cognitive science in the late Victorian period. See 
Appreciations, 1-36.     
37
 The importance of vision in Hardy’s novels and poems has been so thoroughly established in 
scholarly work that vision has come to seem almost identical to mind itself for Hardy criticism. J. B. 
Bullen’s assertion that “the more clearly something is seen in [Hardy’s] work, the more clearly it is 
understood” has been nuanced by Ruth Bernard Yeazell’s recent exploration of light in Hardy’s fiction, 
in which she observes that visual experience is complex and is illusory as often as it is revealing. 
Nonetheless, Yeazell still maintains that light, and by extension visual experience, is “the medium of 
subjectivity” in Hardy’s novels. Anna Henchman’s work on Hardy and Victorian astronomy, while 
likewise disputing many of the stale assumptions in earlier work on sight in Hardy, still privileges 
vision as the sine qua non of sensory perception generally. See Bullen, 8; Yeazell, 48-75; and 
Henchman, 37-64.  See also Berger.  Embodiment more broadly in Hardy’s fiction has been analyzed in 
relation to work by Elaine Scarry and in relation to Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of “faciality” by 
William Cohen.   
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The Semiotics of Sensory Perception 
 
 In his 1888 essay, “The Profitable Reading of Fiction,” Hardy claims that in 
addition to judging a novel’s “regularity” of character and plot, “the appreciative, 
perspicacious reader…will see what his author is aiming at, and by affording full 
scope to his own insight, catch the vision which the writer has in his eye, and is 
endeavoring to project upon the paper, even while it half eludes him” (64).   Hardy 
here suggests that reading is an act of collaboration, in which the reader supplements 
the text by reconstructing the author’s intentions despite his imperfect expression of 
them.  This collaborative  dynamic defines Hardy’s ideal reading scenario; he 
repeatedly, if implicitly, invokes it in his remarks on the reading of his work.38  If this 
ideal reading scenario assumes a fairly generous reader, it also assumes that the reader 
is encountering a text with gaps or opacities, that the author’s vision has in fact “half 
elude[d] him.” Indeed, it implies that the best kind of reading—“appreciative, 
perspicacious” reading—can only be called forth by an imperfect piece of literature.  
The reader’s perspicacity can only exist in proportion to the text’s imperfection.   
 Hardy clarifies the aesthetic principles underlying perspicacious reading in his 
1906 essay, “Memories of Church Restoration.” In this essay, Hardy expresses his 
ambivalence about Victorian methods of restoring old churches, a procedure that had 
in fact made up the bulk of his work as an architect.  Criticizing the restorers’ cavalier 
tendency to replace the existing materials of the churches wholesale, Hardy 
nonetheless maintains that such methods are entirely consistent with the attempt to 
preserve the buildings’ formal beauty, which inheres not in the particular materials 
                                                
38
 In the preface to The Dynasts, for example, Hardy claims that the text assumes “a completion of the 
action by those to whom the drama is addressed” in “supplementary scenes of the imagination” (viii).  
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making up a given church but in its “insubstantial” outline.  Architectural form is an 
“aesthetic phantom without solidity,” freed from the contingencies of its concrete 
manifestation as long as its ideal outline can be discerned by the architect.  The 
architect thus occupies a position vis-à-vis the church that is analogous to that of the 
reader vis-à-vis the text in Hardy’s ideal reading scenario.  Just as the reader 
supplements the text by extrapolating from it the author’s imperfectly executed 
intentions, the architect sees through the dilapidated church to the ideal form it 
approximates.39  In the process, however, the restoring architect neglects what Hardy 
calls the beauty of association.  Whereas a church’s formal beauty is static, an 
aesthetic idea that persists in spite of the changes worked by time on the materials that 
compose it, its associative effects are the product of its history, of the meanings given 
to it and the uses made of it by humans during its passage through time.  The 
associative sense both depends on and fosters historical continuity and social 
cohesiveness insofar as it values the traces of human activities and histories left on the 
materials composing the church and the ad hoc alterations to its form.  Hardy therefore 
argues that “the protection of an ancient edifice against renewal in fresh materials is 
even more of a social—I may say a humane—duty than an aesthetic one.   It is the 
preservation of history, fellowships, fraternities” (105-6).   
Hardy’s claims about formal and associative beauty and their respective social 
values reveal a clear debt to Ruskin’s aesthetic theories.   In The Stones of Venice, 
Ruskin argues that “in decoration or beauty, it is less the actual loveliness of the thing 
produced than the choice and invention concerned in the production, which are to 
delight us; the love and the thoughts of the workman more than his work; his work 
must always be imperfect, but his thoughts and affections may be true and deep” (32).  
                                                
39
 With the difference, of course, that the reader does not attempt to render his interpretation permanent 
by amending the text. See “Memories of Church Restoration,” 103.  
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Here, as in Hardy’s essays, the ideal form is simply the never-to-be-realized adequate 
expression of the artist’s consciousness and intentions from which our delight in the 
building truly derives.40  The spectator can thus read a building, according to Ruskin, 
by attending to the “mental tendencies of the builders, legibly expressed in it” (159).   
As long as the building itself remains legible, its imperfections are nothing more than 
the misspellings, smudges, and partial erasures that make it distinctive as a text and 
express the freedom of its authors. 
 Ruskin’s abstraction of artistic meaning from its concrete embodiment in The 
Stones of Venice rehearses a move he had made earlier in Modern Painters, where he 
defined “great art” as that which conveyed the greatest number of ideas to the 
spectator’s intellect, the “high[est] faculty of the mind.”  The composition of any 
particular painting is merely the “language” in which those ideas are expressed, and 
“the highest thoughts are those which are least dependent on language, [and therefore] 
the dignity of any composition, and praise to which it is entitled, are in exact 
proportion to its independency of language or expression” (Modern Painters, Vol.  1 
10-2).   Ruskin goes so far as to claim that an artist achieves truthfulness to the degree 
she induces a forgetfulness of the sensuous art-object in the spectator caught up in 
reflection on the higher order truths expressed in the painting, beside which “even the 
noblest ideas of beauty sink at once…into subordination and subjection” (33).   The 
subordination of beauty here parallels the distinction Ruskin draws between landscape 
paintings that merely faithfully depict natural objects in a neutral field and those that 
attempt to express the thoughts and feelings of the painter.   The first type brings a 
landscape to the spectator’s eyes, leaving him to reflect or feel as he will, whereas the 
                                                
40
 Like most middle-class Victorians with an interest in art, Hardy was well acquainted with Ruskin’s 
criticism.  He read Modern Painters during his efforts in the 1860s to educate himself in the visual arts, 
and invokes passages from The Stones of Venice both in notes written during his first trip to Venice in 
1887 and in his subsequent recollections of this trip in his autobiography. See Bullen, 23, and The Life 
and Work of Thomas Hardy, 201-3.    
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second masters and directs the spectator’s attention, guiding his mind “to those objects 
most worthy of its contemplation,” and leaving him “ennobled and instructed, under 
the sense of…having held communion with a new mind, and having been endowed for 
a time with the keen perception and the impetuous emotion of a nobler and more 
penetrating intelligence.”  Insofar as the first landscape painter chooses at all, she only 
selects on the basis of disinterested, universal standards of beauty, whereas the second 
landscape painter chooses objects for depiction based on their meaning and relation to 
her particular thoughts and feelings, rather than their beauty.   For this reason, the 
second landscape is an “expression and awakening of individual thought,” whereas the 
first is as standardized as “a tradesman’s wares” (47-9).    
 Aesthetics thus seem to have been thoroughly subordinated to intellect in the 
first volume of Modern Painters, the very universality of beauty aligning it with the 
industrial production and alienated labor Ruskin so hated.   Ruskin defines the 
beautiful as the quality in any object that gives us pleasure in its contemplation 
“without any direct and definite exertion of the intellect,” and treats aesthetic 
experience of the beautiful as comparable to, though not identified with, simple, 
unreflective sense experience, “instinctive” and “necessary.”  Yet Ruskin insists that 
ideas of beauty are subjects of what he calls “moral perception” (29-31), a claim he 
echoes in the second volume of Modern Painters when he asserts “impressions of 
beauty…are neither sensual nor intellectual, but moral.” He explains that impressions 
of beauty are subjects not of our aesthetic faculty alone, but of our aesthetic faculty 
transformed by an awareness of a divine “Intelligence” that created both the beautiful 
object and our capacity for pleasure in it.   Our aesthetic faculties are by themselves 
“the mere animal consciousness of the pleasantness”; transfigured by a perception of 
divine purposiveness, our aesthetic sense becomes what Ruskin calls the theoretic 
faculty (Modern Painters, Vol.  2 13, 17).   Just as the spectator’s intellect reads the 
 83 
art-object for the artist’s intentions and consciousness, the theoretic faculty discovers 
in the beautiful object the divine intentions that license purely aesthetic pleasure.   
Ruskin goes on to insist that “no idea can be at all considered as in any way an idea of 
beauty until it be made up of these [feelings of gratitude and reverence for God], any 
more than we can be said to have an idea of a letter of which we perceive the perfume 
and the fair writing, without understanding the contents of it, or the intent of it” (18).   
Though Ruskin contends that the theoretic faculty is one of moral perception as 
distinguished from both intellectual and sense perception, it seems better described as 
a combination of the two.   Sense perception takes pleasure in the beautiful object, 
pleasure that is hallowed by the perception of “the moral meaning of it,” which is in 
turn, Ruskin suggests, “only discoverable by reflection” (144).   Reflection is the more 
vital for Ruskin in that it is only through its discovery of the moral meanings of 
aesthetic pleasure that we can determine for which sense impressions it is our duty to 
cultivate a preference.    
 Ruskin’s claims are potentially undermined, however, by the destabilizing 
effects of what he calls “the Associative faculty” (37).  In Modern Painters, Ruskin 
dismisses the associationist aesthetics elaborated by Archibald Alison in his 1790 
Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste.   Ruskin scoffs at Alison’s claim that 
beauty is merely the agreeableness we experience in objects associated with pleasing 
experiences and ideas, mocking especially Alison’s contention that historical interest 
can elicit an aesthetic response.   Nevertheless, Ruskin claims that, as opposed to 
“rational association”—the conscious association of objects with known histories or 
experiences—“accidental association” can exert a powerful influence on theoretic 
judgments: 
The eye cannot rest on a material form, in a moment of depression or 
exultation, without communicating to that form…a charm or a painfulness for 
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which we shall be unable to account even to ourselves, which will not indeed 
be perceptible, except by its delicate influence on our judgment in cases of 
complicated beauty.   Let the eye but rest on a rough piece of branch of curious 
form during a conversation with a friend, rest however unconsciously, and 
though the conversation be forgotten…yet the eye will, through the whole life 
after, take a certain pleasure in such boughs which it had not before, a pleasure 
so slight, a trace of feeling so delicate, as to leave us utterly unconscious of its 
peculiar power; but undestroyable by any reasoning, a part, thenceforward, of 
our constitution, destroyable only by the same arbitrary process of association 
by which it was created.   Reason had no effect upon it whatsoever.   And there 
is probably no one opinion which is formed by any of us, in matters of taste, 
which is not in some degree influenced by unconscious association of this 
kind.   (37)  
The unconscious, arbitrary power of associative feeling defies and undermines reason 
or reflection.   Its operations are “momentous” enough to overwhelm the theoretic 
faculty, yet they are also so ethereal as to escape detection, and thus forestall any 
attempt by reason to correct for their presence in an analysis of taste.   The illegible 
stories of the spectator’s own previous experiences become inextricably interpolated 
in the texts of authorial consciousness or Divine Intelligence.    
 Associative feeling thus imports an unconscious solipsism into theoretic 
judgments.   As if startled by his own implications, Ruskin no sooner concludes the 
passage quoted above than he attempts to ground associative feeling in moral agency 
by claiming that pleasure and pain have the most associative power when they stem 
from “duty performed or omitted.”  The lingering feelings arbitrarily connected to 
different objects thus become “the record of conscience, written in things external” 
(143-4).   The spectator affected by associative feeling reads the story of her own 
 85 
moral agency externalized in affecting objects.   Ruskin’s reasoning, not to mention 
his premises, is unconvincing—if associative feeling is not detectable as such, if it 
operates unconsciously, then as the written record of conscience isn’t it still 
illegible?—not least because in order to make this argument he has to conflate 
unconscious, “accidental association” with “rational association,” collapsing the 
distinction he draws to describe the effects of association on theoretic judgment in the 
first place.     
 Despite the complications and contradictions it introduces into his arguments, 
Ruskin cannot simply reject the role of association in aesthetic experience, because its 
destabilizing force is necessary to preserve individual difference.   The deviation from 
conventional perception that associative feeling introduces in theoretic judgments is an 
individuating principle: “by the mingling of universal and peculiar principles…such 
difference is secured in the feelings as shall make fellowship itself more delightful, by 
its inter-communicate character; and such variety of feeling also in each of us 
separately as shall make us capable of enjoying scenes of different kinds and orders, 
instead of morbidly seeking for some perfect epitome of the Beautiful in one” (38).   
Associative feeling preserves the possibility of individual variation within theoretic 
judgments, which would otherwise ossify into thoroughly standardized responses. 
  A similar dilemma underlies Hardy’s claims in his aesthetic essays and his 
treatment of sensory perception in The Return of the Native.   Hardy draws from 
Ruskin’s distinction between standardized and imaginative landscape painting in an 
1878 note.   Reflecting there on landscapes by Boldini and Hobbema, Hardy describes 
their techniques—“that of infusing emotion into the baldest external objects…by the 
mark of some human connection with them”—as also his own: “This accords with my 
feeling about, say, Heidelberg and Baden versus Scheveningen—as I wrote at the 
beginning of The Return of the Native—that the beauty of association is entirely 
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superior to the beauty of aspect, and a beloved relative’s old battered tankard to the 
finest Greek vase.  Paradoxically put, it is to see the beauty in ugliness” (Life and 
Work 124).   Defined against formal beauty, association, Hardy suggests, plays a 
critical role in his own artistic production.   Yet despite the fact that Hardy here and in 
“Memories of Church Restoration” places formal beauty in explicit opposition to the 
beauty of association, he suggests that the mental operations involved in experiencing 
formal beauty share an identical cognitive structure with association.  Formal beauty, 
perspicacious reading, and association all work according to the figural logic of 
synecdoche.    
 Synecdoche provides the framework for redintegration, the most fundamental 
operation of association.  Under its most rigorous interpretation, association is the 
cognitive process that coalesces sensations into objects by bundling those sensations 
that are frequently experienced together into discrete objects of perception; after these 
bundles have become sufficiently tied in the mind, whenever one sensation bound up 
in them is experienced, “it serves as a sign or cue for the idea of the others to arise” 
(James 555).   This process, termed redintegration, made association particularly 
important to late Victorian scientific and philosophical theories of cognition.  While 
theories of association in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries treated 
sensations as unchanging simple elements, in the latter half of the nineteenth century 
physiology and experimental psychology demonstrated an unexpected contingency in 
sense experience, establishing that sensations are necessarily fragmentary and 
supplemented by memory in the act of perception.  Association provided a model to 
account for the perceptual process whereby the mind supplements and completes the 
partial and contingent input of the senses.41  If physiologists demonstrated that 
                                                
41
 Anglo-American psycho-physiologists more often invoked association directly in their theories of 
perception, while their German counterparts employed perceptual models clearly derived from 
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sensation is a physics, associationists conceptualized sensory perception as a 
semiotics.42       
 Hardy’s descriptions of formal beauty and perspicacious reading consistently 
invoke the semiotics of association.  Indeed, Hardy makes its synecdochic logic the 
defining quality not just of aesthetic contemplation but of the authorial “art of 
observation…[which] consists in this: the seeing of great things in little things, the 
whole in the part—even the infinitesimal part” (Life and Work 262).  The convergence 
of author and reader through this shared mode of perception is made explicit in 
Hardy’s 1891 essay, “The Science of Fiction,” where Hardy distinguishes between the 
external observations of the mere imitator and the artist’s apprehension of subtle 
qualities through “the mental tactility that comes from a sympathetic appreciativeness 
of life in all its manifestations.” The “intuitive power” that the artist gains through 
sympathy, he claims, is the redintegrative ability “to see in half and quarter views the 
whole picture, to catch from a few bars the whole tune” (89).   For Hardy, then, 
authorship depends on an intuitive power of observation that is identical to that 
required for ideal aesthetic contemplation.  At issue in both cases is the capacity to 
read texts and perceive experiences as synecdoches.  But, as Hardy’s disparagements 
of realism make clear, the artist does not read these synecdoches according to his 
routinized perceptions.  Rather, he transfigures the signs he encounters, and it is this 
capacity that separates the artist from the “mere imitator,” who only transcribes what 
he sees and thus turns the novel into “a spasmodic inventory of items” (Life and Work 
309). 
                                                                                                                                       
association, such as Hermann von Helmholtz’s theory of unconscious inference, but were often wary of 
identifying those models with association per se.  
42
 What Gary Hatfield has noted in reference to Helmholtz’s work is broadly true for late Victorian 
cognitive science: in the majority of these accounts of cognition, “sensations act as signs, and 
perception is their interpretation.” See Hatfield, 208. 
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 Hardy’s characterization of the realist novelist as “spasmodic,” in thrall to the 
involuntary action of his body, points to the vexed question of agency for 
associationist psychology.  Association abridges agency from two directions.  The 
chain of sensations forged by association seems to routinize mental processes, 
rendering them independent of conscious direction.43  Victorian physiologists reified 
this routinizing tendency by proposing a physical basis for (especially contiguous) 
association in neural habits— pathways inscribed in the nervous system by repeated 
experience.44  At the same time, the arbitrary and overlapping connections between 
sensations mean that, however automatic they are, the paths tracked by the mind will 
always be indeterminate and aleatory.45  James, adapting earlier work on association, 
attempts to preserve volition in the form of what he calls the “selective agency of 
interested attention.” James locates this associative agency squarely within the 
movement from metonymic to metaphoric association, in which the mind, while 
recalling an object through contiguous association, focuses its attention on one quality 
of that object and reads it as a synecdoche of a different object sharing that quality.  It 
is this capacity to analyze objects of perception and generate new wholes from the 
parts thus isolated by analysis that “separates the man of genius from the prosaic 
creature[s] of habit and routine thinking,” those who, “by the general flatness and 
poverty of their aesthetic nature, are kept for ever rotating among the literal sequences 
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 Thomas Reid, for example, criticized Hume’s theory of consciousness on these grounds: “That trains 
of thinking which by frequent repetition have become familiar should spontaneously present themselves 
to our fancy, seems to require no other original quality but the power of habit.” See Reid, 426.  
44
 The consequently unreflective, involuntary nature of association in these accounts led Wilhelm 
Wundt to divide perception into an active, attentive mode—termed apperception—and a passive, 
unintentional mode he identified as association.  See An Introduction to Psychology, 81.         
45
 So while James maintains that association is redeemed from “perfect indeterminism” because it is 
guided by identifiable principles, he admits that “it must still be confessed that an immense number of 
terms in the linked chain of our representations fall outside of all assignable rule…It thus remains true 
that to a certain extent…which associate of the interesting item shall emerge [in any train of thought] 
must be called largely a matter of accident—accident, that is, for our intelligence. No doubt it is 
determined by cerebral causes, but they are too subtile and shifting for our analysis” (James 577).  
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of their local and personal history.”46  However, in thus conceptualizing metaphoric 
association in terms of volition and freedom defined against the thorough routinization 
of contiguous impressions, James comes perilously close to identifying agency with a 
chaotic indeterminacy equivalent, for late Victorian psycho-physiological theory, with 
dreaming, hallucinations, and madness.  James acknowledges this possibility when he 
refers, somewhat nervously, to “the lawless revelry of similarity” (582-3).   
 In his meditations on reading and authorship and especially in The Return of 
the Native, Hardy anticipates James’ difficulties in negotiating a secure position for 
agency within the theories of cognition advanced by association psychology.  In this 
1887 note, Hardy distinguishes his preferred mode of artistic practice from realism on 
the basis of an associative transformation of perceptions that closely resembles James’ 
“selective agency of interested attention”: 
I feel that Nature is played out as a Beauty, but not as a Mystery.  I don’t want 
to see landscapes, i.e., scenic paintings of them, because I don’t want to see the 
original realities—as optical effects, that is…the exact truth as to material fact 
ceases to be of importance in art—it is a student’s style—the style of a period 
when the mind is serene and unawakened to the tragical mysteries of life; when 
it does not bring anything to the object that coalesces with and translates the 
qualities that are already there—half hidden, it may be—and the two united are 
depicted as the All.   (Life and Work, 192)   
As in his earlier note on landscapes, in which Hardy identifies with artists that do not 
imitate but rather transform external objects by infusing them with emotion, the 
                                                
46
 James, 583, 572. James’ argument here is especially indebted to Shadworth Hodgson’s 1865 Time 
and Space, which claims that “no object of representation remains long before consciousness in the 
same state, but fades, decays, and becomes indistinct. Those parts of the object, however, which possess 
an interest resist this tendency to gradual decay of the whole object…This inequality in the object—
some parts, the uninteresting, submitting to decay; others, the interesting parts, resisting it—when it has 
continued for a certain time, ends in becoming a new object.” See Hodgson, 266-7.    
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mature artist here projects part of himself into the objects he represents.  Further, 
Hardy signals in this note that mature style is the product of associative perception by 
invoking the progress narrative of aesthetic transformation that opens The Return of 
the Native, a progress narrative that asserts the superiority of the beauty of association 
over the beauty of aspect.47    
 
Seeing in the Dark 
 
 In the description of Egdon Heath that famously opens The Return of the 
Native, Hardy contrasts “orthodox beauty” with the “chastened sublimity” of Egdon, 
which, appealing “to a more recently learnt emotion,” is becoming the aesthetic 
preference of “the more thinking among mankind” (10-1).  Hardy identifies orthodox 
beauty with the Southern, Hellenic ideals of beauty that are sensual, serene, and self-
contained.48  Egdon Heath, on the other hand, possesses a chastened sublimity in 
common with the other gaunt wastes of the North.49  Hardy suggests that this peculiar 
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 Hardy’s description of authorship here and elsewhere as a process entailing the mutual transformation 
of self and world suggest that it should be understood as  “work,” as Elaine Scarry has described it in 
her reading of Hardy’s novels. That is, as an embodied process of mutual expression, inscription, and 
immersion, fraught with ethical complexity and the potential for both benefit and grievous harm. While 
Scarry focuses on representations of physical labor in Hardy’s novels, she notes that for Hardy these 
forms of creative labor were analogous to the creative labor of novel-writing, and she suggests that the 
same analogy holds between the “reciprocal ventriloquism” of these forms of labor and literary 
interpretation itself. This article seeks to extend Scarry’s reading by accounting for the specific 
dynamics and forms of embodiment and interpretive and ethical relationship that characterize reading 
and authorship for Hardy. See Scarry, 71.  
48
 Hardy’s aesthetic progress narrative here is obviously indebted to Hegel’s account of the transition in 
art from a serene Classical period to a more self-conscious Romantic era. Classical art is serene, 
according to Hegel, because its artworks perfectly balance sensuous presence and idea, form and 
content, and are therefore self-sufficient and self-enclosed. In Romantic art, this harmonious balance 
has given way to a disjunction between form and content because the Idea has outgrown the possibility 
of adequate sensuous embodiment. Romantic artworks are therefore necessarily imperfect and gesture 
beyond and outside of themselves; in effect, they have become signs. Hardy, who would have 
encountered Hegel’s argument through Pater’s “Winckelmann” in The Renaissance (1873), articulates 
Hegelian art history with associationist psychology in his own theory of reading and aesthetics. See 
Hegel, 517-28, and The Renaissance, 114-149. 
49
 In his reading of this passage, Bullen attributes Hardy’s northern ideal of “beauty in ugliness” to three 
sources: Hardy’s personal responses to different landscapes, recorded in notes, letters, and diaries; a 
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preference is emerging because the mournful sublimity of these gaunt wastes accords 
with the feelings of those who have grasped the dim prospects for human happiness in 
a world governed by the defective laws of an indifferent Creation.  In contrast, the 
gardens of Southern Europe and “smiling champaigns of fruit and flowers” (10) 
painfully jar the moods of the more thinking among mankind because, like other 
instances of orthodox beauty, they express a “Hellenic idea of life” that Hardy 
identifies with the “old-fashioned reveling in the general situation” (167).  The beauty 
of association that Hardy finds in ugliness here seems to consist of morose Northern 
Europeans finding pleasure in landscapes whose austerity echoes back to them their 
own gloominess.  As it continues, however, the description of Egdon suggests that the 
beauty of association is comprised of a certain form of relation between the subject 
and the objects of experience, and not merely the affective content of any such 
encounter. 
 Egdon is defined by gloom not as a mood of despondency but as a state of 
darkness.  The heath attains to its most active and characteristic state “during winter 
darkness, tempests, and mists.  Then Egdon was aroused to reciprocity.  The storm 
was its lover; and the wind was its friend.” A “near relation of night” (10), Egdon 
engages in reciprocity with other forces of obscurity—night, storm, mist, etc.  While 
the novel opens with a description of how the approaching twilight underscores the 
division between the darkening heath and the still day-lit sky, this dividing line is 
attenuated as the heath rises to meet the atmospheric elements of obscurity 
                                                                                                                                       
widespread Victorian fascination with the Arctic in the 1870s that had been stimulated by the Nares and 
Markham expedition to Greenland in 1876; and the art and art criticism (especially by Ruskin and 
Pater) in which Hardy had taken a special interest at the time. While each of these sources undoubtedly 
influenced Hardy, this list is incomplete without an account of the associationist psychology through 
which Hardy theorized aesthetic response. Without this account, Bullen cannot adequately explain the 
distinction between orthodox beauty and associative beauty on which the other distinctions in this 
passage—between backward and advanced, South and North, and so forth—are founded. See Bullen, 
90-117 and 259-264. 
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sympathetically, “in a black fraternisation towards which each advanced half-way” 
(10).  This reciprocal relation between night and heath parallels the harmony between 
the heath and its observer, a harmony that is likewise called forth by obscurity, for 
Egdon “could best be felt when it could not clearly be seen” (9).     
 The Return of the Native is replete with such instances of perception through or 
despite sensory obscurity.  Mrs. Yeobright and Thomasin discern the invisible reeds 
along the bank of the stream behind the Quiet Woman Inn from the “sounds as of a 
congregation praying humbly, produced by their rubbing against each other in the 
slow wind” (44).  Though the dried heath-bells cannot be seen in the dark, the listener 
“inwardly” sees them when hearing the wind rustle hundreds of them at once.  This 
dry, papery sound, which Hardy calls the “linguistic peculiarity of the heath,” brushes 
“so distinctly across the ear that, by the accustomed, the material minutiae in which it 
originated could be realised as by touch” (56).  At Eustacia and Wildeve’s midnight 
meeting on the heath after the Guy Fawkes fires have been extinguished, “compound 
utterances addressed themselves to their senses and it was possible to view by ear the 
features of the neighborhood.  Acoustic pictures were returned from the darkened 
scenery…for [the] differing features [of the heath] had their voices no less than their 
shapes and colours” (87).  While the emphasis in many of these examples is primarily 
on acoustic pictures, the sense of seeing through the sense of hearing, Hardy is not 
focused exclusively on the relation of these two senses.  In addition to the claim that 
one could realize “as by touch” the dry heath-bells from their sound, Hardy draws a 
parallel between acoustic pictures and the relation between touch and hearing when 
describing Eustacia’s pursuit of Clym and his family along the darkened heath.  
Eustacia’s sense, while listening intently to their movement and conversation, that 
“her ears were performing the functions of seeing as well as hearing” is, according to 
the narrator, an impression parallel to that of John Kitto, who, having gone deaf at age 
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twelve, claimed that his body had subsequently become “so sensitive to vibrations that 
he had gained the power of perceiving by it as by ears” (116).   
 These recurring instances of synaesthesia implicitly invoke the theory of 
association, according to which any sensation tends to call to mind its associates, but 
they are also insistently framed as moments of sensory obscurity analogous, for 
Hardy, to sensory disability.  This analogy appears most forcefully in the narrator’s 
account of how Mrs. Yeobright developed a “comprehensiveness of…view” despite 
her removed and isolated social position:  
There are instances of persons who, without clear ideas of the things they 
criticize, have yet had clear ideas of the relations of those things.  Blacklock, a 
poet blind from his birth, could describe visual objects with accuracy; 
Professor Sanderson, who was also blind, gave excellent lectures on colour, 
and taught others the theory of ideas which they had and he had not.50  In the 
social sphere these gifted ones are mostly women; they can watch a world 
which they never saw, and estimate forces of which they have only heard.  We 
call it intuition.   (188) 
The trope through which these abilities are figured—that of watching without actually 
seeing—echoes the earlier associative, synaesthetic moments in the novel.  Yet this 
passage further suggests that, for Blacklock, Saunderson, and Mrs. Yeobright, the 
sensory obscurity of objects allows them to be understood not statically but 
dynamically and relationally.  Just as Egdon can best be felt when it cannot be seen, 
the novel suggests that Mrs. Yeobright’s figurative blindness enables her 
comprehensiveness of view.51   
                                                
50
 Thomas Blacklock was not, in fact, born blind. Both he and Nicholas Saunderson went blind as 
infants after suffering from smallpox.  
51
 J. Hillis Miller notes the tacit identification of Mrs. Yeobright’s comprehensiveness of view and that 
of Hardy himself, pointing out the similarities between her “comprehensiveness of…view” and the 
famous aerial perspectives from which events are often narrated in The Dynasts. Miller also assimilates 
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 Sensory obscurity stimulates comprehension for certain characters in The 
Return of the Native insofar as it elicits the conscious mental effort of perceptual 
interpretation.  As I have argued above, associationist theories of cognition became 
particularly important in the latter half of the nineteenth century because they helped 
account for how the mind constructs and cognizes a stable world of objects on the 
basis of fragmentary and imperfect sensory input.  Late Victorian psycho-
physiologists conceptualized association as the perceptual supplementing and 
interpretation of sensations acting as signs.  In The Return of the Native, the 
relationship between a registered sensation and its associates is thus one of denotation.  
Eustacia’s undressing in the dark is “denoted” by the rustling sounds of her clothes 
and her movements (67).   The presence of reeds along the stream bank behind the 
Quiet Woman is “denoted” by the sounds of the wind rubbing them together (44).  The 
contours of the landscape lying below the Guy Fawkes revelers on Blackbarrow are 
“denoted” by masses of shade (19).  Sensory obscurity calls attention to these 
routinized, associative recognitions of objects (at least for the novel’s narrator), but for 
Mrs. Yeobright, Clym, and Eustacia, the three characters who are imperfectly 
assimilated to the customs of the heath, sensory obscurity also makes possible a mode 
of associative agency that escapes from and transforms such unreflectively 
conventional perceptions.52  Just as James’ selective agency of interested attention 
                                                                                                                                       
this comprehensiveness of view to the excess of vision that blinds Clym. In Miller’s account of the 
novel, however, blindness is a “punishment for seeing too well,” an inevitable consequence of having 
the “Promethean temerity” to aspire to “sunlike…knowledge and broad vision.” This knowledge blinds 
by revealing the inadequacy of any object of desire as a phallus, a figure covering over the lack—the 
“always-absent source of value”—that structures desire. While Miller’s reading is suggestive, it cannot 
situate Mrs. Yeobright’s figurative blindness in relation to the text’s other moments of synaesthetic, 
associative perception, and fails to recognize that blindness is not only a consequence and punishment 
but also a precondition for the type of comprehensive view attained by Mrs. Yeobright here. See Miller, 
37-43.  
52 The narrator, for instance, explicitly links the heath’s obscurity to its capacity to stimulate attention, 
noting that “a condition of healthy life so nearly resembling the torpor of death is a noticeable thing of 
its sort; to exhibit the inertness of the desert, and at the same time to be exercising powers akin to those 
of the meadow, and even of the forest, awakened in those who thought of it the attentiveness usually 
engendered by understatement and reserve” (16-7). 
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proceeds by isolating sensuous qualities in a given object so that the mind can leap 
from them to objects sharing those or similar qualities, in The Return of the Native the 
absence of the full set of sensations composing an object allows wider latitude in the 
perceptual interpretation of the remaining sensations.53  Sensory obscurity for Hardy is 
thus equivalent to the narrow focalization preliminary to the metaphoric leaps that 
bring different objects or ideas into relation with one another, and in this way, as the 
narrator remarks in Tess, “the defective can be more than the entire.”54  
 While Hardy valorizes this mode of associative perception when it is applied to 
landscapes, The Return of the Native registers a deep anxiety that, when applied to 
other subjects, such a mode of perception raises difficult ethical and epistemological 
questions.  These questions are foregrounded in the novel’s description of Clym’s 
face.  Whereas Egdon Heath is a type of the beautiful landscapes of the future, Clym’s 
face is identified as “the typical countenance of the future” (167), a status his face 
owes to its embodiment of the strain of thought.  Though its original physical beauty is 
still apparent when Clym first returns to Egdon, the “outer symmetry” of his face is 
already breaking down under “a wearing habit of meditation” (137).  Clym’s 
pensiveness is prompted by “a full recognition of the coil of things,” the same 
perception, that is, of the “defects of natural laws” that allows the observer to perceive 
the beauty of association in the face of the heath:  
                                                
53
 Hardy’s insistent suggestions that comprehensive perception begins with the anesthetic inhibition or 
absence of all sensations outside a tightly focalized area signal his participation in the broader late 
nineteenth-century attempt, magisterially described by Jonathan Crary, to locate forms of cognitive 
agency in the psychological phenomenon of attention. See Crary 11-79. 
54
 Tess of the D’Urbervilles 265. Anna Henchman likewise underscores that enriched perception for 
Hardy’s characters always requires a diminishment or bracketing of some sensory input. In Henchman’s 
reading, this bracketing is analogous both to reading and to the procedures of astronomy, whose 
calculations of distance and motion similarly require that the misleading input of unreflective ways of 
seeing be ignored. However, Henchman unwarrantedly suggests that these mental operations are 
tantamount to the transcendence of an embodied subject position. I argue that Henchman’s otherwise 
suggestive reading needs to be supplemented by attention to the cognitive theories that Hardy drew 
from, without which she cannot fully account for the dynamics of the shift in perception that she 
correctly identifies. See Henchman, 45, 52-6.   
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The lineaments which will get embodied in ideals based upon this new 
recognition will probably be akin to those of Yeobright.  The observer's eye 
was arrested, not by his face as a picture, but by his face as a page; not by what 
it was, but by what it recorded.  His features were attractive in the light of 
symbols, as sounds intrinsically common become attractive in language, and as 
shapes intrinsically simple become interesting in writing.  (167-8)    
As Clym’s recognition of the coil of things allows him to perceive the face of the 
heath as associatively significant, his own face becomes a text signifying this 
recognition to another observer.  However, the associative perception that makes such 
significations possible also introduces an uncertainty about their provenance.  The text 
of Clym’s face is written by the “inner strenuousness” of his “unfold[ing]” thought: 
“[his] face was well-shaped, even excellently.  But the mind within was beginning to 
use it as a mere waste tablet whereon to trace its idiosyncrasies as they developed 
themselves” (137).  At the same time, Clym’s face as a text requires a reader, who 
may, via association, project meanings of her own onto it: “people who began by 
beholding him ended by perusing him.  His countenance was overlaid with legible 
meanings” (137).  The adjective, “overlaid,” here suggests not that the face’s legible 
meanings are expressions of the mind within, but rather that they are superimposed by 
those perusing it. 
 The dilemma hinted at in this description of Clym’s face—in reading a face, 
does one project meaning onto it or discover the meanings expressed by its owner?—
plays out in the novel’s plot through the courtship and marriage of Clym and Eustacia.  
Clym and Eustacia begin their mutual fascination without being able to see the other’s 
face.  Eustacia’s interest in Clym is sparked just before his return to Egdon when she 
overhears two furze-cutters remark on what a suitable match he might be for her, or as 
she puts it, “on the harmony between the unknown and herself” (110).  When Eustacia 
 97 
first comes into contact with Clym in person, as he is walking with his family on the 
heath at evening, she is conspicuously denied a glimpse of his face.  Instead, as she 
surreptitiously follows him, she attends closely to his voice, but not to the words it is 
speaking.  His voice becomes the object of an act of association—it is at this moment 
that the narrator invokes Dr.  Kitto to explain Eustacia’s sense that her ears are seeing 
as well as hearing—that proceeds independently of whatever feelings or ideas his 
voice is attempting to express.  For Eustacia, Clym is thus, as Wildeve was before 
him, “the single object within her horizon on which dreams might crystallize” (95).    
 Similarly, Clym is unable to see Eustacia’s face when he meets her, after the 
brief encounter on the darkened heath, at the Yeobrights’ Christmas party.  Eustacia 
attends the party as the Turkish Knight in the mummers’ play, and her costume 
includes ribbons draped over and disguising her face.  Although Clym is still 
“arrested” by her presence, and guesses her gender despite the costume, Eustacia 
bemoans the limits imposed on her beauty by the circumstances: “the power of her 
face all lost, the charm of her emotions all disguised, the fascinations of her coquetry 
denied existence, nothing but a voice left to her; she had a sense of the doom of Echo” 
(143).  Eustacia’s “doom” here mirrors her meeting with Clym on the heath, when he 
likewise appears to her only as an “awakening voice” (120).  Insofar as they are each 
at first only voices to the other, both she and Clym share the fate of Echo, the nymph 
who fell into unrequited love with Narcissus and pined away until only her voice 
remained.  In addition to “fate” or “end,” however, “doom” also denotes “judgment” 
or “punishment.” Before she fell in love with Narcissus, Echo often distracted Juno 
with stories to keep her from discovering the other nymphs in the act of sex with Jove.  
When Juno discovered the trick, she punished Echo by rendering her mute except to 
repeat others’ words.  The doom of Echo is thus to be unable to speak for herself, to 
speak only the speech of others.  Hardy’s allusion hints at the broader question at issue 
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in Eustacia’s and Clym’s misreadings of each other and in The Return of the Native 
generally: is associative perception inevitably an act of prosopopoeia, of 
narcissistically apprehending any object, whether animate or inanimate, as a text that 
merely echoes oneself?  
 Hardy foregrounds prosopopoeia in the novel’s opening description of Egdon 
Heath, which is repeatedly described as being subject to such a prosopopoeic form of 
ventriloquism.  After his separation from Eustacia, for instance, Clym perceives her 
presence in all the sounds of the surrounding heath: “a bird searching for worms in the 
mould of the flower-beds sounded like her hand on the latch of the gate; and at dusk, 
when soft, strange ventriloquisms came from holes in the ground, hollow stalks, curled 
dead leaves, and other crannies wherein breezes, worms, and insects can work their 
will, he fancied that they were Eustacia, standing without and breathing wishes of 
reconciliation” (336).   The heath here is given voice through a double ventriloquism: 
first its inanimate features are figured as being spoken through by breezes and insects, 
but then this speech is transformed in Clym’s hearing into the sounds of his estranged 
wife.   
 The ventriloquism of the heath in this passage echoes the earlier description of 
the sounds—made by the wind through the dried heath-bells—that accompany 
Eustacia’s vigil on Blackbarrow.  There, the narrator’s associative recognition of the 
dead heath-bells triggered by the sound of their rustling is immediately followed by a 
meditation on the phrase, “the spirit moved them.”  
A meaning of the phrase forced itself upon the attention; and an emotional 
listener's fetichistic mood might have ended in one of more advanced quality.  
It was not, after all, that the left-hand expanse of old blooms spoke, or the 
right-hand, or those of the slope in front; but it was the single person of 
something else speaking through each at once.  (56-7) 
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What the narrator describes here is a relay of reflected agency.  The passive listener 
has a phrase and its meaning forced on her by the sound of the heath-bells, which is in 
fact the voice of the wind speaking through them, a “voice” that is in turn bestowed by 
the “fetichistic” emotional listener in the prosopopoeic act of figuring the wind as a 
speaking “single person.” Ultimately, this relay of ventriloquism expands to include 
Eustacia herself:  
The bluffs, and the bushes, and the heather-bells had broken silence; at last, so 
did the woman; and her articulation was but as another phrase of the same 
discourse as theirs…What she uttered was a lengthened sighing…[and] there 
was a spasmodic abandonment about it as if, in allowing herself to utter the 
sound the woman's brain had authorized what it could not regulate.  (57)  
Eustacia’s dubious self-control here—allowing a spasmodic abandonment, authorizing 
an action she cannot regulate—suggests that her voice is not her own so much as an 
expression of a more encompassing force around her.  This moment thus seems to 
anticipate The Dynasts, in which human thought and action are almost totally 
determined by the combination of relentlessly unfolding natural and social logics that 
Hardy calls the Will.  And yet to read Eustacia as spoken through by something like 
the Will in the same way that Napoleon or the Duke of Wellington are acted through 
by the Will in The Dynasts is to elide the fact that the description of her in this passage 
is already a reading, an instance of free indirect discourse focalized through the same 
hypothetical “emotional listener” who has just prosopopoeically composed a single 
person speaking a discourse from the varied sounds of the heath (56).55  Eustacia is 
spoken through by the emotional listener in the sense that it is the listener who 
                                                
55
 William Cohen, for example, elides the emotional listener in his reading of Eustacia’s vigil as an 
instance of Hardy breaking down the distinction between an embodied human subject and the objective 
field of sensations. While I agree with many of Cohen’s broader conclusions, I suggest that a focus on 
modes of embodied perception can more fully account for the representations of embodiment and the 
near obsession with faces in The Return of the Native. See Cohen, 96-7.   
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perceives her utterance as a spasmodic abandonment that picks up and extends the 
discourse of the heath; Eustacia is here simply one more link in the relay of reflected 
agency. 
 The inclusion of Eustacia within this prosopopoeic circuit takes us back to the 
question of what it means to read others in The Return of the Native, but this circuit 
hints at Hardy’s broader question underlying this one: what does it mean to read The 
Return of the Native?  The relay of reflected agency in the passage above provides a 
partial answer to this question insofar as it can be read as a figure for associative 
reading in relation to an author.  As we have seen, for Hardy an author by definition 
associatively transforms his object of representation, “bring[ing some]thing to the 
object that coalesces with and translates the qualities that are already there” (Life and 
Work, 192).   It is this activity that distinguishes artistry from the spasmodic 
transcription of conventional perceptions that characterizes realism.56  In “The 
Profitable Reading of Fiction,” it is implicitly on the basis of this transfiguration of 
routinized perceptions that Hardy equates the results of his own literary activity, which 
he calls “representation[s] of life,” with the “criticism of life” that, according to 
Matthew Arnold, constitutes poetry.57  As the appeal to Arnold in that essay suggests, 
Hardy’s associative perception is in many respects best understood as a psycho-
physiological version of Arnold’s ideal of criticism: the spontaneous play of 
consciousness on stock notions and habits.58  Both Arnold’s ideal of criticism and 
                                                
56
 Hardy’s claims about artistic perception fit within the larger efforts to re-envision the perceptual and 
affective activity of the artist in light of late Victorian cognitive science. The key problem of these 
efforts was to distinguish the artist’s cognitive activity in crafting representations from modes of 
perception that, like those of Hardy’s heath-dwellers, were seen as routinized and unreflective. In 
addition to Pater’s definition of style as the artist’s imaginative sense of fact, Hardy’s claims about 
authorship bear a close resemblance to those in Wilhelm Dilthey’s 1887 “The Imagination of the Poet.” 
One of Dilthey’s main arguments is that in the poet’s imagination, “images are transformed under the 
influence of feelings. They are shaped by [the poet’s] emotions, just as the uncertain outlines of rocks 
and trees are transformed by the influence of a traveler in the woods at night.” See Dilthey, 95.   
57
 See “The Study of Poetry,” 279-307, and Hardy, “The Profitable Reading of Fiction,” 61. 
58
 Arnold’s most influential attempt to define criticism is, of course, Culture and Anarchy. For an 
account of Hardy’s critical relationship to Arnold’s work, see DeLaura 380-399.  
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Hardy’s model of associative perception are forms of aesthetic agency and freedom 
defined against the routinized operations of consciousness.   
 
Critical and Uncritical Reading 
 
 We might speak, then, of something like critical reading as constitutive of 
authorship for Hardy.  Hardy’s Arnoldian author thus converges with Clym Yeobright, 
whose “culture scheme” of educating the inhabitants of the heath is itself 
anachronistically derived from Arnold.  Clym’s “modern perceptiveness” (167) 
likewise serves as a crucial mode of perceptual agency whose exercise composes a 
text.  In the author’s case, this text is the “representation of life” that constitutes the 
literary work; in Clym’s case, the text is his face, composed of “marks derived from a 
perception of his surroundings” (137).  The author’s text, a novel such as The Return 
of the Native, for example, requires a reader no less than does Clym’s face, and for any 
reader Hardy suggests that there are two possible relations with the text.  One may 
passively receive the text, submitting it merely to thoroughly conventional 
associations that are equivalent to the spasmodic transcriptions of realism.  Or one can 
read a text critically, by bringing something to it that coalesces with and translates the 
qualities that are already there.  In the process, both the critical reader and the author 
become part of a relay of reflected agency, in which the reader prosopopoeically 
composes an authorial consciousness out of a curious amalgam of the reading author 
and the writing reader.   
 Hardy’s reflections on associative or critical reading anticipate many of the 
debates over reading and authorship in twentieth-century literary study.  In their work 
on the “affective fallacy,” Wimsatt and Beardsley categorically reject affective 
response as a legitimate mode of reading because, like critical reading in The Return of 
 102 
the Native, it licenses a form of “impressionism and relativism” that interpolates the 
text by importing foreign meanings into it so that the text, “as an object of specifically 
critical judgment, tends to disappear.”59  Even after New Criticism made affective 
response into a byword for unrigorous belle-lettrism, the distinction between 
routinized and critical reading has survived as the underpinning of a widely held 
disciplinary axiom that critical reading is the proper method and pedagogical goal of 
literary study.60  The bifurcation of reading into critical and uncritical modes that 
underlies this enabling disciplinary axiom typically goes without saying, but it 
occasionally flashes into stark relief, as in Barthes’ pyrotechnic analysis of reading, 
S/Z.   Barthes, like Hardy, there divides reading into two modes: the readerly and the 
writerly.  Like routinized reading for Hardy, readerly reading is passive and unfree.  A 
consumer rather than a producer of literature, the readerly reader is “plunged into a 
kind of idleness—he is intransitive…instead of functioning himself, instead of gaining 
access to the magic of the signifier, to the pleasure of writing, he is left with no more 
than the poor freedom either to accept or to reject the text.”61  Readerly reading 
proceeds according to habit—routine.  It is constrained by the metonymic, 
unidirectional logico-temporal order of the hermeneutic and proairetic codes that bind 
it according to conventional notions of truth and empiricism.  Over and against the 
readerly, the writerly reader is an active agent who produces the text’s multivalence, 
its plurality, by playfully moving between codes and thus achieving jouissance 
(affective response thus returns with a vengeance).  Barthes’ theories of reading are 
idiosyncratic and emerge from a very different set of discourses and methodologies, 
                                                
59
 See Wimsatt and Beardsley 21-39. Unlike Hardy, of course, the New Critics Wimsatt and Beardsley 
are not explicitly invested in an authorial consciousness whose intentions stand behind and ground the 
text, but their concerns over affective impressionism in reading are otherwise quite close to the 
misgivings in The Return of the Native.  
60
 This persisting and often unreflective commitment to a vaguely defined ideal of critical reading is the 
subject of Michael Warner’s suggestive “Uncritical Reading.”   
61
 See Barthes 4.  Barthes elaborates his theory of writerly jouissance in The Pleasure of the Text.  
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but they share many broad assumptions with Hardy’s distinction between critical and 
routinized reading.   
 Barthes was happy to declare that writerly reading rendered the author not only 
irrelevant but dead.  Hardy, however, was unsettled by the implications of critical 
reading for his status as an author and for the ethics of intersubjective relationships.  In 
The Return of the Native, Hardy attempts to contain these effects by figuring the most 
problematic forms of critical and routinized reading according to the available cultural 
logic of the dark lady/fair lady binary.  The novel’s most troubling critical reader is 
found in the complex figure of Eustacia.  Eustacia seems an unlikely choice to 
exemplify the critical reading identified by Hardy as the aesthetic mode of the future, 
since the novel opens by opposing this modernizing aesthetic mode to the appreciation 
of the refined Southern beauty of her type.  She is thoroughly identified with the 
Southern, “Hellenic idea of life” (167).  Hence she fails to appreciate the modern, 
Northern beauty of Egdon.  But Eustacia’s Hellenism is comprised of both a 
refractory, anti-modern sensualism and a form of perception strikingly similar to 
Hardy’s version of critical reading.62  Despite her Classical features, Eustacia’s beauty 
is in fact similar to that of the heath; both demand a “trained” eye because both are 
characterized by “a certain obscurity” (92).  Hardy, playing on the full range of 
meanings of dark/fair, thus opposes Eustacia to Thomasin, her fair rival, whose 
features are more ingenuously “transparent…as if the flow of her existence could be 
seen passing within” (41).   
                                                
62
 In this respect, Eustacia reflects the contradictory meanings assigned to Classical art and culture in 
late Victorian Britain. Hellenism could be equivalent to an elegant but premodern sensualism, as in 
Hegel’s art history or the passage in The Return of the Native that identifies “the Hellenic idea of life” 
with “the old-fashioned revelling in the general situation”(167). Or it could be equivalent to Criticism 
itself, as in Arnold’s definition of Hellenism as the free, spontaneous play of consciousness upon stock 
notions and habits. This ambivalence in Victorian thinking about Greek and Roman antiquity is, of 
course, especially crucial for Pater. 
 104 
 Thomasin exemplifies the routinized and spasmodic mode of perception that 
Hardy calls Realism.  Unlike Eustacia, Thomasin ventures out on the heath at night in 
the rain without fear because “to her there were not, as to Eustacia, demons in the air, 
and malice in every bush and bough.  The drops which lashed her face were not 
scorpions, but prosy rain; Egdon in the mass was no monster whatever, but impersonal 
open ground…it was in her view a windy, wet place, in which a person might 
experience much discomfort, lose the path without care, and possibly catch cold” 
(355).  For Thomasin, the heath is as transparent as her own subjectivity, but for that 
very reason she does not transform its features through metaphoric association.  Its 
features are too clear and self-enclosed—too prosy—to her routinized perceptions.  
Thomasin does not aspire to perceptual agency.  Like James’ creature of habit and 
routine thinking, she passively accepts the elements of the heath as givens, and thus 
for her they remain bereft of the emotional and human significance that would 
transform them, little more than mere bald, external objects.  She is the fair lady—
obedient to convention, and thus destined for a happy marriage.  For that reason, 
however, her psychic life is, in the novel’s terms, both transparent and shallow. 
 The rebellious dark lady Eustacia, on the other hand, experiences the heath 
through metaphor; the raindrops that lash her face are not merely raindrops, but 
scorpions.  By thus charging the commonplace phenomena of the heath with 
significance, Eustacia treats those features as signs in accord with the novel’s own 
definition of what makes up writing: “shapes intrinsically simple” that become 
“interesting” when invested with meaning (168).  Eustacia invests the phenomena of 
the heath with meaning through the pathetic fallacy—reading it as a reflection of her 
own emotional condition—and in doing so she practices something like the technique 
that Hardy himself embraced as constituting “the beauty of association”: “the 
method…of infusing emotion into the baldest external objects…by the mark of some 
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human connection with them” (Life and Work 124).  This mode of perceiving the 
heath recalls the narrator’s account of why Eustacia became involved with Wildeve: 
because he was “the single object within her horizon on which dreams might 
crystallize” (95).63  The narrator confirms this resemblance in an aside that brings 
marital discord and Eustacia’s perception of Egdon into explicit parallel: “to dwell on 
a heath without studying its meanings was like wedding a foreigner without learning 
his tongue.  The subtle beauties of the heath were lost to Eustacia; she only caught its 
vapours” (73).  The intrinsic meanings of Egdon are incomprehensible to Eustacia 
because she perceives the heath as echoing her own feelings, a voice through which 
she speaks to herself.  The form of critical perception practiced by Eustacia on the 
heath is identical to her misreading of Clym’s face.  And this mode of perception thus 
leads ineluctably to tragedy: to her disastrous liaisons with Wildeve; to her fatal 
marriage with Clym; and, finally, to her death from drowning while, in an echo of 
Narcissus, being rolled by currents along the “gashed and puckered mirror”(361) that 
is the surface of the weir.   
 Eustacia’s associative perception and its narrative consequences seem to 
rehearse Ruskin’s claim, in his discussion of the pathetic fallacy, that “when we are 
under the influence of emotion or contemplative fancy” we often succumb to “false 
appearances [that are] entirely unconnected with any real power or character in the 
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 J. Hillis Miller suggests that all objects of desire in The Return of the Native are catachreses—figures 
for that which has no name. Just as catachreses are figures for something that exceeds figuration, 
objects of desire for Hardy are temporary placeholders for an unattainable satisfaction. In Miller’s 
argument, the novel’s attention to the Sisyphean projects of figuring and possessing an object of desire 
reveals that catachresis is intimately related to prosopopoeia. Hardy’s characters prosopopoeically 
compose a face as a catachresis—a figure for an unrepresentable desire. Thus, as Eustacia crystallizes 
desires on an object, she gives it a legible face, but this face is a figure that speaks for Eustacia and her 
desires, rather than for the person upon whom it is composed. Hence, Miller notes, “the face of the 
other is for Hardy always seen narcissistically. It is one’s own face in the mirror” (Miller 31-2, 52-3). 
Within its psychoanalytic framework, Miller’s reading cannot explain why it is not merely desire but 
feeling in general that distorts and undermines the characters’ readings of each other in The Return of 
the Native. Eustacia’s crystallizing her dreams on Wildeve or overlaying her own meanings on Clym’s 
face are simply two more instances of the same form of associative perception that she practices on the 
heath by charging it with emotions unrelated to desire. 
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object, and only imputed to it by us” (Modern Painters, Vol. 3, 175).  In The Return of 
the Native, to perceive another subject critically, as Eustacia does Clym, is to compose 
a text that necessarily distorts the original text produced by the unfolding of that 
person’s own reflective subjectivity through that same process of critical perception.  
Hence the double significance of blindness in the novel: the obscurity that restricts 
one’s apprehension of an object, as in the case of Mrs. Yeobright or the blind or deaf 
poets and scholars invoked by Hardy, can incite a more strenuous form of perception 
that treats the sensations making up the object as multivalent signs and thus grasps the 
object and its relations more comprehensively; but as consciousness thus interprets the 
obscured object, it is liable to be, in Ruskin’s phrase, “over-dazzled by emotion,” and 
so lose its comprehensiveness of view after all (Modern Painters, Vol. 3 178).  Clym’s 
blindness from reading in the dark crystallizes the tendency of the empowerment in 
critical perception to undermine itself.   
 The possibility of such a reversal also haunts Hardy as the author of The 
Return of the Native.  In displacing the most striking instances of critical misreading 
from Clym onto Eustacia, who, as the dark lady, is defined by her refusal to abide by 
the established social order, Hardy underscores his discomfort with the potential of 
critical reading to appropriate authorial authority.  As we have seen, Hardy’s critical 
perception—an active mode of interpretation analogous to reading through which the 
artist translates objects by infusing them with emotional significance in the act of 
perception—is the source of that imaginative sense of fact that constitutes a properly 
artistic style for Hardy.  As he practices this mode of perception, the author produces a 
text that Hardy, aligning his own aesthetics with Arnold’s writing on poetry, calls a 
criticism of life.  However, just as metaphoric association both preserves agency and 
licenses a form of mental play so unregulated that James refers to it as “the lawless 
revelry of similarity,” critical reading opens up its texts to a degree of indeterminacy 
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that Hardy finds both exhilarating and unsettling (James 582-3).  The plot of The 
Return of the Native—as well as its obsession with prosopopoeia—is driven by this 
ambivalence.  If the critical reader cultivates agency by transforming her text, by 
prosopopoeically composing an authorial consciousness out of an amalgam of both the 
author and herself, then Hardy’s repeatedly invoked ideal of perspicacious reading—in 
which the reader faithfully reconstitutes author and intentions in the act of reading—
paradoxically leaves no room for critical reading at all. Critical reading, then, lays 
both the author and his texts open to exactly the kind of misreadings that so infuriated 
Hardy over the course of his professional life. In an irony of the kind Hardy himself 
might have appreciated, the same form of critical reading that made authorship 
possible for him also ensured his own death as an author. 
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CHAPTER 4 
BEAUTIFUL GRAFFITI:  




 Belcaro, the first collection of aesthetic essays by Vernon Lee, began as a 
series of interruptions in her attempts to complete a history.  In the preface to Belcaro, 
Lee writes that during the composition of her first book, Studies of the Eighteenth 
Century in Italy, she found herself “haunted” by the problems, questions, and ideas 
that became the focus of the essays making up Belcaro.  Lee found herself thus 
haunted, she explains, because in returning to the historical material she had compiled 
for her history, she found herself experiencing it differently: rather than perceiving her 
compilations as historical material, she found herself responding to it aesthetically.  
There is, Lee suggests in Belcaro, an important difference between these two modes of 
encounter.  To experience an object aesthetically, Lee argues, is to respond to it in its 
concrete, sensuous particularity.  To historicize an object, however, is to treat it as a 
kind of “historical fossil” and to generalize a historical moment or period from it—in 
other words, to treat it not as an end in itself, but as a means to abstract historical 
knowledge.  Lee’s first book of aesthetic essays thus registers an important tension 
between history and aesthetics that, in varying forms, will preoccupy Lee in much of 
her work from 1878, when her first aesthetic essays were published, to 1887, when 
Juvenilia, her second collection of essays appeared.   
   The distinction Lee makes between historicizing and aesthetic perception, in 
its insistence that aesthetic experience is sensuously particular, signals her debt to 
Walter Pater, which earned her the title “Walter Pater’s disciple” (Colby 56).  Lee was 
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especially indebted to Pater’s call, in the preface to The Renaissance, to attend first of 
all to “one’s own impression as it really is.”  Pater there defines aesthetic experience 
as essentially a physics: all objects of aesthetic criticism are “receptacles of so many 
powers or forces…producing pleasurable sensations, each of a more or less peculiar or 
unique kind” (The Renaissance xxix-xxx).  Aesthetic criticism attends reflectively to 
these sensations in their uniqueness, rather than using them as the pretext for abstract 
speculation.  Lee rehearses Pater’s argument in the preface to Belcaro, whose primary 
aim she defines as “getting rid of those foreign, extra-artistic, irrelevant interests, 
which aestheticians have since the beginning of time interposed between art and those 
who are intended to enjoy it; my work has…been to logically justify that perfectly 
simple, direct connection between art and ourselves, which was the one I had felt, as a 
child, before learning all the wonderful fantastications of art philosophers” (Belcaro 
12-3). 
 Lee’s goal of returning to aesthetic innocence is shaped by the principles of 
what Linda Dowling has called “aesthetic democracy”—the Victorian political project 
deriving ultimately from Shaftesbury that sought to ground the relentless and 
seemingly divisive transformations of liberal modernity in a moral-aesthetic sensus 
communis that simultaneously promised free and valid judgment to all equally and 
ensured that those judgments would conform to shared moral-aesthetic standards.64  
Lee accesses the primary aims of this project as well as its egalitarian rhetoric when 
she declares, “my object is not to teach others, but to show them how far I have taught 
myself, and how far they may teach themselves.”  In making this claim, moreover, Lee 
further underscores the distinction she draws between the aims and methods of history 
and those of aesthetic criticism, since she has already described the change in her 
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 Dowling reads Pater’s preface to The Renaissance as a particularly important and galvanizing, if 
implicit, manifesto of Victorian aesthetic democracy.  See Dowling 75-100.   
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position from writing Studies of the Eighteenth Century in Italy to Belcaro as a shift 
from professorial specialist to lowly student: “Thus I, from my small magisterial chair 
or stool of 18th century-expounder, have descended and humbly gone to school as a 
student of aesthetics” (5).   
 Lee applied the lessons of this humble schooling in her 1884 book of historical 
essays, Euphorion: Being Studies of the Antique and Mediaeval in the Renaissance, by 
focalizing the work through her own impressions of historical objects.  This 
impressionistic technique, “by giving you a thing as it appears at a given moment, 
gives it you as it really ever is; all the rest is the result of cunning abstraction, and 
representing the scene as it is always, represents it (by striking an average) as it never 
is at all” (Euphorion 10).  In its resistance to abstraction and its insistence on the 
particularity of sensory encounter, Lee’s historiographical impressionism is 
characteristic of British aestheticism, but in defining this method against an “average,” 
Lee highlights a disjunction between concrete sense judgments and common sense.  
The dense particularity of sense impressions, Lee suggests in Euphorion, make it 
impossible for her impressions to match either with those of her readers or those of the 
historical subjects she studies, rendering these others unknowable.   
 Euphorion thus throws into relief a conflict in early British aestheticism 
between its tacit advocacy of aesthetic democracy and its at times uncomfortable 
tendency to resemble a mode of cultivated solipsism.  The roots of this conflict lie in 
the emergence of aestheticism at the turn of the 1860s and 70s, a moment that 
immediately followed the rise of cognitive science.  The late 1850s and early 1860s 
saw the publication of ground-breaking works in this field, such as Hermann von 
Helmholtz’s magisterial Handbook of Physiological Optics and On the Sensations of 
Tone as a Physiological Basis for the Theory of Music as well as Wilhelm Wundt’s 
early essays on sensation, which demonstrated in detail that seemingly given 
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sensations and perceptions were highly complex and constructed in surprisingly 
minute and variable ways.  An understanding of this complexity lies behind Pater’s 
characterization of aesthetic experience as a physics.  By revealing the teeming play of 
forces underlying the most apparently straightforward sensations and perceptions, 
cognitive science decomposed the apparent stability of aesthetic common sense, 
opening up the kind of vertiginous perspectives that Pater meditated on in the 
notorious “Conclusion” to The Renaissance.   
Lee does not explicitly grapple with this conflict and in fact seems largely 
unaware of new physiological accounts of sensation in Belcaro, where she instead 
focuses on drawing a firm distinction between aesthetic experience and the 
psychology of association.  Lee attempts this demarcation for the same reason that she 
rigorously distinguishes between aesthetic and historicizing modes of perception: 
association, like historicism, regards the aesthetic object not as an end-in-itself but 
merely as the pretext for a mode of speculation only tenuously connected with the 
object.  Association, Lee suggests in Belcaro, is a form of mental graffiti that treats the 
art object as a tabula rasa on which it can scrawl whatever ideas it wishes.  It 
therefore, she argues, introduces an unacceptable degree of indeterminacy and 
instability into aesthetic experience.  Theories of association in the 1870s and 80s, 
however, were being substantially revised in light of the new accounts of the mind 
advanced by cognitive scientists such as Helmholtz and Wundt.  In an irony that Lee 
would subsequently acknowledge, the associationist theories which had seemed to her 
to destabilize aesthetic experience were being converted into explanations of how, 
given the irresolvable instabilities of the physics of sensation, a stable world of 
common sense was possible at all.65  As Lee’s further reading made her more acutely 
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 Jonathan Crary refers to this as “the problem of ‘reality-maintenance’” opened up after physiology 
had eroded the possibility of Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception.  See Crary 14-7.   
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aware of these instabilities, she reassessed the relation of association and aesthetics in 
her 1887 Juvenilia.  In the course of her reassessment, however, Lee is led to a partial 
reversal of the position that guides her method in Euphorion.  
 This chapter charts Vernon Lee’s progress as a student of aesthetics and a 
specialist in history in relation to her engagement with cognitive science.  The 
development of Lee’s aestheticism and historiographic methods from the publication 
of the first aesthetic essays in 1878 to the appearance of Juvenilia in 1887 is in part the 
story of her increasing awareness of cognitive science.   I argue that neuroscientific 
and psychological theories became a significant preoccupation for Lee during these 
years because they presented specific challenges to the ethical principles that inhered 
in Victorian aesthetic democracy as a political and social project.  Lee’s responses to 
those challenges in her aesthetic essays parallel the efforts made by Wilhelm Dilthey 
in his own essays on aesthetics to contain the relativist, solipsistic forms of perception 
incited by the democratization of art.  Lee and Dilthey, I argue, historicize aesthetic 
response in the service of their vision of an aesthetic polity in which a stable sensus 
communis is forged and managed by the secret shaping hands of an artistic aristocracy, 
under whose tutelage the public receives an aesthetic education in common norms of 
feeling and perception without being aware of it.  For both writers, however, this 
gambit re-introduces a form of aesthetic relativism at the level of history, rendering 
aesthetic objects from other historical cultures opaque and unknowable in the present.  
In the present, Lee and Dilthey suggest, one can only perceive the artworks of the past 
through the layers of beautiful graffiti left behind by the intervening generations.  
Finally, this chapter argues that Lee’s essays, unlike Dilthey’s, embrace aesthetic 
graffiti as a means of resisting or deflecting the perceptual influence of the aristic 
aristocracy, and thus retaining a measure of aesthetic autonomy and privacy.    
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The Museum, and Other Forms of Aesthetic Vandalism 
 
 Belcaro begins with the allegory of a conversion from history to aesthetics.  
“The Child in the Vatican,” the first essay in the collection, tells the story of a child 
learning to experience aesthetic pleasure in sculpture in the midst an environment 
actively hostile to such pleasure: the museum.  The museum space, Lee suggests, is 
organized not to elicit aesthetic pleasure, but to facilitate historical classification.  
Thus, the Vatican has abstracted its statuary from their old places in garden or market 
or temple, where they were fully integrated with daily life, and deposited them in tiny 
“cells” ranged according to classificatory systems based on period and school.  In its 
devotion to dry, historical abstraction, the Vatican has become an “over-ground 
catacomb…a dismal scientific piece of ostentation, like all galleries; a place where art 
is arranged and ticketed and made dingy and lifeless.”  For this reason, if we desire to 
take aesthetic pleasure in the objects displayed in the museum, “we must be prepared 
to isolate what we wish to enjoy, to make for it a fitting habitation in our fancy” 
(Belcaro 17-8). 
 To re-place the Vatican’s classical sculptures within a mental habitation 
conducive to pleasure is difficult, however, because modern mental and aesthetic 
faculties themselves resemble the museum space.  This correspondence, Lee suggests, 
partly stems from the fact that modern aesthetic receptivity has been shaped by 
paintings rather than statuary, and this adaptation to painting has been facilitated by 
the psychology of association:   
Out of fine glossy modern pictures…confused with haunting impressions, of 
things seen or heard of (the strange, deeply significant sights and words of our 
childhood), do we get our original, never really alterable ideas and feelings 
about art; for much as we may clip, trim, and bedizen our minds with borrowed 
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things, we can never change, never even recast its solid material: a compact, 
and seemingly homogeneous soul mass, made up of tightly-pressed, crushed 
odds and ends of impression; broken, confused, pounded bits of the sights and 
sounds and emotions of our childhood.” (22) 
The obstacles to a properly aesthetic appreciation of the statues are two-fold here.  
Lee’s “soul mass” at once too rigidly limits and too chaotically variegates sense 
experience.  Never really alterable, the soul mass can be cosmetically refined but not 
significantly reshaped.  Yet, at the same time, its shape is the product of broken, 
confused odds and ends crushed indiscriminately together.  In this respect, the soul 
mass perfectly complements the museum space, whose classificatory impulses and 
organizational strategies have been evolved to order the accumulated art objects from 
an overwhelming multiplicity of historical periods.  However, to the degree that the 
spectator gives rein to these classificatory impulses, she fails to respond 
aesthetically—to “feel actual, simple, unreasoning, wholesome pleasure in the sight of 
the old broken marbles”—and instead treats each sculpture as “an historic fossil, by 
study of which, as with the bone of a pterodactyl or an ichthyosaurus, [she] can amuse 
[herself] reconstructing the appearance and habits of a long dead, once living 
civilization” (23).  The spectator thus approaches each statue as a synecdoche of its 
original culture, and in doing so falls prey to the second obstacle to a properly 
aesthetic appreciation of sculpture: the fact that the modern mode of aesthetic 
perception treats art works not as receptacles of forces but as signs.  The appreciation 
of sculpture, which was “born when the world was young and had not yet learned to 
think and talk in symbolical riddles,” defies the tendency of modern aesthetic response 
to interpret artworks (20).  Hence the importance Lee gives to painting in the 
development of the soul mass; within the Hegelian schema of art history she invokes 
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throughout the essay, painting emerges once the idea begins to predominate over the 
form in the work of art, once the art work becomes a sign.   
 Insofar as the spectator reads these artworks only as synecdoches for their 
cultures of origin, she fails to attend reflectively to the artworks in their concrete 
specificity or to her concrete impressions of them.  She perceives through a semiotics, 
rather than a physics.  As Lee puts it elsewhere in Belcaro, the modern spectator thus 
transforms each artwork she encounters into “a mere stereotyped symbol, not more 
artistic than the names which [the artist] might have engraved beneath each figure” 
(88).  In fact, Lee suggests that modernized perception not only carves a name 
underneath the artwork, but actually performs an act of mental vandalism, writing over 
the artwork itself in defiance of the intentions of the artist and any possibility of 
intrinsic meaning.  The modern spectator thus effaces the aesthetic object, treating it as 
“a meaningless thing, to which we have willfully attached a meaning which is not part 
or parcel of it—a blank sheet of paper on which we write what comes into our head, 
and which itself can tell us nothing” (60).  The meaning that we thus scrawl across the 
artwork seems not fixed and stereotyped as are historical labels, however, but aleatory; 
it is quite simply whatever comes into our head.   
 The dry classification of art objects by historical period finds its counterpart in 
these random acts of mental graffiti.  The regimented space of the museum is simply 
the inverse of the “habitation in our fancy” made up of confused “haunting 
impressions” and the “broken, confused, pounded bits of the sights and sounds and 
emotions of our childhood.”  In both cases, the underlying modes of perception are 
associative.  Lee explicitly identifies these “haunting impressions” as associative in 
the preface to Belcaro.66  She there explains that she chose the place-name “Belcaro” 
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 In Belcaro, especially, Lee consistently employs a Gothic rhetoric in her characterization of 
association, especially in its aleatory form.  There are likely two reasons for this.  First, if Victorian 
Gothic is, as Patrick O’Malley argues, “the thematic or discursive eruption of a traumatic past into the 
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as a title for her collection because the memory of a day there with Mary Robinson 
similarly “haunted” her during the composition of her essays.  While this title 
“logically…means nothing,” it has, for her, “a meaning of association” (2).  Likewise, 
Lee’s characterization of historicizing perception as synecdochic signals that she 
understands this mode of response, too, as associative, insofar as association functions 
first of all according to the figural logic of synecdoche. 
 Most of the essays in Belcaro are at pains to theorize a mode of aesthetic 
experience that does not depend on or include association.  Again and again, Lee 
decries the fact that, in transforming the artwork into a sign, association becomes a 
form of abstraction, leading the mind away from the concrete, sensuous art object and 
thus neglecting the form in favor of the content.  Hence the importance of classical 
sculpture in awakening the child’s sense of beauty in “The Child in the Vatican.”  As 
the art form that, according to Hegel, achieved the ideal interpenetration of form and 
content, embodiment and idea, classical sculpture does not require interpretation; the 
mind contemplates the form instead of drifting and wandering off in search of its 
meaning.  However, just as the child in the Vatican goes on to perceive other art forms 
in the same way it has learned to view sculptures, so Lee insists that the classical mode 
is the true form of aesthetic response, regardless of the artistic medium.. 
We must remember that this work is merely the externally existing, definite, 
finite form, and not the ideas of emotions which, by the power of association, 
that form may awaken in ourselves.  What the artist gives is merely the 
                                                                                                                                       
present, distorted into a suggestion of the supernatural,” then Lee’s use of it here gestures at the role of 
inheritance in association, which we will explore more fully below.  But O’Malley also observes that 
the Victorian Gothic often “pose[s] a challenge to the notion of the stabilizing classificatory power of 
language.”  The Gothic thus furnishes particularly apt tropes for association, insofar as the Gothic has, 
by the late Victorian period, become widely available in Victorian culture as a figure for indeterminacy 
itself.  Lee herself, moreover, describes the Gothic in terms that are strikingly similar to her description 
of the “soul-mass.”  In the preface to Hauntings, she claims that the supernatural is made up of “things 
of the imagination…sprung from the strange confused heaps, half-rubbish, half-treasure, which lie in 
our fancy, heaps of half-faded recollections, of fragmentary vivid impressions, litter of multi-0colored 
tatters, and faded herbs and flowers.”  See O’Malley, 12-30, and Hauntings.   
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arrangement of lines and colours in a given manner, which may, as in painting, 
resemble an already existing natural object; or, as in architecture and pattern 
decoration, resemble no already existing natural object…This, and not any 
train of thoughts awakened by this possibly but not necessarily existing 
resemblance to an already known natural object…is artistic form, the 
absolutely, objectively existing work of art.  (183-4)   
Lee thus suggests in Belcaro that art’s “magic speech, its language of lines and colours 
and sounds” is not properly a language at all, because art and aesthetics are 
fundamentally separate from representation and interpretation (64).  Lee, drawing 
especially from Pater’s arguments in “The School of Giorgione” (which I discuss in 
the next chapter), defines art fundamentally as a physics, rather than a semiotics.   
 For this reason, Lee excludes moral concerns from the proper function of art.  
Narrowly circumscribed within the limits of direct sensuous impressions of a 
particular conjunction of physical forces, the domain of aesthetic response remains 
independent of whatever moral representations are incidental to the artwork.  Despite 
these formal protestations, however, Lee’s essays suggest that one of her primary 
concerns with an associative mode of aesthetics was, in fact, that association 
undermined the ethical common sense authorizing aesthetic democracy.  When 
viewing an artwork associatively, Lee writes, “although your bodily eyes may be fixed 
on the picture or statue, your intellectual eyes are busy with some recollection or 
impression in your mind” (64).  In this regard, association enables a willful 
indifference to the intentions of the artist and a solipsistic turning away from sociality. 
To the extent that the spectator attends to a private, “half articulate language…of 
associations” at the expense of the “clear language of form, which is equally 
intelligible to all men” (283), he suppresses sensus communis and thus refuses to 
participate in the common judgments that affirm our capacity to hold shared moral or 
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aesthetic standards.  Concomitantly, in turning away from the social elements of 
aesthetic experience and toward a purely personal language of association, the 
spectator fails to respond to the artwork as a communicative utterance.  In arbitrarily 
scrawling across the artwork his private associations without attending to its “real, 
inherent effect,” the spectator fails to recognize the artwork as the product of another 
consciousness, separate from itself and with a moral claim to recognition as such.  Lee 
makes this argument explicitly in Juvenilia, where she lists it as a central reservation 
in her reassessment of association and aesthetics.  There, she claims that association’s 
indifference to the “reality” of the work of art violates the imperative to “do our best 
to get at the reality of man, woman, beast, or plant, knowing that on that reality 
depends all it can do for us, or that we must do for it” (Juvenilia 45-6).  Lee illustrates 
this moral failure with the figure of the “unproductive aesthete,” who sits at a concert 
“blandly, a pleasant noise of music soothing or gently stirring [his] nerves, letting [his] 
mind fill (like a leaky boat) with vague thoughts and emotions” while ignoring the 
musical forms on which the composer labored with an “agony of long unsuccessful 
effort” (49).  In this way, Lee finesses the question of authorial intention: if an artist’s 
intentions are merely the physics of the artwork, intention can be grasped by the 
spectator without the necessary recourse to interpretation or mental reference to 
something beyond the concretely existing object.   
 In Belcaro, Lee’s moral-aesthetic principles are underwritten by the 
assumption that a given artwork’s form is “equally intelligible to all men”—that, in 
other words, there is an “absolutely, objectively existing work of art” available to a 
common sensory experience.  Lee thus invests sensory experience with a stability that, 
as Pater knew very well, is an illusion of language and habit.  By the 1870s, the 
emergence of neuro-science had rendered such assumptions untenable by 
demonstrating an unexpected complexity and contingency underlying even the most 
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routine cognitions.  The very dawn of the nineteenth century saw important scientific 
work that heralded the demise of classical models of perception, such as William 
Herschel’s discovery of light outside the visible spectrum in 1800 and Thomas 
Young’s demonstration that light is a wave, rather than a particle, as Newtonian 
orthodoxy held.  By mid-century, Helmholtz had invented the opthalmoscope in order 
to closely examine the retina, and found that light is not transmitted through the eye as 
through a transparent medium, but instead falls on complex field of receptors inside 
the retina that initiate a series of neural processes constituting visual sensations.  As 
Jonathan Crary suggests, by the 1870s neural science established beyond doubt that 
sensation and perception were densely mediated processes, which entailed active 
participation by both the sense-organs and the consciousness of an observing subject 
(Crary 152-155). 
 Fundamentally, nineteenth-century cognitive science proposed that any 
cognition is the product of sensory and perceptual faculties that form an interlocking, 
two-tier system dedicated to the filtration, selection, and supplementation of stimuli.  
The first tier of this cognitive system is made up of the sense organs, whose 
functioning neural science analyzed with unprecedented clarity.  As these sensory 
processes were more clearly mapped out, however, their hold on a stable world of 
objects became considerably diminished.  Not only did the discovery of light outside 
the visible spectrum and the closer measurement of the range of human hearing67 make 
clear the narrow range of human senses, but the more precise understanding of their 
operations suggested that the sensations they produce are always to a certain degree 
contingent and fragmentary.68  As the instability of the first tier of cognition became 
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 Helmholtz claims that the range of human hearing runs from 20 to 32,000 waves per second, 
relatively close to the contemporary scientific consensus that the human hearing range is between 20 
and 20,000 hertz.  See Science and Culture, 52.   
68
 For example, the close examination of the retina revealed that the fovea—or center—was densely 
packed with nervous receptors, which were far sparser in the peripheral parts of the eye.  As Crary 
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apparent, cognitive scientists were obliged to theorize a second tier that stabilized the 
first by synthesizing its fragmentary sense data in the act of perception.  The primary 
model for synthesizing perception was provided by associationist psychology, whose 
theories were continually revised to fit with new physiological knowledge.69  
Helmholtz, for example, drew substantially from associationism in his account of 
“unconscious inference”—the theory that perception results when we unconsciously 
infer the existence of an object from a fragmentary group of sensations.   
 For Helmholtz, as for nineteenth-century cognitive science generally, what 
association crucially provides is not merely a grammar of combination for sensations 
but a semiotics, a means of shoring up through language the common world of objects 
now threatening to collapse into a teeming, unpredictable vortex of atomized and 
partial sensations.  As Gary Hatfield argues, in Helmholtz’s epistemology of 
unconscious inference, “sensations act as signs, and perception is their 
interpretation.”70  One of the most paradigmatic examples of perceptual interpretation 
is thus found in the act of reading itself.  Wundt, among others, calls attention to the 
fact that practiced readers do not focalize every letter in a given word while reading, 
but instead make interpretive leaps based on attention to only a few elements of the 
word and likely combinations with the words preceding it.  Hence the tendency to pass 
unconsciously over misspellings and other small errors.  Wundt concludes that reading 
offers a particularly vivid example of a pervasive mental process: 
                                                                                                                                       
notes, while the difference between foveal and peripheral vision was always apparent to naïve 
observation, its systematization in physiology presented epistemological problems and exposed the 
width and depth of focus in the ostensibly simultaneous vision of classical perspective as a composite of 
separate moments of foveal vision.  See Crary, 290-295.   
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 Psychology thus acts as an indispensable supplement for physiology; in the second half of the 
nineteenth-century, the two disciplines are unthinkable without one another.  Crary argues that the 
psychology of attention supplanted earlier associationist models during the 1870s, but the history of 
physio-psychology at the end of the nineteenth century is considerably messier than his account of this 
shift allows; associationism in fact provided the foundation for many of the early theories of attention.    
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 See Hatfield 208.   Hatfield provides a useful overview of the development of Helmholtz’s theory of 
unconscious inference.   
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What we imagine we perceive directly really belongs in a great extent to our 
memory of innumerable previous impressions, and we are not aware of a 
separation between what is directly given to us and what is supplied by 
[spontaneous association]…Many words of a lecture are imperfectly heard; the 
contours of a drawing or painting are only imperfectly represented in our eye.  
In spite of this, we notice none of the gaps.  That does not happen because we 
perceive things inaccurately, as this phenomenon is often incorrectly 
interpreted, but because we have at our disposal the rich stores of memory 
which fill out and perfect the perceived image. (Introduction to Psychology 
100-1). 
While Wundt, like Helmholtz and many other nineteenth-century cognitive scientists, 
quibbled with the exact fit between associationist models and these perceptual 
processes, their qualifications and reworkings of association stemmed from the need to 
invoke a perceptual semiotics in order to preserve a stable world of common objects 
and judgments from the contingency of sensory experience.  In Belcaro, Lee makes 
exactly the opposite argument—that a perceptual semiotics should have no place in 
aesthetic judgment because it imports contingency into what should be a stable world 
of common sensory experience—and thus she is bound to run aground against the 
growing realization that sensory experience is far more volatile than had been 
believed.  As Lee reappraises this relationship over the course of the 1880s, she is 
likewise forced to reassess the relationship between history and aesthetics, and is 
finally led in Juvenilia to posit the profound historicity of all aesthetic experience.   
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Figuring the Aesthetic Polity 
 
 In the mid 1880s, as Lee began to rework her aesthetic ideas in light of her 
growing awareness of neural science and experimental psychology, Wilhelm Dilthey 
was simultaneously elaborating his own cognitive aesthetics.  In “The Imagination of 
the Poet,” first published in 1887, Dilthey attempts to grasp the implications of 
cognitive science for aesthetics with an eye towards the same constellation of 
problems taken up by Lee—the relationship between history and aesthetics, and the 
potential political effects of an emerging “aesthetic democracy.”  Like Lee, Dilthey 
begins his essay by invoking the bewilderment of late nineteenth-century Europe 
awash in an incomprehensible amalgamation of the art of different cultures and 
historical moments.  “Today,” he writes, “a colorful mixture of forms from all periods 
and peoples is breaking in upon us and seems to undo every delimitation of literary 
genres and every rule…In this anarchy, the artist is forsaken by rules; the critic is 
thrown back upon his personal feeling as the only remaining standard of evaluation.  
The public rules…Thus today art is becoming democratic” (“The Imagination of the 
Poet” 31-5).  As in “The Child in the Vatican,” the overwhelming flood of historical 
artworks is simply the objective side of a widespread subjective confusion, a pervasive 
and dissociative solipsism resulting from the absence of stable standards of judgment.  
Dilthey, more explicitly than Lee, thus presents the image of aesthetic democracy 
without sensus communis, in which common forms have become impossible in the 
face of the “vulgar instincts of the masses” and their “low” desire for what he calls 
“gripping effects.”   
 Dilthey, again like Lee, argues that this crisis can be averted through an 
aesthetic education, but while Lee suggests in Belcaro that the masses can teach 
themselves simply by returning to the innocence of the student, Dilthey is too aware of 
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the theories of cognitive science to believe in a return to Eden.  Instead, Dilthey 
suggests that as history and physio-psychology have created this aesthetic-political 
anarchy, its solution lies in a historicized psychology.  Accordingly, in “The 
Imagination of the Poet” and in his 1892 “Three Epochs of Modern Aesthetics,” 
Dilthey employs cognitive scientific theories in order to account for the historical 
variability of artistic forms and to discover “universally valid” aesthetic principles to 
guide poetic creation and critical evaluation amidst the vagaries of historical changes 
in taste.  Attention to Dilthey’s project of a hermeneutic poetics can thus provide 
substantial aid in an understanding of Vernon Lee’s aesthetic essays.  A comparative 
analysis demonstrates that Lee and Dilthey were separately responding to a common 
set of problems posed by cognitive science to historical knowledge and the politics of 
classical aesthetics.  Moreover, Dilthey’s attempts to solve these problems by 
addressing “the historicity of psychic life” as it manifests itself in artistic forms and 
his investment in a form of aesthetic authoritarianism throw into relief Lee’s own 
historicized aesthetics and the competing principles underlying the aestheticist 
political and ethical programs she advances in her essays.   
 Dilthey’s essays model aesthetic forms on a perceptual semiotics—the 
“representations” through which cognition of the external world takes place.  Arguing 
that the fundamental function of art is an affective symbolism—in which “an image 
itself or something akin to it represents a mental content, and this mental content takes 
on sensory concreteness in this image or one akin to it” (90)—Dilthey claims that 
association enables this affective symbolism and thus plays an indispensable role in 
aesthetic experience.  Association deepens the power of a given representation to elicit 
an affective response by linking it with other representations and thus converting it 
into a repository of complex feelings and ideas.  However, Dilthey also explicitly 
reworks the theory of association to bring it in line with physiological knowledge.  
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Dilthey pointedly distinguishes his revision of association by noting that earlier 
accounts assume that the associated elements—whether perceptions or sensations—
are discrete, fixed, and given, whereas they are actually in flux.  Perceptions and 
representations, Dilthey writes, “are permeated, colored, and enlivened by feelings.”  
These feelings and interests guide our attentiveness to experience, and thus they bring 
about “the appearance, gradual unfolding, and the disappearance of representations.”  
Our interested attention works on our representations, and thus “every representation 
is a process.  Even the sensations which are connected in an image, and the relations 
existing among them, are subject to inner transformations” (68, emphasis in the 
original).  The changing state of consciousness alters the elements it works on, so that 
representations are always in a state of becoming, and can never be repeated 
identically.  Only those elements of an earlier perception that are “of interest” to 
consciousness in its present state will recur in a subsequent perception, so that “the 
same image can no more return than the same leaf can grow back on a tree the 
following spring” (102).71  This characterization of psychic processes—defined by a 
flux in which representations instantaneously decompose as the changing “interest” of 
consciousness dictates—raises the specter of exactly the formless aesthetic anarchy 
that Dilthey attempts to contain through his appeal to psychology.  Accordingly, 
Dilthey is led to posit a conserving force to restrain these transformations, and here he 
turns to the theory of neural habits.   
 The theory of neural habits provides the basis for one of the most important 
concepts in Dilthey’s aesthetic essays: what he calls, “the acquired nexus of psychic 
life.”  The nexus of psychic life is the hub of all the representations, feelings, and 
processes acquired through experience that mediate our experience of the external 
                                                
71
 Dilthey’s account the transformational force exerted by interest seems indebted to Shadworth 
Hodgson’s discussion of interest and association in Time and Space.  See Hodgson, 266-7.   
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world.  As Dilthey writes in “Three Epochs of Modern Aesthetics,” “the sensory 
impression, even when it seems to affect us by itself, that is, to appear without 
reference to anything else, is intertwined with a dim nexus of representations, drives, 
and feelings in the background of my psychic life” (“Three Epochs of Modern 
Aesthetics” 217).  While the nexus of psychic life thus seems to be identical to the 
force at work in the transformations of perceptual and sensory experience, Dilthey 
makes clear that its action is bound insofar as the nexus is the result of a kind of neural 
bildung.   
 In explaining the development of the acquired nexus of psychic life, Dilthey 
rehearses the same bildungsroman of neural habit that pervades late nineteenth-
century literature and neural science.  As the child develops, Dilthey writes, a gap 
opens between the reflex action of stimulus and response.  Gradually, stimuli become 
mediated, and thus are transformed into sensations, while formerly unconscious 
responses are cognized as desires.  These sensations “eventually leave behind traces.”  
As these traces accumulate, “habits of feeling and desire are formed.  Gradually, as the 
psyche develops, an acquired nexus of psychic life emerges between sensation and 
movement” (“The Imagination of the Poet” 97, emphasis in original).  Dilthey here 
suggests that the acquired nexus of psychic life is composed of neural habits.  As we 
have seen in chapter one, physiologists such as G.H. Lewes understood neural habits 
as pathways carved out within the nervous system and altered over time by repeated 
sensations.  The gradual establishment of these neural grooves as repeated sensations 
engrave themselves on the nervous system serves as the necessary physical condition 
for the learned ability to purposefully manage and recognize sensations, but these 
pathways likewise determine and restrict how the mind registers new stimuli.  For this 
reason, Lewes describes consciousness as a palimpsest: new sensations re-write the 
mind, but only on the basis of the text already inscribed there by previous sensations 
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or by neurological inheritance.  Dilthey, adapting this theory, suggests that these 
neural habits are not tantamount to reflex action.  As the habits of the nexus overlap 
one another, they enable more than one way of registering and cognizing a given 
stimulus, thus creating a zone of indeterminacy in which several different mental 
actions are possible (in this respect, Dilthey looks forward to Bergson’s arguments in 
Matter and Memory, which I will take up in the next chapter).  At the same time, the 
habits of Dilthey’s psychic nexus bind the range of mental action to a set of stable, if 
slowly changing, usages and established ways of experiencing and perceiving the 
world.   
 The cost of this gambit, however, is that the sensus communis Dilthey 
preserves through an appeal to neural habit theory is radically circumscribed by 
history and culture.  The invisible shaping force exerted by history and culture on 
cognition discloses the limits of any purely empirical aesthetics.  The empirical effects 
of even the smallest components of any given aesthetic impression—“such as a line or 
a shape, a chord or a sequence of tones”—are in fact “conditioned by acquired habits.”  
Given that “the impression embodies the results of a considerable amount of cognitive 
sense experience,” Dilthey must acknowledge the very limited conclusions that can be 
drawn from his own aesthetic experience “as a person educated and historically 
conditioned in a certain context.”  The same limitations obtain for the same reasons in 
an analysis of the aesthetic impressions of larger groups.  The reliability of any 
conclusion drawn from such aesthetic empiricism “remains geographically and 
temporally limited, and it remains so of necessity.  Longstanding cognitive usages are 
embodied in our sense experience, and this can, over generations, produce judgments 
of taste which appear to be simple and immediate” (“Three Epochs of Modern 
Aesthetics” 199).  While Dilthey’s concept of the acquired nexus of psychic life staves 
off the theoretical conclusion that sensory experience is ineluctably anarchic and 
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contingent, it reintroduces contingency in the form of an insurmountable cultural and 
historical relativism, rendering “universally valid” aesthetic principles impossible to 
discern.   
Dilthey’s responds to this impasse by supplementing his analysis of aesthetic 
impressions with an analysis of artistic production.  Hence his primary aim in the 
aesthetic essays is to call for and tentatively sketch a hermeneutic poetics.  Drawing on 
classical theories of aesthetic disinterestedness, Dilthey attempts to circumvent the 
problem of cultural relativism by exempting poets from the constraints of the habits 
constituting the acquired nexus of psychic life:  
For a person whose images stand in relation to intended actions or knowledge 
to be attained, images are signs for something which occupies a determinate 
place in the calculation of his intentions or in the relations to what is knowable.  
But a poetic genius yields himself to lived experience or to an image with an 
independent interest in them, with a satisfaction in intuition, however 
frequently he may be distracted by external life or science.  A poetic genius is 
like a traveler in a foreign land, who, with great enjoyment and complete 
freedom, abandons himself, without any utilitarian motives, to the surrounding 
impressions. (“The Imagination of the Poet” 61) 
Dilthey here suggests that the poet escapes from historical and cultural determination 
exactly insofar as he resists employing a perceptual semiotics.  Unlike the average 
person, who treats phenomena as signs to be unhesitatingly interpreted as custom and 
his routinized interests dictate, the poet disinterestedly focuses on phenomena without 
conceptualizing them or filling them out and completing them with Wundt’s rich 
stores of memory.  In doing so, the poet truly acts “like a traveler in a foreign land,” 
someone, that is, for whom all cultural norms of perception are alien.  Dilthey, 
however, cannot sustain the poet’s full exception from the rule of the acquired nexus 
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of psychic life.  Estrangement from all norms of perception is a condition of extreme 
alienation analogous not just to foreign travel, but also to dreams, reveries, 
hallucinations, and madness.  In each case, what is first of all impossible is access to 
the common sense or understanding of phenomena provided by the nexus of psychic 
life.  As Dilthey acknowledges, the poet must be “bound by [norms of perception] if 
he is to satisfy his readers or listeners” (127).   
 Dilthey is thus at some pains to specify the conditions under which the poet 
transcends the nexus of psychic life and to distinguish the poet from the dreamer and 
the madman.  The madman and the dreamer, he claims, experience a “diminution in 
the efficacy” of the nexus, while poetic production is “grounded in the efficacy of the 
acquired psychic nexus”; the activity of the poet consists of “a utilization of the nexus, 
which at the same time intentionally transcends the reality represented within it” (98).  
Dilthey suggests that the poet simultaneously employs and transcends the acquired 
nexus of psychic life by representing its action and thus raising it to conscious 
attention.  In its normal functioning, the acquired psychic nexus is the invisible 
foundation of mental life: “although its constituents are not represented clearly and 
distinctly and its connections are not explicit, nevertheless its acquired picture of 
reality regulates our understanding of whatever impression our consciousness is 
occupied with” (97).  An all-powerful and omnipresent shaping force, the acquired 
psychic nexus nevertheless remains below the threshold of consciousness.  Neither 
clear, distinct, nor explicit, the nexus operates “unintentionally” and unreflectively.  
What is most significant about Dilthey’s poet is that he renders the action of the 
acquired psychic nexus visible by bringing its whole force to bear on a given 
representation, in a process Dilthey calls positive completion: 
Only when the whole acquired psychic nexus becomes active can images be 
transformed on the basis of it: innumerable, immeasurable, almost 
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imperceptible changes occur in their nucleus.  And in this way, the completion 
of the particular originates from the fullness of psychic life.  Thus we obtain 
from images and their connections what is essential about a state of affairs; 
what gives it its meaning in the nexus of reality…[This is] the process of 
completion, by which something outer is enlivened by something inner or 
something inner is made visible and intuitable by something outer.  (104, 
emphasis in original)  
While positive completion seems similar to the kind of affective symbolism made 
possible by association—charging a given representation with feeling by linking it to 
another representation with affective content—Dilthey insists that positive completion 
differs by bringing the entire acquired psychic nexus into play.  In positive completion 
a discrete change worked on the image is in any case irrelevant, by itself “almost 
imperceptible.”  What positive completion offers instead is the spectacle of the 
acquired psychic nexus as it works, “unfolding” a representation with all the 
complexity of the nexus’ overlapping habits and processes.  The poet transcends the 
acquired psychic nexus only in that he overcomes its partial and unconscious action, 
synthesizing and representing its processes in their totality.   
 The poet’s ability to represent the acquired psychic nexus is extremely 
important for Dilthey because it is this ability that offers a solution to the anarchy of 
modern aesthetic democracy.  The “formless” state of late nineteenth-century Europe, 
flooded by an inassimilable multitude of forms from other cultures and historical 
periods, its coherence breaking down as the “vulgar masses” frantically search for the 
atomized thrills of “gripping effects,” simply represents an acute case of a recurrent 
social problem.  Any “historical situation,” Dilthey argues, comprises “a multiplicity 
of particular facts.  They stand next to one another indifferently and cannot be traced 
back to one another” (161, emphasis in original).  Any social entity at any moment 
 130 
thus encompasses a set of disconnected conditions that it works to link together and 
coordinate through routine social interactions.  The set of relations that thus emerges 
is, however, merely a loose system of “reciprocities and affinities”; unreflectively and 
unconsciously coordinated, the historical situation is the objective side of the 
overlapping habits and processes making up the acquired psychic nexus.  The 
conscious and formal unity of the historical situation—what Dilthey calls the historical 
spirit of the age—can only be attained through the action of (artistic, philosophical, or 
political) “genius”: “knowledge or artistic creativity can produce a unity in, among, 
and between these indifferent facts—a unity which is made possible by this 
coordination of facts in a given age” (162, emphasis in original).  The genius, like the 
poet, formalizes an unreflective set of relations that are already given, organizing and 
displaying the manifold of a historical situation so as to enable the self-
conceptualization of a given historical period.   
  The activity of the poet in figuring the acquired psychic nexus not only 
provides the model for these feats of historical representation, it performs them at their 
most fundamental site: the mind itself.  The coordinated system of interactions that 
make up the historical situation structures the cognitive norms embodied in the 
acquired psychic nexus.  The acquired psychic nexus thus represents the historical 
situation.  When the poet represents the psychic nexus in its totality and thus 
formalizes it, making it reflective, he is simultaneously figuring the historical geist.  
Dilthey concludes: 
Psychologically, the contribution of the poetic genius is made possible by the 
fact that the acquired nexus of his psychic life is conditioned by the 
coordination of the constituents of an age.  The nexus thus represents this 
coordination.  In turn, the poetic processes taking place in consciousness and 
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their results…are conditioned by this acquired nexus and thus themselves 
represent this nexus.  (163)    
By elaborating a cognitive aesthetics, therefore, Dilthey is also elaborating a theory of 
social order under the conditions of modernity.  The poet imposes an organizing form 
on the aesthetic anarchy of nineteenth-century European society by representing its 
representation.   
 The aesthetic education with which the poet thus reforms “the vulgar instincts 
of the masses” is guaranteed by Dilthey’s understanding of aesthetic reception.  
Dilthey insists that the reader or listener “re-creates” the poem, performing over again, 
though with a lesser intensity, the poet’s labor of feeling and composition.  This 
insistence is undergirded by cognitive scientific theories of perception and sensory-
motor response.  Insofar as poetry’s fundamental function is affective symbolism, the 
reader obviously must experience the emotions that the poem expresses.  More 
importantly, though, Dilthey’s understanding of reception as re-creation rests on the 
physiology of habit.  Neural habits were thought to encompass not only the channels 
through which the nervous system filtered stimuli so as to transform them into 
sensations, but also motor-reflexes ancillary to such activity.  To organize stimuli into 
sensation, therefore, necessarily included a set of muscular responses, and on this basis 
neuroscientists suggested that the sensory interpretation of phenomena such as 
language required a certain amount of motor re-enactment.72  Bergson summarizes this 
theory in Matter and Memory, using the example of learning a foreign language.  The 
foreign language at first presents an indistinguishable welter of phenomena, in which 
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 Physiologists argued that full motor-reenactment was typically suppressed, and only a ghostly, 
incomplete version was initiated as the relevant nervous channels processing stimuli became excited.  In 
The Functions of the Brain, for example, Ferrier argues that “we think of form by initiating and then 
inhibiting the movements of the eyes or hands through which by which ideas of form have been gained 
and persist…We recall an object in idea by pronouncing the name in a suppressed manner.”  See Ferrier 
286.   
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discrete words and even syllables are impossible to separate from one another.  To 
organize them requires “automatic movements of internal accompaniment…sketching 
a simplified figure in which the listener would find…the very movements of the 
speaker.”  Bergson calls these movements of accompaniment “the motor diagram” of 
heard speech.73  Dilthey, like a range of other aesthetic theorists in the late nineteenth 
century, including Lee, applied the theory of motor diagrams to aesthetic response.  In 
his poetics, the poet’s formalizing organization of the acquired psychic nexus is 
repeated by, and thereby inscribed in, the body of every reader.   
 The mechanism of imitation thus orders the chaos of aesthetic democracy.  In 
implicitly making this claim, Dilthey draws from Gabriel Tarde, the French sociologist 
who was the first person to take sensory-motor habits as the basis for a systematic 
theory of social order.  “Society is imitation,” Tarde argues.  Re-enactments of 
observed behavior constitute the hidden mainspring of political, economic, and 
cultural life by creating the norms of behavior and perception on which any social 
interaction relies.  “Just as a man does not see, listen, walk, stand, write, [or] play the 
flute…except by means of many co-ordinated muscular memories, so a society could 
not exist or change or advance a single step unless it possessed an untold store of blind 
routine and slavish imitation which was constantly being added to by successive 
generations.”74  Such imitation is largely unconscious; the social man is thus a 
“veritable somnambulist” living out a dream of spontaneous volition while in reality 
bound to unreflective convention in the very fibers of his being.  These relatively 
homogenous customs and conventions of modern Europe were produced by 
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 See Matter and Memory 110-1.  Bergson, I should note, complicates this model, arguing that, given 
the role played in perception by memory and expectation, the motor diagram of heard speech is guided 
by the perceiving subject’s assumptions about the speaker’s meaning.   
74
 See Tarde 75.  While The Laws of Imitation was published in 1890, I focus here on the chapter “What 
is a Society?”, which was first published as an essay in Revue Philosophique in 1884, three years before 
Dilthey’s The Imagination of the Poet.   
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charismatic leaders, whose “prestige” subordinated an original refractory social 
heterogeneity into a governable, unified society by “fascinating” all who came into 
their orbit.  On the basis of such involuntary consensus, mimetic democracy emerges 
as the prestige and power of fascination that had been concentrated in the charismatic 
leaders are dispersed among the people at large.  Tarde’s account of the progress of 
imitation, like Dilthey’s account of the development of poetic forms, thus tells the 
story of how a sensus communis is made so that a democracy, aesthetic or otherwise, 
can emerge.   
 In both Tarde’s mimetic democracy and Dilthey’s aesthetic democracy there is 
a deep strain of authoritarianism.  Tarde not only argues that the common sense 
underpinning democracy results from the authoritarian control of charismatic 
leaders—whose authority he thoroughly naturalizes as the power of fascination—he 
also suggests that democracy itself should be transcended in a return to authoritarian 
rule.  Tarde finds himself “pessimistic” about the prospect that expanded opportunities 
for education and employment for women and the poor will prompt both groups to 
abandon “their” necessary labor, leading to a time when “we shall be without 
agricultural laborers, without nurses, and even without mothers who can or will 
nourish the continually decreasing number of their children” (66).  He therefore urges 
that a return to enforced hierarchy will be inevitable to correct the effects of this 
misguided pursuit of equality, and that “equality is only a transition between two 
hierarchies” (73).  While Dilthey’s politics are comparatively inoffensive, he 
nonetheless takes liberally from Tarde’s theory of imitation and likewise makes clear 
that the common sense underwriting his aesthetic democracy results from the guiding 
hand of “genius.”  It is, he writes, “by means of [the personality of genius] that we 
understand the language of sensuous manifestations and read the gestures and actions 
of men; by means of [the personality of genius] the inner meaning of everything outer, 
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and ultimately of the entire phenomenal world is opened up for other men” (211).  
Through the mechanism of imitation, our aesthetic education always occurs under the 
strict tutelage of the charismatic artist.   
 Dilthey’s authoritarian aesthetic democracy nonetheless constrains the power 
of the poet according to the prevailing habits of the acquired psychic nexus, and the 
dispersed power of habit thereby threatens to undermine his project of discovering 
universally valid aesthetic principles subtending the historical and cultural differences 
in artistic forms.  In Tarde’s mimetic democracy, once the power of fascination 
wielded by the charismatic leader has been distributed throughout a society, 
fascination itself is conditioned by the prevailing habits of perception and imitation.75  
Similarly, Dilthey’s aesthetic democracy is founded on the principle that the poet 
transcends the acquired psychic nexus of a given historical moment only by 
formalizing it and representing its operations.  This move both invests the poet with 
the power to shape a society and limits that power to merely making that society’s 
shape explicit.  Moreover, since a poem and its reading are thus conditioned by their 
respective historical and cultural origins, Dilthey cannot fully solve the problem of 
historical and cultural relativism that his essay addresses.  He consequently slips into 
an agnosticism about whether a poem that represents the nexus of a given period could 
ever do so for a reader whose habits of perception are conditioned by the nexus of a 
later period.76  In his attempts to secure the stability of common sense for late 
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 Anticipating Dilthey’s description of the poet as foreign traveler, Tarde claims that an awakening 
from the somnambulism of imitation and the consequent introduction of new forces into the closed 
system of mimetic democracy is only possible outside of one’s customary social environment in a 
“super-social” isolation or among an “alien society” (88, 79).  Yet just as in the case of Dilthey’s poet, 
it is not at all clear how, according to the habit theory Tarde draws from, the innovations brought back 
from such super-social excursions would be perceptible without passing through just those mimetic 
habits that they have supposedly transcended. 
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 Dilthey claims that art forms enable a historical culture to “become thematic both to itself and to us” 
but he also suggests that “when a new social order has been instituted…the poets of the preceding 
epoch no longer move us as they once moved their contemporaries” (163, 173).  He is also hard pressed 
to square his account of changing modes of perception with the supposedly “eternal” greatness of 
canonical figures.   
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nineteenth-century Europe in the midst of social upheaval by grounding it in neural 
habits, Dilthey is led to the tentative but seemingly inescapable conclusion that the 
past is truly a foreign country.   
 1887, the same year that Dilthey published “The Imagination of the Poet,” also 
saw the publication of Juvenilia, Lee’s second collection of aesthetic essays that 
begins with her reconsideration of association and aesthetics.  While association must 
be excluded in the bildungsroman of the aesthete that Lee recounts in “The Child in 
the Vatican,” in Juvenilia Lee argues that association is the source and process of 
bildung itself.  Clearly now aware of the sensory instabilities discovered by cognitive 
science, Lee identifies association as the force that builds up the solidity of 
perceptions and of the self from the churning flux of sensations:    
[Association] is the action which is for ever making the firm soil of our mind; 
by collecting round the microscopic present all the floatsam of the past, the 
action which is perpetually preventing the sea of constantly undulating 
experiences, atoms of sensation and reflection for ever changing place like 
drops in the ocean, from reabsorbing everything which might become a 
permanently existing idea, a definite emotion, a solid form…The wave of 
association may deprive us ever and anon of some addition to the little islet of 
wisdom and beauty in our lives; but had there not been that wave tossing the 
past to the present, no solid wisdom or beauty, nay, no individuality of 
ourselves would have existed at all. (55-6)     
Aptly employing the figure of waves, Lee here describes a world that has dissolved 
into a random and meaningless distribution of forces, a world of pure physics.  
Association solidifies portions of this world, building up both consciousness and the 
objects we perceive by allowing the fleeting, present sensations within the flow of our 
atomized impressions to bond with the sensations we have previously experienced.  
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This feat of brain-building results from an accretion of cognitions in which each new 
perception is made possible by previous ones.  Past impressions thus operate as 
principles of selection that determine what it is possible for our minds to grasp: “What 
we catch hold of with our mind is not that which is new, which belongs to today; but 
that which is old, and belongs to yesterday…We wander, as it were, through a vast 
and populous city; those that we notice and speak to are our old acquaintance; but the 
old acquaintance introduce new ones, whom we admit for their sake” (61).  Far from 
the dispersive, distracting force of Belcaro, association in Juvenilia focuses attention 
and provides the means for the grouping and stabilizing of sensations.  
 Lee clearly revises her arguments about association on the basis of greater 
familiarity with cognitive scientific accounts of perception.  Her account of 
association as structuring present perceptions through past impressions makes it clear 
that association fulfills the same task here as in Wundt’s and Helmholtz’s work: it is 
the mechanism for the acquisition and use of the “rich stores of memory” that 
construct a stable world from the necessarily fragmented and unstable sense-
experience of the body.  Lee grounds these rich stores of memory not just in a 
psychological process but in the neural pathways of the body.  In “Botticelli at the 
Villa Lemmi,” the essay following her opening defense of association in Juvenilia, 
Lee writes that “completely new impressions are not perceived, since the very organs 
of perception are formed by the repetition of a but slightly varying act of perceiving” 
(108).  The process of constructive, gradually shifting, repetitive perception evoked 
here is that of association, but this process shapes the “organs of perception” 
themselves, as well as the psychological capacity for specific cognitions.  In making 
this claim, Lee signals that her understanding of association draws from the primarily 
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Anglo-American cognitive theorists who argued that association is grounded in the 
physiology of neural habits.77  
 “On Novels,” an essay appearing in Lee’s 1886 collection, Baldwin, 
demonstrates Lee’s familiarity with the theory of neural habits.  In that essay, Lee 
employs the concept of neural pathways in order to account for the social and 
psychological effects of novel-reading.  Defining the primary interest of novel-reading 
as social and psychological, rather than aesthetic, so that her theory of novel-reading 
can evade her strictures on explicitly moral or social considerations in the domain of 
art, Lee argues that novels play an especially significant role in the processes of 
cognitive development that refine our capacity for feelings and their reflective 
discrimination.  Novels, with their special focus on psychic interiority and affective 
response, spur such development by “playing upon our emotions” and directing our 
attention to these emotional states, thus inducing in us both new affective states and a 
more reflective appreciation of their subtleties.  Employing the rhetoric of neural 
pathways, Lee describes novelists as “people who have taught mankind to see the 
broad channels along which its feelings move, who have dug those channels” 
(Baldwin 210-3, 221-3).    
 Lee accords novelists an especially prominent role in establishing affective 
habits because she invests them with the power to command and manage the reader’s 
attention.78  “Life,” she argues, cannot inscribe the mind as lastingly or effectively as 
literature because our typical experiences are fragmentary and overlapping, and we 
receive them with the mind “not tense, but slack,” in a state of dispersed, “constantly 
diverted” attention, so that “the things which are washed on to our consciousness, 
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 In The Principles of Psychology, for example, William James argues that metonymic or contiguous 
association is an effect of neural habits (James 563).  For a similar argument, see also Carpenter, 343-5.   
78
 In this respect, Lee seems to corroborate Garrett Stewart’s argument that the form of the Victorian 
novel strives to have its reader “always potentially at attention.”  See Stewart, 46.   
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floating on the stream, by the one wave, are washed off again by another wave.”  In 
receiving the impressions of literature, on the other hand, the mind is “tense…broad 
awake, on the alert,” so that we give to each impression our exclusive attention.  
Literary impressions are thus attentively experienced by the intellect, which “graves 
into itself” these impressions as “the essential, the selected, the thing to be preserved 
and revived,” and thereby bestows on them the “property of haunting the imagination, 
of determining the judgment” (221-2).  Lee suggests that as we engrave these focused 
sense impressions into the mind, they become “types” or “generalizations,” and thus, 
implicitly, abstractions that mediate experience by serving as templates for our 
perceptions.  Our attentiveness while reading thereby shapes the focus of our attention 
in the subsequent experiences of daily life.  In ascribing to the novelist the power to 
focalize the minds of his readers during and after the act of reading, Lee participates in 
the larger late nineteenth-century project, described at length in Crary’s Suspensions of 
Perception, of engineering techniques to manage attention.79  Lee’s suggestion that the 
novelist dictates the reader’s sense of what is “essential” in her impressions obviously 
shares many assumptions with Dilthey’s claim that the poet reveals to his readers the 
“inner meaning” of the phenomenal world.80  Like Dilthey in his aesthetic essays, Lee 
thus turns to neural habit theory in “On Novels” partly in the service of theorizing an 
authoritarian project to shape and manage a cognitive field of common sense.   
  Lee’s subsequent rethinking of the role of association in what she considered 
properly aesthetic experience extends her attempt to theorize an authoritarian aesthetic 
education.  This preoccupation underlies her essay on aesthetic environments, 
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 Crary notes that structure of attention, which is continuous with states of distraction and reverie, 
dooms this project to failure from its very beginning.   
80
 While Lee could not have been aware of Tarde’s arguments when she wrote the essays in Belcaro, 
she does there employ the concept of unconscious imitation, arguing that when experiencing an artwork 
aesthetically, the aesthete involuntarily seeks to increase her pleasure by “creating the work of art over 
again in the intensity of appreciation” (62).   
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“Botticelli at the Villa Lemmi.”  Building there on her claim that progressive 
repetitions form the organs of perception, Lee argues that in order to experience 
aesthetic impressions at their full intensity, “there must already exist in our life a habit 
of impression akin to those given wholesale by art…[and] there must be in the manner 
in which artistic impressions are presented to us something familiar, something 
analogous to the manner in which we obtain the ordinary inartistic impressions of life” 
(108-9).  In other words, aesthetic experience requires not only that we bring to the 
artwork the proper perceptual habits from our daily lives, but also that the artwork 
itself be presented to us in circumstances similar to those that make up our daily lives.  
The latter point comprises the main argument of this essay, whose occasion is Lee’s 
annoyance and uneasiness at the removal of Botticelli’s frescoes from the dilapidated 
former scullery of the Villa Lemmi, where they had been painted, to the galleries of 
the Louvre.  This essay thus rehearses Lee’s attacks on the museum space in “The 
Child in the Vatican,” but here Lee suggests that habits of association can help 
spectators provide the artworks with a “fitting habitation in [the] fancy.”  Especially 
effective in this regard is the Arts and Crafts movement, which, Lee writes, is 
“train[ing] innumerable men and women into an habitual perception of beauty, 
without which they must wander through all the galleries provided for them by the 
nation with mere vacant, unfamiliar wonder, and leave them as poor of durable artistic 
impressions as they entered them” (113).  Lee suggests that the decorative arts 
determine habits of aesthetic impression through the influence of aesthetic habitations.  
“Botticelli at the Villa Lemmi” thus taps into the late Victorian discourses around 
aesthetic environments that, as Douglas Mao has compellingly demonstrated, were 
primarily concerned with employing engineered spaces to shape and define character 
(Mao 18-108). Lee suggests that the perceptual and aesthetic habits acquired from 
such managed environments function to rein in the more extravagant interpretations of 
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association, serving as guarantees against its tendency to “seek in statue or 
picture…[for] utterly gratuitous suggestion” (112).  The significance of aesthetic 
environments for Lee thus becomes clear: decorative artists, like novelists, manage the 
development of our association-pathways, ensuring that a stable and shared cognitive 
field emerges in spite of the apparent randomness of association.  That association 
proceeds through neural habits manageable in this way is the necessary condition for 
Lee’s reconsideration of it in Juvenilia.  If association were not susceptible to such 
control, Lee could not have used it to shore up aesthetic experience against those 
uncertainties of sense that neuroscience had by this time irreversibly established.   
 It is this construction of a precarious common sense that leads Lee to the 
conclusion that aesthetic experience has a history.  This history comprises not only 
those interactions of a given subject with her environment and those encounters with 
aesthetic objects that have formed her association-pathways, but also those of her 
progenitors.  Lee follows the physiologists who argued that neural habits were 
inheritable.  Employing the Lamarckian model of “soft inheritance,” British 
physiologists, especially, argued that neural habits are already latent prior to a given 
individual’s experience because specific neural dispositions are passed on as 
hereditary traits (Carpenter 342).  G.H. Lewes, for example, writes in Problems of Life 
and Mind that “all sensations, perceptions, emotions, volitions, are partly connate, 
partly acquired; partly the evolved products of the accumulated experiences of 
ancestors, and partly of the accumulated experiences of the individual, when each of 
these have left residua in the modifications of the [nervous] structure” (Problems of 
Life and Mind 111). Lee, like Lewes, therefore represents consciousness as a 
palimpsest, only partially re-written as neural habits are incrementally altered.  Insofar 
as racial inheritance thus shapes the individual’s neural habits, her association-
pathways are bound even more tightly to an authoritative set of norms, but this 
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common sense also changes over time as new deposits of residua accumulate.  While 
this aesthetic common sense is made possible by neural habit theory, then, neural habit 
theory also suggests that aesthetic experience is historical, the contingent product of 
sensory-perceptual norms that change over time.  
 The contingency of this common sense worries Lee in Juvenilia, where she 
expresses concern that aesthetic experience is burdened by history, constrained by the 
network of accumulated association-pathways that intervene between the aesthete and 
the artwork she experiences.  Lee’s appeal to association aimed to stave off social 
fragmentation and solipsism by grounding sense-experience in a shared set of 
association-pathways.  In turning to theories that figured the mind as a palimpsest, 
Lee’s goal had thus been to ensure that the mind cannot treat the artwork as a tabula 
rasa, “a blank sheet of paper on which we write what comes into our head, and which 
itself can tell us nothing.”  This move sets Lee up to suffer an ironic reversal.  For if 
the aesthete can no longer use the artwork as a tabula rasa, a blank slate on which to 
scrawl random associations, this is only because she finds it already covered with 
them, written over with multi-layered habits of feeling, a palimpsest of graffiti.   
Lee’s turn to association in order to preserve sensus communis opens a gap 
between artistic intention and aesthetic effect that yawns particularly wide in the case 
of historical aesthetic objects.  While shared aesthetic and moral standards are 
preserved, then, this very common sense makes it impossible to grasp the artwork as a 
communicative object or utterance.  In the essay “Perigot,” for example, Lee worries 
that late nineteenth-century readers can no longer “fairly judge” Shakespeare’s plays: 
In order to do so, we must, so far as we can, remove the network of thoughts 
and feelings with which each succeeding generation of critics, of actors, and of 
readers have overlaid the original work.  I sometimes doubt whether, even after 
all our trouble, we could see the real Shakespeare, so utterly have we corrupted 
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the text of what he represents to our soul.  The many scholars and societies 
who labor to give us back the original word and meaning of what he wrote are, 
in reality, defeating their own object: every explanation is virtually an 
interpolation, an alteration, and Shakespeare’s plays are by this time one mass 
of such interpolations and alterations.  (264-5)  
Lee’s claim that “every” act of interpretation interpolates a text comes close to the 
concerns about the randomness of individual association in Belcaro, but here it is the 
cumulative effect of these individual readings, their cohesion into a network of 
perceptions, that palimpsestically effaces the text of Shakespeare’s plays.  As Lee goes 
on to explain, moreover, it is not merely the critical or dramatic interpretations of 
Shakespeare that rewrite his plays, but also the cultural habits of reading that have 
been cultivated by other art forms and texts, most especially the novel:  “perception, in 
all things, is a matter of practice…and we have been trained for two centuries…to 
understand Stendhal, and Balzac, Charlotte Brontë, and George Eliot” (274).  The very 
novelists who have dug the channels along which our common feelings move have 
bounded those feelings by historical period.  The same problem of the historical 
relativism of psychic life that challenged Dilthey appears in Juvenilia, as Lee arrives 
at the conclusion that art works or ways of knowing that originate outside the horizons 
of a common sense are almost necessarily misjudged with them.  Almost.  Despite her 
skepticism and the seeming impossibility of the task, Lee enjoins the reader to remove 
“so far as [she] can…the network of thoughts and feelings” that have been internalized 
in the nervous system as the pathways of association.  Lee does not explain how this 
might be accomplished according to her theory, but this injunction to erase the 
palimpsest of neural habits—a sort of bildung in reverse—should be familiar to 
readers of Victorian aestheticism.  To make the mind a tabula rasa is a goal of the 
Paterian aesthete.     
 143 
 Lee’s attempts to elaborate a psychological aesthetics in Juvenilia thus seem to 
arrive with Dilthey at the same dead ends: an aesthetic democracy seemingly possible 
only through the authoritarian power of art to inculcate a common sense in the public, 
yet this same common sense constraining artworks and their power of influence 
through its inescapable historical and cultural relativism.  However, there is an 
alternate strain of argument in Juvenilia that, in contrast to Dilthey, embraces the 
indeterminacy of association as enabling a mode of aesthetic freedom and privacy that 
resists both the restrictive perceptual norms of common sense and the authoritarian 
capacity of the artist to command attention.  In “Perigot,” the same essay in which Lee 
enjoined the aesthete to erase her own palimpsest of habits so as to judge Shakespeare 
fairly, Lee also suggests that these association-pathways act as a crucial check on art’s 
power of fascination.  Worrying that increased nervous sensitivity has rendered 
contemporary play-goers vulnerable to being overwhelmed by representations of 
emotions too powerful for them to bear, Lee contrasts the invasion of “moral privacy” 
by theatrical representations with the experience of reading novels, which likewise 
aim at the representation of psychological and emotional states in all their fineness of 
detail. 
The [distinction], to my mind, lies exactly in the difference between the thing 
which is read and the thing which is actually witnessed.  In the case of the play 
the actor does the realizing, and to his realizing we are forced to submit…In 
reading a book we usually realize only so much as we can bear; each reader, in 
point of fact, selecting automatically that which shall most impress him; or 
rather, details gravitating to the mind, flying to it like needles to a magnet, 
according as there exists a natural affinity between them and it…We respond 
to the author's suggestion, we do one half of the work, and do it, inevitably, in 
the way least painful to ourselves.  Moreover, in this intellectual 
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representation, our mind is appealed to, not our nerves; and our mind grasps, 
welds into an harmonious whole, healthy and endurable, a whole state of 
feeling or a whole character, instead of having merely the outer expression 
thereof hurled violently at us.  (260-1) 
Although the act of reading here proceeds “automatically,” through the interpretive 
reflex action of perception, it nonetheless entails a greater degree of freedom and 
aesthetic activity—the reader does half the work in “realizing” or interpreting the text 
whereas the play-goer passively submits to the actor’s construction.  While the action 
of this associative reading initially occurs below the threshold of reflective volition, it 
enables a fuller realization of the meaning of the artwork as the mind synthesizes a 
“whole state of feeling, or a whole character” out of discrete gestures or expressions.  
By distancing the reader from the full power of unmediated sensation, association 
becomes a means for the reader to thus “master the situation,” ensuring that she is not 
overwhelmed by “the mere momentary physical expression” (261-2).    
 While Lee suggests in “Perigot” that the act of reading enables this form of 
aesthetic agency, it is clear from the broader context of this claim that she is 
describing a mode of aesthetic reception that is like reading, one that is applicable to 
other kinds of sense-experience.  Lee’s description of reading as an involuntary 
process of selection—of choosing details from an aesthetic object around which the 
reader organizes her impressions—invokes what G.H. Lewes called “the law of 
interest.”  At its most basic, this law is simply the physio-psychological principle that 
within a given field of stimuli, a subject cognizes those sensations and objects in 
which he has an interest.  Late nineteenth-century cognitive science defined “interest” 
partly as simple advantage, so that the subject perceiving according to its interests 
only recognizes what is useful to itself.  Interest was thus often represented as almost 
instinctive: functioning reflexively to guide and orient physical action, interest was 
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frequently treated as synonymous with neural habits.81  That all perception is 
interested in this sense is one of the major arguments in Matter and Memory, in which 
Bergson identifies the law of interest as the key principle underlying sensory-motor 
habits.  Yet “interest” also denotes the feeling accompanying or arousing attention.  
This second sense of the term implied something very different about mental action, 
since many of these same philosophers and physio-psychologists were in the process 
of constructing attention as a mode of mental agency and perceptual synthesis 
transcending the mere reflex action of habit.82  These two very different meanings of 
interest tend to shade into one another in late nineteenth-century cognitive scientific 
writings, as they do in Lee’s account of reading above, where a process that begins as 
involuntary and reflexive ends with the reader mastering and synthesizing her 
impressions. Reading as Lee describes it in “Perigot” is a version of interested 
perception.  While Dilthey, as we have seen, describes a similar form of interested 
perception at work in the nexus of psychic processes, the role of mastery and synthesis 
is there given to the poetic genius, rather than his readers.  Lee here gives that role to 
the reading subject explicitly as an ethic, a technology of the self.  Proceeding partly 
through reflexive association and partly through attentive synthesis, Lee’s reading 
subject, like the attentive one, purposefully limits mental action to a restricted set of 
phenomena within a larger field of stimuli in order to master that field and herself 
more effectively.   
 Elsewhere in Juvenilia, Lee extends this logic into a defense of interested 
perception that locates freedom in the refusal to allow artworks to manage attention.  
                                                
81
 Here, for instance, is Lewes on the law of interest and neural pathways: “The satisfaction of desire is 
that which both impels and quiets mental movement.  Were it not for this controlling effect of the 
established pathways, every excitation would be indefinitely irradiated throughout the whole organism” 
(Problems of Life and Mind 112).   
82
 William James employs interest in this sense in his concept of the “selective agency of interested 
attention.”  See James 572-583.    
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As contemporary critics such as Crary have demonstrated, attention is finally 
inseparable from distraction.  Insofar as attention presumes the narrowing of a 
cognitive field, the extreme focalization of a small part of a broad range of stimuli, any 
state of attention is also a state of distraction, of ignoring or failing to cognize 
whatever surrounds the point of focus.83  Lee seems to have understood this quite well; 
in extolling the negative liberty of interested perception, she suggests this liberty is 
constituted by the freedom to be distracted during aesthetic experience.  Echoing her 
distinction in “Perigot” between novels and plays, in “Botticelli at the Villa Lemmi” 
Lee contrasts concerts and operas on the basis of each form’s capacity to encourage 
distraction.  Concerts, like plays, demand the continuous “attention of the ear” without 
providing the intermittent relief of stimulation for the other senses, so that “our minds 
are tied as with a ligature” and melodies are “forced upon us whether we be fit to 
enjoy them or not.”  Operas, on the other hand, are like read texts in that they allow 
the mind to wander.  Operas encourage the spectator to select points of focus amongst 
the music, the sets, the costumes, the actors’ gestures, and the other audience-
members, so that the mind is given room to “freely” direct its attention and “melodies 
may be taken or left at will.”  To illustrate the distinction between these two means of 
presentation, Lee employs the same metaphor she uses earlier in Juvenilia as a figure 
for associative perception: that of freely wandering through a town and selectively 
noticing its inhabitants.  “The difference between an opera and a concert,” she writes, 
“is that between a town, with all its trivial details and its statues and pictures here and 
there, and an awful expanse of gallery” (124-6).   
 The reappearance of the museum space in the midst of Lee’s defense of 
interested perception marks the limit of her attempts to explore the convergence of 
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 Thus Crary argues that “attention and distraction cannot be thought outside a continuum in which the 
two ceaselessly flow into one another” (51).  For a similar argument in reference to the act of reading 
specifically, see Dames 73-122.    
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cognitive science and aesthetics. Lee does not, to be sure, consistently hew to the 
claims she makes for interested perception; even within the same essays, Lee makes 
arguments that conflict with these claims about its virtues.  In all of Lee’s essays, she 
tends to assume contradictory positions as she logically follows out the implications of 
a given idea.  However, this tendency makes the essays in Juvenilia into vivid 
dramatizations of the broader contradictions in the project of elaborating a cognitive 
aesthetic democracy.  In Lee’s arguments for interested perception, association is an 
important aesthetic mode for the very same reasons that Lee had earlier tried to 
distinguish it from aesthetic experience.  Here association enables the aesthete to take 
an active, interpretive role in aesthetic experience, to “do half the work.”   Put another 
way, association is the means by which the aesthete constructs her own version of the 
artwork by selecting and supplementing elements of the original.  This mode of 
aesthetic experience is not disinterested.  It does not judge artworks “fairly,” or 
concern itself with the artwork as a communicative utterance with a moral claim to 
full and impartial attention.  Since its distribution of attention includes an irreducibly 
random component, it participates only obliquely in anything like a stable sensus 
communis.  Yet its value for Lee derives from her commitment to unmistakably liberal 
principles of self-development and negative liberty.  In this respect, Lee’s 
endorsement of interested perception bears witness to the collapse of Victorian 
aesthetic democracy and looks forward to Wilde’s writings from the 1890s.       
 It also looks towards the potential reconciliation of aesthetic experience and 
history.  Lee’s account of interested perception—interpretive, selectively attentive, 
synthesizing—is in many ways a fair account of her historiographical methods before 
and after Belcaro.  In this respect, Lee’s cognitive aesthetics point her towards the 
subject of her essay, published in the 1890s, “The Puzzles of the Past.”  There, Lee 
asks “whether the Past ever really did exist,” and concludes that it probably did not.  
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Instead, the past, like the artwork for the interested aesthete, is in fact “a creation of 
our own…not merely in its details, but in what is far more important, in its essential, 





WALTER PATER’S ETHICS OF INFLUENCE 
 
 
To burn always with this hard, gem-like flame, to maintain this ecstasy, is success in 
life.  In a sense it might even be said that our failure is to form habits: for, after all, 
habit is relative to a stereotyped world, and meantime it is only the roughness of the 
eye that makes any two persons, things, situations, seem alike. 
      —Walter Pater, The Renaissance 
    
And was it that Gaston too was a less independent ruler of his own mental world than 
he had fancied, that he derived his impressions of things not directly from them, but 
mediately from other people’s impressions about them, and he needed the pledge of 
their assents to ratify his own?   
      —Walter Pater, Gaston de Latour 
   
 In the above epigraph from the notorious conclusion to his 1873 study, The 
Renaissance, Walter Pater follows his most infamously bold and stirring claim with 
one that seems heavily qualified, even by Paterian standards.  “In a sense it might even 
be said”: these dual conditions suggest the tentativeness with which Pater approached 
this assertion identifying habit with failure.  Pater’s wariness here stems from the 
implicit challenge this claim mounts against the broad Victorian consensus that the 
formation of good habits was both the means and the end of ethical practice.  At 
Victorian Oxford, where Pater was a fellow at Brasenose Collge, this consensus 
derived its authority from Aristotle’s Ethics, in which Aristotle argued not only that 
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moral virtue is acquired by habit, but also that it consists of habits: voluntarily 
cultivated dispositions towards emotions, desires, and acts that prompt both virtuous 
actions and pleasure in their performance.84  Ironically, while Aristotle identifies virtue 
with habit because habits are consciously and voluntarily acquired—in distinction 
from faculties and states of emotion—Pater identifies habits with failure because 
habits are insufficiently reflective.  Transposing habit from the domain of action to 
that of perception, Pater suggests that habit falsifies impressions because it fosters an 
inattentiveness to their details.85  Like language, habit unreflectively invests 
impressions with the “solidity” of objects.  Habit’s inattentiveness prevents one from 
“know[ing] one’s own impression as it really is,” and it is thus at odds with the goal 
and process of education as Pater describes it in the preface to The Renaissance: to 
increase “our susceptibility to these impressions…in depth and variety.” 
 Only five years after the publication of The Renaissance, however, Pater re-
imagined the aesthetics of habit in his 1878 mini-bildungsroman, “The Child in the 
House.”86  This story details the “process of brain building” by which its protagonist, 
Florian Deleal, formed his character by interacting with the environment of his 
childhood home.  Pater refers to Florian’s retrospective reconstruction of this process 
as “tracing back the threads of his complex spiritual habit.”  Here and throughout the 
story, Pater draws mainly on three related meanings of habit—as mental or moral 
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 This identification of moral virtue and habit survives etymologically in “ethics”, from ethos, which in 
Ancient Greek denotes both character and habit.  See The Nicomachean Ethics 31-49.  On the 
importance of Aristotle’s Ethics in Victorian Oxford, see Turner 322-367.  Discussing this passage in 
“De Profundis,” Wilde confirms that “the dull Oxford people thought the phrase a mere willful 
inversion of the somewhat wearisome text of Aristotelian Ethics,” though Pater’s caginess here likely 
has more reference to the well-founded suspicion that the passage would be read as an attack not just on 
Aristotelian ethics but ethics generally.  See “De Profundis” 879.   
85
 Pater’s transposition of habit in effect erases Aristotle’s distinction between faculties and virtues.  
Whereas faculties such as vision and hearing are simply given for Aristotle and do not depend on 
practice to function, Victorian cognitive science had demonstrated that sensory faculties are shaped by 
repeated acts of perception and are in this sense acquired.  
86
 “The Child in the House” was published five years after The Renaissance but ten years after Pater 
published the passages making up his “Conclusion” in a separate essay on William Morris.   
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character, as vestment or bodily constitution, and, more rarely, as habitation—whose 
interplay undergirds the story’s central trope: that Florian’s “house of thought” 
emerges from his material habitation.  While in the conclusion to The Renaissance 
habit dulls aesthetic susceptibility, this is not the case in “The Child in the House”: 
“our susceptibilities, the discovery of our powers, manifold experiences…belong to 
this or the other well-remembered place in the material habitation…and the early 
habitation thus gradually becomes a sort of material shrine or sanctuary of sentiment; a 
system of visible symbolism interweaves itself through all our thoughts and passions; 
and irresistibly, little shapes, voices, accidents…become part of the great chain 
wherewith we are bound” (6).  Here, the repeated interaction with our material 
habitation develops and defines our susceptibilities, and our habitual impressions of 
the objects making up that habitation gradually evolve themselves into a system of 
signs interwoven with our mental and emotional life.  Far from being at variance with 
aesthetic experience, habit is intimately involved in the growth of Florian’s aesthetic 
receptivity.  As the force that interweaves a system of visible symbolism with 
Florian’s thoughts and feelings, habit creates a mode of perception in him that seems 
identical to the mode of aesthetic receptivity that Pater, in “The School of Giorgione,” 
calls “the ‘imaginative reason,’ that complex faculty for which every thought and 
feeling is twin-born with its sensible analogue or symbol.”87  At the same time, Pater 
signals his ambivalence towards this process of brain-building in the metamorphosis 
of the threads of this interwoven system of symbolic impressions into “the great chain 
wherewith we are bound.”  Binding here suggests both the cohesion and coherence of 
a defined character as well as its restraint and limitation.  As a binding force at work in 
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 Pater takes the name of this faculty from Matthew Arnold, who suggests that the imaginative reason, 
a dialectical combination of pagan sensuousness and rationality with medieval Christian sympathetic 
imaginativeness, is the defining faculty of the modern spirit.  See “Pagan and Medieval Religious 
Sentiment” 155-176. 
 152 
Florian’s brain-building, habit seems to form a trammeling system that restricts, even 
if it simultaneously develops, the capacity for experience.    
 This chapter analyzes the relations between ethics and aesthetics in Walter 
Pater’s writings.  In Pater’s writing as in late Victorian culture, habit plays important 
and related roles in constructions of ethical virtue, cultural norms, and aesthetic 
perception.  Cognitive and behavioral habits were widely identified as the set of tacit 
rules and norms that stabilize and provide coherence for a given culture.  Habit, as 
William James memorably put it, “is thus the enormous fly-wheel of Society, its most 
precious conservative agent” (James 121).  In Aristotelian ethics and the Victorian 
moral programs and discourses influenced by them, habits are cultivated as both the 
means and end of moral character.88  Underlying both these dimensions of habit is the 
psycho-physiological concept of neural habits: the channels inscribed in the nervous 
system by repeated experience and neural inheritance.89  Pater draws explicitly on this 
concept of habit in “The Child in the House,” especially in his punning 
characterization of bildung as brain-building and his use of a neural metaphorics in the 
story’s extensive troping on threads and weaving.  Habit is thus a key site in Pater’s 
attempts to clarify and develop his aesthetic arguments and their relations to moral 
norms and cultural tradition.  This chapter follows Pater’s efforts, in response to the 
public furor that greeted The Renaissance, to reconcile his commitments to aesthetic 
negative liberty and attention to the unique details of each aesthetic experience with 
participation in the perceptual norms and habits undergirding ethics and community in 
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 For an example of how pervasive Aristotelian ethics are in Victorian discourses about morality, see 
William Kingdon Clifford’s “On the Scientific Basis of Morals” 297-299, and “Right and Wrong: the 
Scientific Grounds of their Distinction” 300-338.  In both essays, Clifford’s efforts to explain the 
scientific basis of morals tacitly assume an Aristotelian ethical model.   
89
 Moral and cultural norms were thus understood to rest on a physiological foundation in late Victorian 
culture.  Walter Bagehot, for example, argued that “the transmitted nerve element” is “the ‘connective 
tissue’ of civilization…the continuous force which binds age to age.”  In his Oxford notebooks, Wilde 
suggests that the same is true of ethics when he remarks, “Aristotle’s theory of habit may be said to 
have given ethics a physical basis.”  See Physics and Politics 8; and Oscar Wilde’s Oxford Notebooks 
121.   
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late Victorian culture.  I begin with a reading of Pater’s 1877 essay, “The School of 
Giorgione,” in which he famously claims that all art aspires to the condition of music 
in order to facilitate “pure perception.”  Juxtaposing Pater’s pure perception with 
similar concepts in the work of Wilhelm Wundt and Henri Bergson, I argue that Pater 
evolves his idea of pure perception by drawing from scientific accounts of harmony as 
a model of perceptual synthesis.  I chart Pater’s development of this concept in “The 
Child in the House” before turning to his 1885 novel, Marius the Epicurean, where 
Pater attempts to reconcile his aestheticism with the imperatives of common sense by 
elaborating a theory of aesthetic influence—the process by which beautiful objects or 
persons mold the aesthete’s perception into a common form.   While influence seems 
to abridge the aesthete’s agency, I argue that Pater’s turn to scientific studies of 
harmony allows him to theorize a form of influenced aesthetic experience in which the 
aesthete brings a concrete sense impression into relation with perceptual norms 
making up a sensus communis without fully merging it with them, and thus retains 
both the unique specificity of that impression and at least a degree of his own negative 
liberty of perception.   
 
Harmony and Pure Perception 
 
 “The School of Giorgione” has long been read as an instance of Pater’s 
formalism at its most uncompromising.  The essay attempts to position his 
aestheticism in opposition to two types of Victorian art criticism: didactic popular 
criticism, which tended to appraise paintings based on their narrative content and its 
usefulness for moral or civic instruction, and the new scientific criticism, which 
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brought new scientific assumptions and methods of verification to bear on artworks.90  
While scientific criticism focused its attention on the artwork as an index of the artist’s 
technique, and popular criticism addressed itself to the painting’s “literary interest,” 
Pater rigorously demarcates properly aesthetic experience from extra-aesthetic 
concerns about the technical and poetic meaning of artworks:  
[A painting] must first of all delight the sense, delight it as directly and 
sensuously as a fragment of Venetian glass: and through this delight alone 
become the vehicle of whatever poetry or science may lie beyond [it] in the 
intention of the composer.  In its primary aspect, a great picture has no more 
definite message for us than an accidental play of sunlight and shadow for a 
few moments on the wall or floor: is itself, in truth, a space of such fallen light, 
caught as the colours are in an Eastern carpet, but refined upon, and dealt with 
more subtly and exquisitely than by nature itself.  (The Renaissance, 84-5) 
An artwork is fundamentally a sensory object.  Independent of meaning and 
interpretation, an aesthetic object in its most essential character comprises only, as 
Pater writes in the preface to The Renaissance, a receptacle of forces.  Art “is thus 
always striving to be independent of the mere intelligence, to become a matter of pure 
perception, to get rid of its responsibilities to its subject or material” (88).   
 Pater’s characterization of aesthetic experience as “pure perception” invokes 
Romantic aesthetic theory as well as debates about cognition that were especially 
prominent in the late Victorian period.  Most obviously, Pater’s claim is an implicit 
appeal to Schopenhauer.  It has become common critical knowledge that “The School 
of Giorgione” is indebted to Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Idea.  In 
particular, Pater’s claim that all art aspires to the conditions of music has been clearly 
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 For a detailed reading of “The School of Giorgione” as a polemic aimed at these two schools of 
criticism, see Teukolsky 151-169.   
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recognized as indebted to Schopenhauer’s argument that music alone among the arts is 
capable of embodying the Will directly, without the mediation of Ideas, because music 
is the one art which has no represented subject matter or content, the one art whose 
content is its form.  By characterizing aesthetic experience as “pure perception,” 
moreover, Pater alludes to Schopenhauer’s definition of genius as “the capacity to 
maintain oneself in the state of pure perception, to lose oneself in perception, and to 
withdraw from the service of the will the knowledge which originally existed only for 
that service; that is to say, genius is the power of leaving one’s own interests, wishes, 
and aims entirely out of sight, thus of entirely divesting oneself of one’s own 
personality for a time so as to remain pure knowing subject, clear eye of the world” 
(109, emphasis in original).  Pure perception transcends the routinized operations of 
consciousness, which instrumentally cognizes objects according to conventional 
usage.  By tacitly invoking Schopenhauer’s concept of pure perception, Pater thus 
provides support to his repeated insistence in “The School of Giorgione” that aesthetic 
experience is an end-in-itself.  The essay’s appeal to Schopenhauer’s disinterested 
aesthetics is complicated, however, by the fact that late Victorian cognitive science 
was submitting the concept of pure perception to considerable scrutiny.   
 Schopenhauer’s model of pure perception assumes that there is a human 
capacity, even if one only possessed by “genius,” for a universal perception, a 
perception in which neither the contingent calibration of physical forces attending the 
perceptual act nor the perceiving subject’s mental and neural history impinge on or 
distort the perception itself.  As I have been arguing throughout this dissertation, the 
possibility of such a seamless fit between the mind and the world it perceives had been 
demolished by mid-century scientific studies of sense organs and the nervous system.  
These studies revealed complex, heretofore unimagined structures of mediation at 
work in even the simplest act of perception.  Helmholtz’s dissection of the retina, for 
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example, established that clear and detailed outlines and colors are only perceptible in 
the narrowly circumscribed area of the visual field registered in the fovea or center of 
the retina.  The peripheral areas of the retina, Helmholtz demonstrated, are equipped 
with fewer photoreceptor cells, so that, while sensitive to movement, they provide 
only blurred, indefinitely colored impressions.  As Jonathan Crary argues, Helmholtz’s 
dissections of the retina overturned and swept away classical models of perspective: 
“After several centuries during which the visual field was conceived to be like a conal 
section of homogeneous clarity and range, the notion now developed that most of what 
we saw at any given moment hovered in an irreducible vagueness, in which a reading 
of space or distance was not possible.  It was a major shift that led to a reformulation 
of how a subjective visual field came into being: not through an instantaneous intake 
of an image but through a complex aggregate of processes of eye movement that 
provisionally built up the appearance of a stable image” (Crary 290).  Put another way, 
the physiological analysis of the retina made it clear that even simple visual 
perceptions are composite, built out of separate moments of focus that are synthesized 
in the act of perception itself.     
 Experimental psychology suggested, moreover, that consciousness plays a 
considerable role in gathering up fragmentary sensations into a perception, and that it 
does so partly by applying memories of past perceptions to present sensations.  As 
Henri Bergson writes in Matter and Memory, “any memory-image that is capable of 
interpreting our actual perception inserts itself so thoroughly into it that we are no 
longer able to discern what is perception and what is memory.”  To illustrate this 
point, Bergson appeals to the example of the act of reading: 
[In reading,] our mind notes here and there a few characteristic lines and fills 
all the intervals with memory-images which, projected on the paper, take the 
place of the real printed characters and may be mistaken for them.  Thus we 
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are constantly creating or reconstructing.  Our distinct perception is really 
comparable to a closed circle, in which the perception-image, going toward the 
mind, and the memory-image, launched into space, careen the one behind the 
other.  (103)   
As Bergson here suggests, it was neither empirically nor scientifically possible to 
untangle present sensations from the past perceptions through which the mind makes 
sense of them.  Given this irreducibly composite character of perception, pure 
perception could only be a chimera. Experimental psychologists did make various 
attempts to isolate and define an elemental, pure perception, and to this end 
experimenters developed devices seeking to control and measure such small mental 
units, such as the tachistoscope in the early 1880s.  Yet as Crary notes, the perceptual 
experience measured by the tachistoscope—which flashed symbols for less than a 
second to an observer from whom all other stimuli had been, as much as possible, 
blocked out—testified to how attenuated and impoverished such a pure perception 
must inevitably be were it even possible.91   
 A gulf thus intervenes between Schopenhauer’s claims for a disinterested 
aesthetics of pure perception in 1819 and Pater’s invocation of pure perception in “The 
School of Giorgione” in 1877.  Even a passing glance at the notorious “Conclusion” is 
sufficient demonstration that Pater could not simply have been unaware of the 
epistemological problems and debates attending late Victorian scientific investigations 
of cognition.  What, then, does Pater mean to suggest by pure perception?  The 
aesthetic objects that address themselves to it, he writes, are “those in which the 
constituent elements of the composition are so welded together, that the material or 
subject no longer strikes the intellect only; nor the form, the eye or the ear only; but 
form and matter, in their union or identity, present one single effect to the ‘imaginative 
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reason,’ that complex faculty for which every thought and feeling is twin-born with its 
sensible analogue or symbol” (88).  Pure perception is thus not independent of 
interpretation and meaning so much as it fuses interpreted meaning to signifying 
sensation, content to form.  It is for this reason, Pater argues, that the most ideal art is 
music, the art in which “the end is not distinct from the means, the form from the 
matter, the subject from the expression; they inhere in and completely saturate each 
other; and to [music] therefore…all the arts may be supposed constantly to tend and 
aspire” (88).  Music thus provides the type for Pater’s pure perception.  It does so, 
however, not by exemplifying a fictitiously simple and elemental mode of perception 
but by offering him a particular kind of model for perceptual synthesis, the dynamic 
organization and cognition of heterogeneous mental contents.  
 Pater locates this model of perceptual synthesis in music partly by drawing 
from late Victorian psycho-physiological studies of music.  As critics have long 
recognized, Pater’s remarks about music in “The School of Giorgione” seem to echo 
Schopenhauer’s claims that music is the highest of the arts because it is the one 
thoroughly nonrepresentational art, the art whose content is its form.  It was just this 
nonrepresentational character of music that, Helmholtz observed in 1857, initially 
deterred the scientific investigation of musical perception.92  After mid-century, 
however, scientific accounts of music became more common, especially following the 
appearance of Helmholtz’s widely influential On the Sensations of Tone as a 
Physiological Basis for a Theory of Music in 1863.  More importantly for Pater, these 
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 Poetry, painting, and sculpture can “be critically investigated in respect to [their] correctness and 
truth to nature, [and] scientific art-criticism…has actually succeeded in making some progress in 
investigating the causes of that aesthetic pleasure which it is the intention of these arts to excite.  In 
music, on the other hand, it seems at first sight as if those were still in the right who reject all 
‘anatomisation of pleasurable sensations.’  This art…not attempting to describe, and only occasionally 
to imitate the outer world necessarily withdraws from scientific consideration the chief points of attack 
which other arts present, and hence seems to be as incomprehensible and wonderful as it certainly is 
powerful in its effects.”  See Science and Culture, 46.   
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studies put music into circulation as an important model for the work of consciousness 
in perception.  Wundt, for example, derives his theory of apperception partly from his 
experiments with a metronome, which revealed an almost irresistible mental tendency 
to organize identical beats into rhythmical patterns.93  Bergson uses just this perceptual 
tendency, in regard to the tolling of a bell, to illustrate his distinction between duration 
and number in Time and Free Will:   
The sounds of the bell certainly reach me one after the other; but one of two 
alternatives must be true.  Either I retain each of these successive sensations in 
order to combine it with the others and form a group which reminds me of an 
air or rhythm which I know: in that case I do not count the sounds, I limit 
myself to gathering, so to speak, the qualitative impression produced by the 
whole series.  Or else I intend explicitly to count them, and then I shall have to 
separate them, and this separation must take place within some homogeneous 
medium in which the sounds, stripped of their qualities, and in a manner 
emptied, leave traces of their presence which are absolutely alike.  (Time and 
Free Will, 86-7, emphasis in original) 
As in the case of Wundt’s metronome experiments, Bergson here suggests that the 
mind’s more basic inclination is to synthesize the bell’s tolls, to recognize them as 
heterogeneous while at the same time gathering them together into a provisional unity: 
an air or rhythm.  In both cases, such musical forms elicit a mode of perception that 
organizes heterogeneous elements experienced successively.  Put another way, the 
perception of music cognizes heterogeneous sensations in time.   
 As opposed to painting, sculpture, and architecture, musical form is temporal; 
both music and its apprehension unfold in time.  Wundt and Bergson foreground this 
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 Significantly, Wundt begins his popular Introduction to Psychology by using his experiments with the 
metronome as an example of the most elemental aspects of apperception.  He first detailed the results of 
these experiments in volume 2 of his 1874 Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie.   
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temporal unfolding by appealing to melody and rhythm.  But music is not simply 
composed of melody and rhythm—harmony is equally fundamental to musical form.  
Similarly, an act of perception does not just arrange different sensations that occur 
successively, but also different sensations occurring simultaneously.  Both the 
successive and simultaneous dimensions of music’s temporal form serve as crucial 
models for Pater’s pure perception, as well as for Bergson’s theory of duration.   
 As Helmholtz’s studies of tone demonstrate, to experience music requires a 
complex perceptual economy of sensory and interpretive activity.  Most 
fundamentally, the sensation of tone results from regular vibrations in the air—sound 
waves.  Regular sound waves are transformed into musical tones by passing on their 
vibrations to the hair cells on a series of plates—which Helmholtz compares to the 
keys and strings of a piano—inside the cochlea.   These vibrations are then transferred 
as neural currents to the brain.  Unlike in the case of light, a scientific consensus that 
sound is made up of waves had been established long before the nineteenth century.  
Nonetheless, Victorian scientists’ detailed analysis of the ear strikingly revealed a 
hallucinatory landscape of teeming physical forces that lay beneath the apparently 
predictable world of our habitual perceptions.  Helmholtz captures this effect by 
describing the soundscape of a ballroom:  
You must conceive the air of a concert-hall or ballroom traversed in every 
direction…by a variegated crowd of intersecting wave-systems.  From the 
mouths of the male singers proceed waves of six to twelve feet in length; from 
the lips of the songstresses dart shorter waves, of eighteen to thirty-six inches 
long.  The rustling of silken skirts excites little curls in the air, each instrument 
in the orchestra emits its peculiar waves, and all these systems expand 
spherically from their respective centres, dart through each other, are reflected 
from the walls of the room, and thus rush backwards and forwards, until they 
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succumb to the greater force of newly generated tones.  (Science and Culture, 
57-8) 
Despite this astonishing complexity, Helmholtz observes, the human ear 
simultaneously processes these overlapping wave-systems, orienting the mind among 
them.  The wave-systems traversing the ballroom gain an additional complexity, 
moreover, in that each tone is made of compound waves—combinations of two or 
more simple waves.  Simple waves, and thus simple tones, are in fact very rare, 
produced only by specially designed devices, such as tuning forks.  One of 
Helmholtz’s most important discoveries in On the Sensations of Tone was that simple 
notes played by musical instruments or sung by human voices are not simple tones.  
Musical instruments, vocal chords, and other resonant systems produce compound 
waves, waves composed of a fundamental tone combined with what Helmholtz called 
upper partials—vibrations at frequencies above that of the fundamental tone.  The 
quality of a tone—whether it sounds like a violin or a trombone or a familiar voice—
results from the distribution of these upper partials.  Helmholtz argued, therefore, that 
all the tones of musical instruments are, strictly speaking, harmonic.   
 While auditors do not usually attend to each distinct tone present in a musical 
note, the ear analyzes the note nonetheless and, with effort, the mind can distinguish 
the separate tones.  Thus, Helmholtz suggests, “the material ear of the body” analyzes 
compound tones into their components, while “the spiritual ear of the mind” puts these 
different components into relation as notes, chords, timbre, or, put another way, as 
music (64).  Comparing the ear with the eye, Helmholtz throws into relief the 
harmonic capacities of hearing to simultaneously distinguish and synthesize sensory 
elements.  The eye is unable to analyze compound waves of light, to break up mixed 
colors into their components.  Thus, Helmholtz writes, “the eye has no sense of 
harmony in the same meaning as the ear.  There is no music to the eye” (74).  As we 
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shall see, this analysis of the complex harmonic capacities of the ear laid the 
groundwork for Pater’s concept of pure perception and Bergson’s theory of duration.     
 
The Harmonics of Duration 
 
 Again and again in Time and Free Will, Bergson recurs to the example of 
music to theorize duration.  As a succession of heterogeneous sensations that melt into 
and thoroughly permeate one another, duration is analogous to “the effect of a musical 
phrase which is constantly on the point of ending and constantly altered in its totality 
by the addition of some new note” (106).  In Time and Free Will, Bergson does not 
specifically invoke harmony to illustrate duration; instead, he draws analogies with 
melody and rhythm.  However, duration is not a succession of simple states, but a 
succession of sensory multiplicities.  For Bergson, any given moment of duration is 
alive with multiple, simultaneous sensory experiences that overlap and bleed into one 
another even as they shift and succeed one another in time.  While Bergson never 
mentions Helmholtz by name, his descriptions of duration evoke Helmholtz’s account 
of the harmonic capacities of hearing, which likewise emphasize just that conjunction 
of successive and simultaneous heterogeneity within perception.94  Indeed, Bergson 
obliquely cites Helmholtz’s work on harmony in Matter and Memory to explain the 
dynamics of sense experience.  A sense organ, Bergson writes, “is like an immense 
keyboard, on which the external object executes at once its harmony of a thousand 
notes” (128).   
 While Bergson draws from Helmholtz’s account of harmony, he incurs this 
debt with the aim of challenging Helmholtz’s theory of perception.  For Helmholtz, as 
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Matter and Memory (Crary, 319-322).   
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for late Victorian cognitive science more broadly, sensory perception is fundamentally 
a semiotics.  Immersed in a complex and fluctuating field of forces that it can only 
imperfectly register, the mind proceeds to convert stimuli into objects by making what 
Helmholtz calls “unconscious inferences.”  From fragmentary sensory input, the mind 
unconsciously infers the presence of objects as their causes.  In the act of perception, 
the mind thus reflexively interprets sensations as signs.  As Crary notes, Bergson’s 
work suggests that he found Helmholtz’s theory of unconscious inferences, like the 
associationist theories to which it is closely related, repellant in its abridgement of 
autonomy and degrading resemblance to alienated, industrial labor.   
 Like Pater in The Renaissance, Bergson objected especially to the 
standardizing effects of language on consciousness and sensory experience, effects 
which associationist theories embraced for the sake of preserving a common sense and 
avoiding the collapse of all sensory experience into solipsism.  Just as Pater argues 
that habit and language ossify and stereotype impressions, Bergson contends that the 
semiotics of perception desiccates and standardizes our experience of duration. 
We instinctively tend to solidify our impressions in order to express them in 
language.  Hence, we confuse the feeling itself, which is in a perpetual state of 
becoming, with its permanent external object, and especially with the word 
which expresses this object…Every sensation is altered by repetition, and…if 
it does not seem to me to change from day to day, it is because I perceive it 
through the object which is its cause, through the word which translates it.  
This influence of language on sensation is deeper than is usually thought.  
(Time and Free Will, 130-1).   
Words segment and spatialize the experience of duration, crystallizing and dividing up 
its vital flux in the service of utility and communication.  Language thus “constitutes 
the common element, the impersonal residue, of the impressions felt in a given case by 
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the whole of society” (133).  For Bergson, language embodies a standardized common 
sense in whose terms duration is not even conceivable: “the idea of a multiplicity 
without relation to number or space, although clear for pure reflective thought, cannot 
be translated into the language of common sense” (122).  The opposition Bergson thus 
establishes between duration and semiotics seals off duration from any common 
measure of experience, making duration a “kingdom within a kingdom” (139) and 
merging true experience with just the kind of solipsism that Pater’s aestheticism so 
often resembled.    
 In Matter and Memory, Bergson attempts to distinguish duration from 
solipsism, dreams, and hallucinations by appealing to neural habit theory.95  One of the 
book’s central polemics is aimed at the scientific consensus that neural habits 
constitute the physical basis of memory.96  To counter this argument, Bergson 
distinguishes between the memory that accrues as pathways in the nervous system—
which he calls sensori-motor habits—and memory-images.  Memory-images comprise 
our memories of particular experiences, of moments of duration.  Bergson’s memory-
images cannot be localized within the nervous system or in what Durkheim, making a 
similar argument, mockingly referred to as “a geography of the brain” (Durkheim, 12). 
Nevertheless, sensori-motor habits guide conscious attention to memory-images by 
providing the framework in which each act of perception must take place.   
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ameliorate this stark division between consciousness and duration.   
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 William James, for example, claims that “the cause [of memory] is the law of habit in the nervous 
system, working as it does in ‘the association of ideas.’”  See James 653-663.     
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 By inscribing neural pathways in the body, sensori-motor habits shape the 
process that converts stimuli into sensations, laying the foundation for agency and free 
will.  Bergson argues that these pathways always reflect the modes of our possible 
action on the forces surrounding us; we learn to sense those aspects of objects that 
appeal to actions relevant to our bodies’ interests.  He identifies the perceptions 
resulting from these interested sensori-motor habits as pure perception.  In Bergson’s 
pure perception, however, the limitations of our creaturely interests impoverish 
sensory experience.  “Any unconscious material point” is rich compared to 
consciousness, Bergson writes, “since this point gathers and transmits the influences 
of all the points of the material universe, whereas our consciousness only attains to 
certain parts and to certain aspects of those parts…But there is, in this necessary 
poverty of our conscious perception, something that is positive, that foretells spirit: it 
is, in the etymological sense of the word, discernment” (38).  As we shall see, this 
unconscious perceptual power of discernment bears a close resemblance to what Pater 
calls selection.  Discernment makes agency possible by presenting to the mind a range 
of possible actions in relation to a sensory field, opening up what Bergson calls “a 
zone of indetermination.”  In this way, as Bergson claims in Time and Free Will, 
sensation “is nascent freedom” (34).   
 Sensori-motor habits present alternatives for consciousness to choose among, 
but consciousness makes this choice on the basis of memory-images that interpret 
sensations.  For Bergson, pure perceptions—perceptions procured solely through 
sensori-motor habits—are not only impoverished but unreflective.  As it habitually 
perceives objects, consciousness functions automatically, analyzing stimuli into 
discrete appeals to reflex action.  In what Bergson calls complete or attentive 
perception, in contrast, consciousness resists these appeals to reflex action and 
synthesizes sensory stimuli by projecting memory-images onto present perceptions.  
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Memory thereby enriches pure perceptions, filling them out with prior experiences and 
making possible reflective choice among potential paths of action.  Thus, “any 
memory-image that is capable of interpreting our actual perception inserts itself so 
thoroughly into it that we are no longer able to discern what is perception and what is 
memory” (103).   
 If memory “interprets” pure perceptions, however, then Bergson’s model of 
complete perception tacitly embraces the same semiotic theories of sensory perception 
that his work ostensibly critiques.  Bergson admits as much when he writes that “in 
most cases...memories supplant our actual perceptions, of which we then retain only a 
few hints, thus using them merely as ‘signs’ that recall to us former images” (33).  
Despite this cagey use of quotation marks around signs, the interpretation of pure 
perceptions through memory-images shares very similar dynamics with late Victorian 
associationism and other semiotic models of sensory perception, including, I argue, 
those developed by Pater.  As in, for example, William James’ account of association, 
memory’s interpretations of sense data take place along a continuum stretching from 
the most conventional and unreflective habitual perceptions to the most polysemic, 
dissociative leaps of consciousness, leaps analogous for both writers to dreams, 
hallucinations, and madness.  Matter and Memory exhibits an acute awareness that the 
forms of enriched perception that Bergson valorized bore an uncomfortable 
resemblance to reverie and trance.  For example, Bergson makes the well-nigh 
Wildean claim that in order to possess the capacity for complete perception, “we must 
be able to withdraw ourselves from the action of the moment, we must have the power 
to value the useless, we must have the will to dream” (83).  While such prescriptions 
may seem like conventional pleas for disinterested aesthetic experience, they are 
belied elsewhere in Matter and Memory by the arguments that a fully disinterested 
sensory experience is impossible and the considerably anxious efforts Bergson makes 
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to sharply distinguish enriched perception from dreams and other dissociative, trance-
like modes of consciousness.  As I have been arguing throughout this dissertation, this 
specific constellation of arguments and anxieties characterizes much of the late 
Victorian writing on cognitive science and the semiotics of sensory perception, not 
least by Pater himself.   
 As in much of this writing, Matter and Memory employs sensori-motor habits 
and the bodily needs they reflect to restrain the dangerous tendency of perceptual 
interpretation to elicit unruly, solipsistic states of consciousness.  Bergson ensures that 
the perceiving mind does not take such unruly flights by reworking associationism’s 
most beloved metaphor for the movement of consciousness: the train of thought.  
Perception, Bergson writes, “is supposed to be a rectilinear progress, by which the 
mind goes further and further from the object, never to return to it.  We maintain, on 
the contrary, that reflective perception is a circuit” (104, emphasis his).  Within this 
circuit, the pure perception provided by our sensori-motor habits and the memory-
images projected onto it by our mind revolve, each altering and refining the other.  
The circuit of perception thus tethers to a given pure perception the memory-images 
that interpret it, securing what Bergson calls “attention to life” (14).  When optimally 
functioning, the balance thus established separates the “man of action” and “good 
sense” from the unreflective “man of impulse,” on one side, and the ineffective 
dreamer, on the other (153).97   
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 In conceptualizing this circuit of perception, Bergson again draws analogies to 
music.  Capable of both extreme dilation and extreme contraction, the circuit of 
perception narrows down into something resembling reflex-action at one end and, at 
the other, expands to accommodate multiple memory-images—enabling 
consciousness “to grasp in a single intuition multiple moments of duration” (228).  In 
the latter case, the link between duration and sensori-motor habits facilitates the acting 
out of duration.  “The role of the body,” Bergson later wrote in The Creative Mind, 
“was thus to reproduce in action the life of the mind, to emphasize its motor 
articulations as the orchestra conductor does for a musical score; the brain did not 
have thinking as its function but that of hindering the thought from being lost in 
dream” (The Creative Mind, 87).  The body, here and in Matter and Memory, is a 
neural nexus, set to vibrating both by external forces and by memory-images 
themselves within the circuit of perception.  In this regard, memory-images constitute 
a counterpart to the keyboard formed by our sense organs; they are, as Bergson 
evocatively calls them, “a mental ear” (129).  Complete perception, he thus suggests, 
is itself a “harmony of a thousand notes,” played on the keyboards of mind and body 
at once.    
 
Between Fact and Value: Pure Perception and Pater’s Imaginative Sense of Fact 
 Pater’s work, too, elaborates a theory of a certain kind of perception as 
harmonic.  In “The School of Giorgione,” Pater follows his claim that all arts aspire to 
the conditions of music with a description of one existing picture believed at the time 
to have been painted by Giorgione: The Concert in the Pitti Palace.  The subject of 
this painting is a musical performance, or, rather, as Pater describes it, the subject is 
the moment just preceding the performance, when the three musicians are finding the 
tonic, the harmonic center of the piece they are about to play. 
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The Concert in the Pitti Palace (sic), in which a monk, with cowl and tonsure, 
touches the keys of a harpsichord, while a clerk, placed behind him, grasps the 
handle of a viol, and a third, with cap and plume, seems to wait upon the true 
interval for beginning to sing, is undoubtedly Giorgione’s.  The outline of the 
lifted finger, the trace of the plume, the very threads of the fine linen, which 
fasten themselves on the memory, in the moment before they are lost 
altogether in that calm unearthly glow, the skill which has caught the waves of 
wandering sound, and fixed them for ever on the lips and hands—these are 
indeed the master’s own.  (The Renaissance, 92) 
Pater’s description of this painting subtly invokes a perceptual movement from 
analysis to synthesis.  In contemplating the painting, the aesthete’s keen eye seizes 
upon even “the very threads” of the musician’s clothes, threads fastened and preserved 
in memory even while they disappear into the calm unearthly glow of the painting’s 
complete aesthetic effect.  The aesthete thus mirrors the artist, who likewise 
synthesizes the life of Venice, with “all the motives, all the interests and effects of a 
long history,” into “ideal instants…exquisite pauses in time…which are like some 
consummate extract or quintessence of life” (95-6).  Just as the aesthete synthesizes 
his impressions of the individual threads into a complete aesthetic effect, Giorgione 
captures and condenses “waves of wandering sound” into the dramatic gestures 
represented in the painting.    
 The aesthete’s capacity to grasp such fine details and then retain this hold even 
as he subsumes those details in a complete aesthetic impression contrasts starkly with 
the scientific art criticism criticized in Pater’s essay.  For, the practitioners of the new 
scientific criticism, the painting exists only as fine details.  Adept at analyzing 
aesthetic objects, they fail to synthesize those details into a complete aesthetic 
impression.  Similarly, Crowe and Cavalcaselle, the two critics whose efforts to 
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authenticate paintings attributed to Giorgione dramatically reduced the number of 
paintings thought to have been painted by him, analyzed Giorgione’s reputation 
without recognizing its complete aesthetic worth.  They see only the threads, not the 
glow.  “In the ‘new Vasari,’” Pater tartly writes, Giorgione’s “great traditional 
reputation, woven with so profuse demand on men’s admiration, has been scrutinized 
thread by thread; and what remains of the most vivid and stimulating of Venetian 
masters, a live flame, as it seemed, in those old shadowy times, has been reduced 
almost to a name by his most recent critics” (91).   
 If Crowe and Cavalcaselle’s scientific criticism reduced Giorgione to a name, 
however, Pater suggests that it is as a name that Giorgione possesses much of his 
aesthetic value.  While the “new Vasari” successfully refuted much of the traditional 
knowledge regarding Giorgione, Pater faults such a one-sided critical project for its 
inability to recognize that “in what is connected with a great name, much that is not 
real is often very stimulating” (94).  More than just stimulating, Pater exalts these 
factually inaccurate traditions into what he calls “the vraie vérité...those more liberal 
and durable impressions which, in respect of any really considerable person or subject, 
anything that has at all intricately occupied men’s attention, lie beyond, and must 
supplement, the narrower range of the strictly ascertained facts about it” (98).  In the 
case of Giorgione, this vraie vérité consists of the painter’s influence, his “school”: his 
effects on his contemporaries, on other painters, and on traditions of artistic 
representation, “traditions of subject and treatment, which really descend from him to 
our own time, and by retracing which we fill out the original image.”  By following 
the conventions of representation that comprise Giorgione’s influence, we can 
reconstruct him and his lost paintings.  Moreover, just as Giorgione and his paintings 
can be re-imagined through the subsequent paintings that in effect represent them, 
Giorgione and his paintings are in their turn representations, insofar as Giorgione, 
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through the conventions of subject and treatment that he bequeaths, “becomes a sort of 
impersonation of Venice itself, its projected reflex or ideal, all that was intense or 
desirable in it crystallizing about the memory of this wonderful young man” (94).  
Giorgione, by thus establishing a “school,” both elaborates and becomes a part of what 
Pater in “The Child in the House” calls “a system of visible symbolism.”  In doing so, 
however, Pater’s Giorgione seems to contradict Pater’s claims that true pictorial art 
eschews signification and interpretation.  
  “The School of Giorgione” thus arrives very quickly at one of the fundamental 
tensions at work in Pater’s aestheticism: that between object and sign.  As we have 
seen, Pater criticizes the encroachment of language and interpretation on aesthetic 
experience in The Renaissance and “The School of Giorgione,” citing its capacity to 
standardize and constrain sensory impressions.  Hence “The School of Giorgione” 
famously urges that “painting must be before all things decorative, a thing for the eye, 
a space of color on the wall, only more dexterously blent than the marking of its 
precious stone or the chance interchange of sun and shade upon it:—this to begin and 
end with; whatever higher matter of thought, or poetry, or religious reverie might play 
its part therein, between” (89).  Yet Pater’s own virtuoso poetic descriptions of 
artworks—his notoriously “poetic” reading of The Mona Lisa, for example—entirely 
disregard and violate this prescription.  This contradiction takes several forms in 
Pater’s work.  As James Eli Adams argues, it plays out partly as a tension between 
surface—the sensuous presence and integrity of the aesthetic object—and depth—the 
hidden recesses of meaning gestured at but not fully embodied by the aesthetic object, 
an announced but undisclosed psychic interiority particularly important to Pater as a 
form of masculine social presentation (Dandies and Desert Saints, 199-201).  In “The 
School of Giorgione,” it also plays out as a tension between fact and value, in which 
scientific art criticism’s narrow focus on establishing facts must be supplemented by 
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an appreciation of aesthetic value in order to arrive at the vraie vérité, but the 
discovery of that value entails just that “literary interest” in aesthetic objects as 
representations that Pater criticizes in popular criticism (84).  Subtending both these 
contradictions is the epistemological tension between object and sign.  As Pater 
recognized, to regard an aesthetic object as a sign would be both to standardize it—to 
solidify it and put it into public circulation—and to undermine its claims to exist as an 
end-in-itself—to make its value conditional on its social meanings.  Yet to regard an 
artwork purely as an object would be to render it similarly inert, a simple fact with no 
special claim to our interest or appreciation.  The faith in such a purely disinterested 
and unmediated relation with sensory objects had in any case been conclusively 
refuted by late Victorian cognitive science, as Pater was very well aware, and as he 
acknowledges in his well-known pronouncement in “Coleridge” that “to the modern 
spirit nothing is or can be rightly known except relatively and under conditions” 
(Appreciations, 65).   
 To resolve this dilemma, Pater develops his concept of the imaginative reason, 
the faculty of pure perception.  Art, he writes in “The School of Giorgione,” 
“addresses not pure sense, still less the pure intellect, but the imaginative reason 
through the senses” (83, my emphasis).  Thus, if paintings must be a thing for the eye, 
the sensuous delight they provide is nonetheless a “vehicle,” a means of reaching the 
imaginative reason (84).  However, an artwork’s sensuous qualities are also more than 
just a means, because vehicle and tenor are inseparable for the imaginative reason, 
“that complex faculty for which every thought and feeling is twin-born with its 
sensible analogue or symbol” (88).  The imaginative reason thus preserves the sensory 
qualities of art as its “primary aspect,” while simultaneously enabling the aesthete to 
find a meaning in those sensory qualities that endows the artwork with a value over 
and above its mere physical existence, its status as fact.  The imaginative reason thus 
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charts a perfect middle course between the purely literary interests of popular art 
criticism and the ostensibly value-neutral, fact-oriented focus of scientific art 
criticism.  One might say that it makes possible what Pater elsewhere calls “the 
imaginative sense of fact.”   
 Pater elaborates on the perceptual dynamics and ethical implications of 
imaginative reason in “The Child in the House,” published the year following the 
appearance of “The School of Giorgione.”  The account of Florian’s brain-building is, 
fundamentally, an account of the emergence of his faculty of imaginative reason.  It is 
clearly this faculty that Florian develops as his childhood sensory experiences 
interweave “a system of visible symbolism…through all [his] thoughts and passions” 
(“The Child in the House,” 6).  When Florian later encounters philosophy, he affirms 
the importance of his imaginative reason, observing that the “sensible vehicle or 
occasion [of any abstract thoughts] became…the necessary concomitant of any 
perception of things, real enough to be of any weight or reckoning in his house of 
thought” (11).  Pater suggests, moreover, that Florian’s imaginative reason enables an 
ethical relation to others.  “There were times,” Florian reflects, “when he could think 
of the necessity he was under of associating all thoughts to touch and sight, as a 
sympathetic link between himself and actual, feeling, living objects” (11).  Florian’s 
quickness to realize the sensible vehicles of any idea makes him more alive to the pain 
of others, as when he recognizes that by taking a bird away from her nestlings, he had 
“become an accomplice in moving, to the limit of his small power, the springs and 
handles of that great machine in things, constructed so ingeniously to play pain-fugues 
on the delicate nerve-work of living creatures” (10).  Additionally, however, Florian’s 
imaginative reason enables an ethical relation to others by inculcating in him the 
neural habits that make up a sensus communis.   
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 “The Child in the House” turns to neural habits both to explain the physical 
basis of the imaginative reason and to make ethics possible within Pater’s 
aestheticism.  The story clearly draws from late Victorian associationist arguments 
that neural pathways carved out by repeated sensory experiences gradually built up a 
semiotics of perception, in which any given sensation acts as a sign for its associates.  
Pater employs much of the language and rhetoric of late Victorian associationism as 
he describes the effects of his surroundings on Florian as his mother, aptly enough, 
teaches him to read:  
How insignificant, at the moment, seem the influences of the sensible things 
which are tossed and fall and lie about us, so or so, in the environment of early 
childhood.  How indelibly, as we afterward discover, they affect us; with what 
capricious attractions and associations they figure themselves on the white 
paper, the smooth wax of our ingenuous souls, as ‘with lead in the rock 
forever,’ giving form and feature, and as it were assigned house-room in our 
memory to early experiences of feeling and thought, which abide with us ever 
afterwards, thus, and not otherwise.  (6)98 
Inscribing associations in the mind, neural habits here develop Florian’s imaginative 
reason by giving form to thoughts and feelings, joining them to particular sensory 
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 Interestingly, Pater here employs the figure of the tabula rasa, suggesting that Florian begins life with 
no inherited neural habits.  Since inheritability was a crucial feature of neural habits in late Victorian 
physiology, most writers from this period figured the mind as a palimpsest instead.  Inherited perceptual 
habits were, however, very important for Pater, and he elsewhere suggests that consciousness is a 
palimpsest.  Most often, he does so indirectly, through an emphasis on the importance to aesthetic 
experience of striving to “clear” the mind of perceptual habits, to make the mind a tabula rasa, but he 
employs the figure directly in Plato and Platonism.  There, Pater refers to “ancient, half-obliterated 
inscriptions on the mental walls, the mental tablet” that could be revived in us under the right 
circumstances (Paterian anamnesis draws heavily from the theory of neural inheritance).  See Plato and 
Platonism, 66.  Douglas Mao argues that Pater revises the language of neural habits, replacing the 
figure of inscription, which implies the uni-directional action of stimuli on a consistently passive mind, 
with the figure of “one inextricable texture” composed of both consciousness and the material world 
(Mao, 71).  While Pater certainly does complicate the relation of mind to world in the associationist 
model, it must nonetheless be acknowledged that such revisions exist alongside many moments when 
Pater employs a more conventional associationist rhetoric.     
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analogues that will “interpret” his later experiences (8).  As Florian yields himself to 
his surroundings “to be played upon by them like a musical instrument,” he acquires 
habits of perception that tune his consciousness to his childhood home.  As Douglas 
Mao has compellingly argued, Pater’s story encapsulates many of the themes and 
ideas informing the late Victorian fascination with aesthetic environments and their 
power to shape juvenile growth (Mao, 66-81).  But Florian’s home is not just any 
aesthetic environment; it is also “typically” English.   In the story’s most extensive 
instance of narrative intrusion, the narrator explains the especially “home-like” 
character of Florian’s home by appealing to its especial Englishness. 
As, after many wanderings, I have come to fancy that some parts of Surrey and 
Kent are, for Englishmen, the true landscape, true home-counties…so, I think 
that the sort of house I have described, with precisely those proportions of red-
brick and green, and with a just perceptible monotony in the subdued order of 
it, for its distinguishing note, is, for Englishmen at least, typically home-like.  
And so for Florian [the sense of home] was reinforced by this special home-
likeness…[and] the sense of harmony between his soul and its physical 
environment became, for a time at least, like perfectly played music.  (7) 
This typically English house determines the ethical character of Florian’s habits.  If 
Florian’s habitation shapes his cognitive and perceptual habits, if his material house 
builds up his house of thought, then the especial Englishness of that house ensures his 
participation in an English common sense.  Pater’s moral defense of Florian’s 
aesthetic sensibilities—on the grounds that they quicken his capacity for sympathy—
tacitly appeals to just such a common sense, insofar as late Victorian ethics of 
sympathy, such as that promulgated by George Eliot, rest on the feeling in common 
made possible by neural habits.  Pater later uses the concept of sympathy to denote 
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just this sharing of common sense in Marius the Epicurean.99  In the passage above, 
moreover, Pater uses the same trope that he will employ to figure the ethics of 
common sense in Marius: harmony.   
 In “The Child in the House,” this trope governs not only Florian’s relationship 
with his typically English home, but also the form of enriched perception that Florian 
develops through religious observance.  Adapting religious symbolism to his daily 
life, Florian enriches his perception of his surroundings by “habitually” recognizing 
alongside of each object its “celestial correspondent.”  By religiously interpreting his 
home, by making all the objects in it “weighty with meanings,” Florian sacralizes the 
common usages and objects making up his domestic life (16).  Florian conceives of 
religion as “a transcendent version or representation, under intenser and more 
expressive light and shade, of human life and its familiar or exceptional incidents….a 
complimentary strain or burden, applied to our every-day existence, whereby the stray 
snatches of music in it re-set themselves, and fall into the scheme of some higher and 
more consistent harmony” (15).  Religion, here, teaches Florian an interpretive mode 
of perception that functions by harmonizing a given sensory experience with 
intensified, idealized representations of it.  When Florian “applies” religion to his 
daily life, he self-consciously engages in a “constant substitution of the typical for the 
actual” (16).  Yet Florian, steeped in the imaginative reason and always ascribing 
more importance to thought’s sensible vehicle than to thought itself, does not simply 
replace the actual with the typical.  Rather, he makes these substitutions primarily to 
fill out the actual, to enhance its value by making it “weighty with meanings.”  Thus, 
Florian neither dissolves the actual in the typical nor collapses the distinction between 
the two—instead, he experiences them harmonically, at once unified and distinct in 
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 See, for one example, Marius the Epicurean 261.   
 177 
effect.100  In this respect, harmony, for Pater, instantiates a mode of perception that 
accommodates habit—and thereby, as we shall see, common sense—without 
generating “a stereotyped world.”  Florian’s harmonic perception may be defined by 
“the habitual recognition, beside every circumstance and event of life, of its celestial 
correspondent,” but, insofar as his perception is harmonic, this habitual recognition 
will not become equivalent to “the roughness of the eye that makes any two persons, 
things, situations seem alike” (The Renaissance, 153).    
 Harmonic perception also makes possible the form of aesthetic agency that 
Pater designates “choice” or “selection.”  The power of aesthetic distinction implied 
by “choice” played an important role in Paterian aestheticism, which exhorted 
aesthetes to achieve a “quickened, multiplied consciousness” by constantly 
discriminating and seeking out the most “choice” aspects of experience, the “focus 
where the greatest number of vital forces unite in their purest energy” (152-3).  One of 
Marius’ first and most enduring commitments, for example, is to “discriminate, ever 
more and more exactly, select form and color in things from what [is] less select” 
(Marius the Epicurean, 38).  Like harmony, then, selection entails the reflective 
focalization of sensory experience, a voluntary coordination and arrangement of 
experiential contents in which consciousness intensifies some sensations—the select—
and attenuates others—the less select.  In this respect, selection lays the 
epistemological groundwork for the figurative strategy, deftly analyzed by Williams, 
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 Pater indirectly underscores the importance of harmonic perception through his turn to typology as a 
figurative strategy and formal method in “The Child in the House” and in Marius.  Typology, Carolyn 
Williams writes in her study of Pater, does not consist of the simple substitution of terms; rather, 
typology “must be grounded in historical actuality, must preserve the integrity of separate historical 
events, and must not allow the linear, ‘horizontal’ dimension of history to disappear in allegorical, 
‘vertical,’ spiritualizing or symbolic substitutions.”  Put another way, typology entails the coordination 
of a multiplicity of events, experiences, and meanings both in and across time.  The typological 
representation of any given event must simultaneously preserve that event’s concreteness and join it 
with other events—either preceding it or anticipated by it—that interpret it.  Typology, in this respect, is 
harmonic.  See Williams, 209.   
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that Pater calls “relief.”  Relief masters a complex sensory or cognitive field by raising 
and defining a figure against a background of which the figure is a part (Williams, 
153-8).  Relief thus employs a form of perceptual selection, and Pater suggests that all 
artistic representations rely on this principle.  “The basis of all artistic genius,” he 
writes in “Winckelmann,” “lies in the power…of putting a happy world of its own 
creation in place of the meaner world of our common days, generating around itself an 
atmosphere with a novel power of refraction, selecting, transforming, recombining the 
images it transmits, according to the choice of the imaginative intellect” (R 137).  
Pater identifies selection here as the function of “the imaginative intellect,” a faculty 
that anticipates the imaginative reason in “The School of Giorgione” as well as Pater’s 
claim in “Style” that fine art attempts to represent not fact but the artist’s “imaginative 
sense of fact” (Appreciations, 4).  The imaginative intellect’s choices, here, effect a 
transubstantiation—changing the meaner world of our common days into a happier 
one of its creation—in a manner that is strikingly similar to that of Florian’s religious 
observances.  Both artistic representations and religious symbolism enrich our 
perception by reorienting and re-focalizing sensory experience.  In that respect, both 
provide us with an imaginative sense of fact, in which “sense” denotes sensory 
experience as well as understanding.  To the degree that they do so, however, the 
“select” in our perception is not of our own selecting.   
 Perceptual selection constitutes the fundamental mechanism of perhaps the 
most enduring theoretical concern of Pater’s work: influence.  While selection and 
choice imply the participation of the aesthete’s reflective agency in any act of 
perception, in fact the aesthete’s “choice” is often guided, if not determined, by the 
selections made by others.  Florian’s religious observances and the artworks 
mentioned in “Winckelmann” provide two paradigmatic instances of this kind of 
perceptual influence.  Cultural customs bequeath to Florian the celestial 
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correspondents that orient his perceptions.  Florian’s religious observances thus ensure 
his participation in a set of cultural traditions, a common sense of the world and its 
significance.  These traditions, diffuse in origin and effect, contrast with artworks, 
which, while they may depend and draw on cultural traditions in both their production 
and reception, are also individual products of an individual consciousness.  To that 
extent, being influenced by particular artworks became tantamount to being “under the 
influence” of another person, to becoming vulnerable to that person’s control.   
 The influence of artworks thus became charged with especially acute anxieties 
over lost or compromised autonomy in Pater’s writings as well as in late Victorian 
culture more broadly.  Music, in particular, seemed to many late Victorians the artistic 
medium most conducive to the diffusion of dangerous forms of influence.  The 
protagonist of Tolstoy’s 1889 novella, Kreytzerova sonata, for example, claims that 
music possesses an almost boundless capacity for influence and therefore ought to be 
regulated by the state. 
Music, at once, immediately transfers me into the spiritual state in which he 
who wrote the music found himself.  My soul melts into his, and together with 
him I am transferred from one state to another, but for what reason I do this, I 
do not know.   You know he, who wrote the Kreutzer Sonata, Beethoven, he 
knew why he found himself in such a state…That state had meaning for him, 
but for me there was nothing of the sort.  (Tolstoy, 193).  
The capacity of music to affect us “at once, immediately” hints at an important reason 
that music seemed the art form above all others that crystallized the dangers of artistic 
influence.  Ostensibly nonrepresentational, the dynamics of music’s influence were 
therefore all the more inscrutable, and its effects therefore all the more insidious.  In 
addition, music’s movement, its temporal form, suggested parallels with the methods 
used to induce hypnosis, which had become the object of renewed scientific and 
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popular fascination from the 1870s until the turn of the century (See Crary 65-71, 230-
6).  George Du Maurier’s immensely popular 1894 novel, Trilby, for example, 
represents these seemingly hypnotic properties of music in sometimes lurid detail.101  
These widespread anxieties and fascinations with artistic influence were both 
shared and stimulated by late Victorian science, especially by theories of nervous 
reflexes and the cognitive mechanisms of interpretation (See, for example, Wallen).  
As I have argued in detail in chapter 3, late Victorian psycho-physiologists held that 
the interpretation of any expression of another consciousness included the ideo-motor 
reenactment of the feelings and ideas expressed by that consciousness.  Bergson, for 
example, claims in Matter and Memory that “to follow an arithmetical addition is to 
do it over again for ourselves.  To understand another’s words is, in like manner, to 
reconstruct intelligently, starting from the ideas, the continuity of sound which the ear 
perceives” (Matter and Memory, 116-7).  Bergson refers to this intelligent 
reconstruction as “the motor-diagram” of heard speech.  While Bergson’s intelligent 
reconstruction implies conscious, willed mental effort, other writers characterized such 
ideo-motor mechanisms of interpretation as involuntary and unconscious.  Their 
potentially automatic, unreflective character led Gabriel Tarde to claim that society 
simply is unconscious imitation, and made possible Dilthey’s faith in the capacity of 
genius to manage the emerging vulgarization of art by discreetly providing the masses 
with a proper aesthetic education.  Theories of ideo-motor re-enactment thus invested 
art with the power to quietly shape the consciousnesses of those who came in contact 
with it, for good or ill. 
Pater, too, invokes the physiology of interpretation in his representations of 
art’s capacity for influence.  As Adams cannily notes, Pater insistently employs 
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 Trilby likewise explicitly remarks on the absolute independence of music’s hypnotic power from the 
representational content of song lyrics.  See, especially, Du Maurier 44, 213.   
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strategies of representation that blur “distinctions between aesthetic representation and 
social presentation; aesthetic understanding comes to be understood on the model of 
intimate knowledge of another person” (Dandies and Desert Saints 185).  Both forms 
of knowledge require at least a degree of ideo-motor re-enactment, since, for Pater, art 
and artistic personalities re-orient the aesthete’s sensory experience according to their 
own perceptual selections.  As Marius discovers in reading The Phaedrus, art and 
artistic persons possess the power of “conforming the seer to themselves as with some 
cunning physical necessity” (Marius the Epicurean 38).  Consequently, artists enjoyed 
a charismatic social authority, with whose forms and rhetoric Pater was certainly 
adept.  At the same time, this power of influence potentially compromised agency in 
aesthetic experience, rendering the aesthete an unconscious automaton.  One of the 
most important critical tasks for Paterian aestheticism was therefore, as Wallen argues, 
to reconcile the aesthete’s capacity to be aesthetically influenced with his ability to 
reflectively analyze his aesthetic experiences (Wallen 86).  This task is further 
complicated, however, by the fluidity between individual and cultural influence.   
For Pater, moments of individual influence cascade and ramify themselves into 
traditions and forms of cultural influence.  In Pater’s work, Adams observes, “as the 
critic—and more generally, any receptive beholder—responds to aesthetic ‘powers or 
forces,’ that response in turn takes its place in a relay of influence, within which each 
new testament to the vital power of the artwork becomes itself an aesthetic stimulus, 
which confirms, extends, and diffuses the powers of the original object.  Aesthetic 
meaning and significance are thus always unfolding through varied forms of influence, 
influence registered not only in individual lives but across generations and centuries, 
in the shaping of schools, tradition, cultures.”102  Thus Giorgione’s “school”—the 
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  See “Transparencies of Desire: An Introduction,” 2.   As I argue below, the problem of individual 
influence in Pater’s writings cannot be fully understood without attention to the problem of cultural 
influence.   
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traditions of representation and perception initiated by his influence—constitutes a 
vraie vérité independent of his actual surviving paintings.  As such influences diffuse 
themselves into traditions, they become the basis for the aesthetic, perceptual, and 
ethical habits that make shared cultural values possible.    
Pater’s representations of influence thus impinge in two ways on the question 
of ethics for Paterian aestheticism.  As is hardly surprising for a writer so notoriously 
accused of leading impressionable youths astray, Pater’s work betrays a keen interest 
in the ethics of having an influence on another person.  Most recently, this aspect of 
Pater’s work has been taken up in queer studies focusing on the importance of 
seduction and the erotics of pedagogy to Paterian aestheticism.103  But running 
alongside Pater’s attention to the ethics of having an influence is a corresponding 
attention to the ethics of being influenced.  If being influenced enables one to 
participate in a common life of shared values, then being influenced amounts to an 
ethical imperative no less binding than the norms that would govern one’s having an 
influence on others.  The ethics of being influenced make up perhaps the central focus 
of Marius the Epicurean, the 1885 novel in which Pater attempts to answer the 
charges that the aesthetic program outlined in The Renaissance amounted to little 
more than the amoral solipsism of “high-toned corruption” (Donoghue, 48). 
 
Marius and the Ethics of Influence 
 Marius the Epicurean opens with its protagonist having reached the same stage 
of development that Florian has reached when “The Child in the House” closes.  Like 
Florian at the end of “The Child in the House,” Marius has acceded to a set of 
religious usages and symbols, in his case those belonging to the traditional Roman 
religion of the Lares, the household gods.  These symbols and usages have likewise 
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grown out of provincial Roman domestic life, sacralizing its mundane acts and objects 
by endowing them with “poetic and…moral significance” (18).  By teaching Marius to 
perceive the incidents and objects of daily life with reference to their customary 
spiritual meanings—their traditional “celestial correspondents,” as it were—the 
religion of the Lares inculcates in him the “habit” of feeling a “responsibility towards 
the world of men and things…a claim for due sentiment concerning them” (24).  In 
other words, the religion of the Lares cultivates in Marius the feeling of ethical 
responsibility, or conscience.  However, just as Florian must ultimately leave his 
home, Marius soon outgrows the narrow constraints of the life and religion of rural 
Roman domesticity.  He soon begins to wonder whether the “religion of the villa 
might come to count with him as but one form of poetic beauty, or of the ideal, in 
things; as but one voice, in a world where there were many voices it would be a moral 
weakness not to listen to” (49).  His departure from home to finish his schooling in 
Pisa intensifies these doubts, breeding in him a “boundless appetite for experience, for 
adventure,” in defiance of “the old, staid, conservative religion of his childhood” (52-
3).   
 Pater frames the conflict between Marius’ religious reverence and his hunger 
for experience partly through the bildungsroman’s conventional opposition of tradition 
and modernity.  While studying in Pisa, Marius shrinks from the “imaginative 
exaltation of the past” urged on him by the old religion, and cautiously asserts the 
superiority and freedom of the present, “ready to boast in its very modernness” (52).  
Having left home, Marius makes the conventional claim to the negative liberty of 
modernity, to the “entire liberty of heart and brain” untrammeled by the traditional 
past and its demands on the present and thereby promising him “unlimited self-
expansion in a world of various sunshine” (53, 49).  Although Marius ultimately 
pursues this promise by moving to Rome—fulfilling the bildungsroman’s generic 
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convention of moving from the provinces to try one’s fortune in the capital—the 
liberty of experience he seeks does not lie in mere freedom of social or geographical 
mobility.  The freedom of experience Marius desires is in fact more fundamental, 
more literal, than the liberty to travel or advance in the social hierarchy.  For Marius, 
the negative liberty of experience denotes instead the freedom of a sensory experience 
unfettered by traditional norms of perception.   
 In striving to free himself from norms of perception, Marius rehearses the 
epistemological shift that, according to Pater, characterizes the advent of modernity.  
In distinction from ancient thought, Pater famously writes in his 1866 essay 
“Coleridge,” modern thought is relative.  While ancient thought attempts to define and 
fix its objects permanently, modern thought self-reflexively focuses on the relative 
conditions that attend the act of knowing.  Under modernity, therefore, “it is the truth 
of these relations that experience gives us, not the truth of eternal outlines ascertained 
once for all, but a world of fine gradations and subtly linked conditions, shifting 
intricately as we ourselves change—and bids us, by a constant clearing of the organs 
of observation and perfecting of analysis, to make what we can of these” 
(Appreciations 67).  To arrive at the truth of relations, Pater suggests, one must strive 
to move beyond—in order to attain a vantage point on—any partial viewpoint or 
particular set of conditions.  Marius’s attempts to experience modernity are thus 
defined by “his efforts towards a complete, many-sided existence” (246).  But these 
efforts play out at the level of aesthetic experience; in order to move beyond the limits 
of any one-sided perspective, Marius must strive to clear constantly the organs of 
observation.  It is to aid him in these efforts that Marius turns to the epistemological 
skepticism of Epicureanism.  Marius embraces Epicureanism in order “to clear the 
tablet of the mind from suppositions no more than half realisable, or wholly visionary, 
leaving it in flawless evenness of surface to the impressions of an experience, concrete 
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and direct” (142).  Pater observes that the value of Epicureanism, in both Marius’ time 
and in the late nineteenth century lies in just these strivings “to be absolutely virgin 
towards such experience, by ridding ourselves of such abstractions as are but the 
ghosts of bygone impressions” (142).  In this way, Pater tacitly signals that Marius’ 
Epicureanism stands in for his own aestheticist iteration of it in The Renaissance. 
 Marius’ turn to Epicureanism thus rehearses many of the arguments in Pater’s 
“Conclusion,” most especially his argument against habit.  Epicureanism’s attempts to 
“clear the tablet of the mind,” to erase from it “the ghosts of bygone impressions” and 
make it a tabula rasa, invoke neural science’s figure of consciousness as a palimpsest 
written over by neural habits.  When Marius encounters the philosophy of Heraclitus 
as a forebear of Epicureanism, he notes that Heraclitus too suggests that the proper 
reception of his ideas “must involve a denial of habitual impressions, as the necessary 
first step in the way of truth” (130).  Like Pater in “The Conclusion,” Marius’ 
Heraclitus contends that these habits constrain and distort sensory experience, 
covering over the teeming sensory world with a veil of routinized perceptual norms 
that disclose only sameness and immobility where in fact there is infinite difference 
and perpetual alteration.  Further, just as Pater’s arguments against habit implied an 
attack on the foundation of Victorian ethics in common sense, so Marius’ 
Epicureanism seems to define itself against a debased world of “common experience.”  
Heraclitus suggests that his philosophy cannot be understood by “the many,” scorning 
their “careless, half-conscious, ‘use-and-wont’ reception of…experience” and the 
“common opinion” that finds only “fixed objects” instead of the ceaseless play of vital 
forces (130-2).  Having moved beyond the habits of the old Roman religion, Marius 
finds himself becoming aware of a “large dissidence between an inward and somewhat 
exclusive world of vivid personal apprehension, and the unimproved, unheightened 
reality of the life of those about him…To move afterwards in that outer world of other 
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people, as though taking it at their estimate, would be possible henceforth only as a 
kind of irony” (134).  Marius even applies this ironic skepticism to the very concept of 
“common experience” itself, which, echoing Pater’s claim in the “Conclusion” that 
language creates the apparent solidity of objects, he dismisses as “only a fixity of 
language” (139).  Through Epicurean skepticism, Marius asserts an empowering 
negative liberty of perception that, by virtue of the distance it opens up between his 
own conscious life and that of those about him, functions both as a defense against 
hostile social scrutiny and, as Adams argues, a form of social presentation that entices 
fascination in order to establish his worth (Dandies and Desert Saints 190).  
Nevertheless, his Epicurean efforts to clear his mind from perceptual habits and norms 
seem to substantiate the charges of amoral solipsism that Pater sought to refute in 
Marius.   
Marius’ negative liberty of perception endangers not only his moral sense but 
also his capacity for aesthetic experience.  Adams notes the conflict in the novel 
between two orders of experience: “one that embraces a specific aesthetic or criteria of 
evaluation…another that upholds what is in effect an ideal of the innocent eye” 
(Dandies and Desert Saints 213).  The innocent eye, the absolute virginity of 
experience striven for by Epicureanism, presents a problem for Paterian aestheticism 
insofar as its principled rejection of all perceptual habits seems to make any perceptual 
organization of stimuli impossible.  The Epicureans’ refusal to give any “reasonable 
‘assent’” to the norms and habits that define traditional religion and ethics renders 
their sensory experience flat and indiscriminate.  “The spectacle of their fierce, 
exclusive, tenacious hold on their own narrow apprehension,” the narrator remarks, 
“makes one think of a picture with no relief” (264).  The dilemma presented by the 
Epicureans’ perceptual iconoclasm thus rehearses the conflict—between surface and 
depth, fact and value, object and sign—animating “The School of Giorgione.”  In their 
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rigorous efforts to exclude social values from sensory perception, the Epicureans 
parody the scientific art critics whose exclusive focus on facts renders them incapable 
of appreciating the vraie vérité of aesthetic impressions.  Above all, as Pater’s analogy 
of the picture without relief suggests, the Epicurean ideal of the innocent eye destroys 
the capacity to exercise the aesthetic agency of relief and selection, on which the 
possibility of artistic production hinges.  Despite its early promise to help Marius 
experience a “full or complete life, a life of various yet select sensation,” 
Epicureanism’s aim to become virgin to experience ultimately reveals itself to be at 
variance with the chief goal of aesthetic education as Pater defines it: “to impart the art 
[of] relieving the ideal or poetic traits, the elements of distinction in our everyday life” 
(143, 58).  Thus Marius discovers that “the thirst for every kind of experience, 
encouraged by a philosophy which taught that nothing was intrinsically great or small, 
good or evil, had ever been at strife in him with a hieratic refinement, in which the 
boy-priest survived, prompting always the selection of what was perfect of its kind, 
with subsequent loyal adherence of his soul thereto” (344).  The Epicurean rejection of 
perceptual habit thus makes impossible both the aesthetic and the moral judgments 
underwritten by a sensus communis. 
 Marius the Epicurean therefore attempts to accommodate the negative liberty 
of perception with the ethical and aesthetic imperative to participate in common sense 
by turning to the dynamics of influence.  Cornelius Fronto, the Stoic tutor of Marcus 
Aurelius, takes the relationship between influence and the ethics of common sense as 
the subject of his public discourse on “The Nature of Morals” (243).  Fronto’s 
discourse directly addresses the ethical dilemma that Marius finds himself increasingly 
haunted by: what possible foundation for ethical values can exist if one has rejected 
the norms that define sensus communis?  At this stage in his development, Marius has 
begun “questioning himself with much impatience as to the possibility of an 
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adjustment between his own elaborately thought-out intellectual scheme and the ‘old 
morality’ [that will neither] retard him in his efforts towards a complete, many-sided 
existence [nor] distort the revelations of the experience of life [nor] curtail his natural 
liberty of heart and mind” (246).  Fronto locates just such a possibility in the idea of a 
common sense that embodies an aesthetic aristocracy.  In even the most rigorously 
skeptical Epicurean, Fronto argues, there still exists a remnant of “right conduct” that 
stems not from his choice but from “a deference, an “assent,” entire, habitual, 
unconscious, to custom—to the actual habit or fashion of others, from whom he could 
not endure to break away, any more than he would care to be out of agreement with 
them on questions of mere manner, or, say, even, of dress” (248).  The reason for the 
persistence of these residual habits, Fronto argues, lies “in the purely aesthetic beauty 
of the old morality, as an element in things, fascinating to the imagination, to good 
taste in its most highly developed form, through association” (247).  Through its 
beauty and fascination, the old morality conforms the Epicurean skeptic to itself 
without him realizing it.  Its aesthetic power of fascination thus makes possible an 
ideal form of social relation, a “universal commonwealth of mind” guided by an 
aesthetic aristocracy (249).  This aristocracy has in fact shaped the norms and habits 
that make up the old morality, and therefore in unconsciously assenting to them one 
participates in “a select communion of just men made perfect.” 
The world is as it were a commonwealth, a city: and there are observances, 
customs, usages, actually current in it, things our friends and companions will 
expect of us, as the condition of our living there with them at all, as really their 
peers or fellow-citizens.  Those observances were, indeed, the creation of a 
visible or invisible aristocracy in it, whose actual manners, whose preferences 
from of old, become now a weighty tradition as to the way in which things 
should or should not be done, are like a music to which the intercourse of life 
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proceeds—such a music as no one who had once caught its harmonies would 
willingly jar.  (249) 
Fronto thus imagines an aesthetic republic similar to that envisioned by Dilthey and 
Lee: an ostensible aesthetic democracy whose citizens’ common judgments are in fact 
the product of an aristocracy’s hidden shaping force.  The mainspring of this 
aristocracy of the aesthetic is influence.   
 Influence provides Marius with the capacity for moral and aesthetic judgments 
by inscribing in him habits of perception.  These influences reach him not through 
Fronto’s abstract appeals to an aesthetic republic but through concrete, particular 
embodiments of that republic: beautiful objects and beautiful persons.  Flavian and, 
after him, Cornelius bring all the seduction of the beautiful to bear on Marius.  Too 
affecting to be contained within the framework of either his provincial religious habits 
or his Epicurean ironic skepticism, these beautiful men break in upon Marius with all 
the force of the “solid world” of real objects (57, 169).104  In this perceptual ravishing, 
Flavian and Cornelius seem to expose the insufficiency of Marius’ prevailing 
orthodoxies of perception, their narrow viewpoints on a sensory world that far exceeds 
their capacities for experience.  However, in affecting Marius as they do, Flavian and 
Cornelius communicate to him an “inward standard…of distinction, selection” with 
the capacity to shape his perception subsequently (229).  On making his original 
journey with Cornelius, for example, Marius becomes attuned to a beauty in the 
otherwise “unpleasing,” austere aspect of the country and reflects that the landscape 
“seemed to have been waiting for the passage of this figure to interpret or inform it” 
(169).  Flavian and Cornelius thus in their own persons perform the same role as 
artworks: that of mediating Marius’ perception.  Flavian, for example, takes 
                                                
104
 Pater describes the effects of beauty on Florian in very similar terms in “The Child in the House,” as 
a stream of impressions that works its way into the enclosed world of his childhood associations and 
habits of perception “as [through] windows left ajar unknowingly, or over the high garden walls” (8).   
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inspiration for his own literary efforts from the thought that the poet has a “mediatorial 
function, as between the reader and the actual matter of his experience” (102).  Hence 
the power of aestheticism’s famed golden/yellow/poison book, which Florian and 
Marius discover when, having hidden away in a granary to read Apuleius’ The Golden 
Ass, they look up from the novel to their surroundings.   
They looked round: the western sun smote through the broad chinks of the 
shutters.  How like a picture!  and it was precisely the scene described in what 
they were reading, with just that added poetic touch in the book which made it 
delightful and select, and in the actual place, the ray of sunlight transforming 
the rough grain among the cool brown shadows into heaps of gold.  (59)  
This passage seemingly circumscribes the select in the scene described in the novel, 
distinguishing it from the “actual place.”  Yet the scene in the book prompts Flavian 
and Marius to recognize the actual place as “the scene described,” to exclaim that it is 
“like a picture.”  Further, if there is just that “added poetic touch in the book which 
made it delightful and select,” the ambiguity of the pronoun “it” signals the merging of 
the scene in the book with the “actual” scene for Flavian and Marius.  To exercise this 
form of influence even becomes an ambition for Marius himself, who moves to Rome 
to study rhetoric because he, like Flavian, desires to become “the interpreter” of art 
and sensory experiences for others (153).  
 Individual objects or persons that influence Marius mediate his contact with 
the larger, more systemic habits of perception that make up a common sense.  Marius 
regards both Flavian and Cornelius as “sensible exponent[s]” of larger communities 
and philosophies of perception (231).  As the initial heat of personal influence 
subsides, Marius interprets these beautiful men—Flavian as the embodiment of 
Epicureanism, Cornelius as that of early Christianity—and thus derives from them a 
“theory of practice” (231).  Influence thus inducts Marius into the common habits 
 191 
subtending the shared moral and aesthetic judgments of these wider communities, 
making it possible for him to fulfill the ethical imperative to develop and expand his 
“sympathy” (270).  Influence reveals to him “a venerable system of sentiment and 
idea, widely extended in time and place, in a kind of impregnable possession of human 
life…grown inextricably through and through it; penetrating into its laws, its very 
language, its mere habits of decorum, in a thousand half-conscious ways” (268-9).  
The influential system of perception, “like some other great products of the conjoint 
efforts of human mind through many generations, is rich in the world’s experience” 
(268).   Therefore, the expansion of Marius’ sympathy, his participation in a common 
sense, “has, in itself, the expanding power of a great experience” (268).  “It is,” the 
narrator remarks, drawing a direct analogy to semiotics, “what the coming into 
possession of a very widely spoken language might be, with a great literature, which is 
also the speech of the people we have to live among” (268).  Yet if the influence of 
common sense radically enlarges Marius’ experience, it necessarily demands the 
“curtailing of his liberty” (270).  Even at its most new and erotically charged, 
Cornelius’ influence elicits in Marius “some sense of a constraining tyranny over him 
from without” (169).  While influence thus enables Marius to access the wider 
experiences of a common sense (and possibly offers some erotic satisfactions as well), 
it does not by itself fully reconcile beauty with freedom.   
Consequently, Marius attempts to make space for the negative liberty of 
perception within an aesthetic experience defined by influence.  There are two major 
critical readings of these attempts.  According to Adams, Marius retains a degree of 
aesthetic agency by remaining open to influence, by refusing to make a final assent to 
any one perceptual system (Dandies and Desert Saints 214-6).  Adams points to 
Marius’ ultimate choice not to convert to Christianity, and his deathbed meditation 
that “the aim of a true philosophy must lie…in the maintenance of a kind of candid 
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discontent, in the face of the very highest achievement; the unclouded and receptive 
soul quitting the world finally, with the same fresh wonder with which it had entered 
the world still unimpaired” (448).  Pater, Adams argues, thus converts the passive 
posture of being influenced into a strenuous, disciplined effort to retain one’s capacity 
for various and fresh influencing experiences.  Marius’ goal of making his 
consciousness a tabula rasa resolves itself, in a sense, into the perpetual openness to 
having one’s mind re-written by new experience that, as we have seen in chapter 1, 
forestalls the erosion of feeling and agency by routinization in Eliot’s and Lewes’ 
work.  Thus the novel seems to bear out Marius’ reflection that his “seemingly active 
powers of apprehension were, in fact, but susceptibilities to influence” (307).  In 
contrast, Douglas Mao locates a vital, if diminished, form of agency in the reflective 
awareness of being influenced, in knowing that we are under the burden of necessity 
and reflecting on its workings.  Mao’s analysis, which centers on Pater’s earlier work, 
emphasizes Pater’s suggestions that “we feel a certain transcendence of our 
determinations when we contemplate them” (Mao 80).105  Mao cites the declaration, in 
the concluding passages of “Winckelmann,” that the modern mind has grasped that 
contemporary life is fully shaped by a “magic web [of necessity] woven through and 
through us…penetrating us with a network, subtler than our subtlest nerves” and that 
modern art should therefore “represent men and women in these bewildering toils so 
as to give the spirit at least an equivalent for the sense of freedom” (R 148-9).  In 
Marius, this line of thought plays out in the trajectory of influence: initially ravished 
by the beautiful, Marius proceeds to reflectively interpret the aesthetic objects that 
influence him, to regard them as sensible exponents of a particular “theory of practice” 
(231).  Hence the narrator compares the “authority” of a common sense ultimately 
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 Mao’s argument here is indebted to Jonathan Freedman’s claim that Pater sought by such dialectical 
reversal to obtain an “aesthetic mastery over Necessity.”  See Freedman, 66.     
 193 
grounded in the preferences and traditions of an aesthetic aristocracy to “some 
beautiful and venerable ritual, in which every observance is become spontaneous and 
almost mechanical, yet is found, the more carefully one considers it, to have a 
reasonable significance and a real history” (270).  
Critics have so far overlooked a third strategy that Pater employs to prevent the 
individual aesthete’s agency from being reduced to a nullity by influence: harmonic 
perception.  Both in Marius and his other writings, Pater insistently figures 
participation in a common sense as a kind of music.  Fronto, for example, represents 
the aesthetic traditions in his ideal commonwealth as “a music to which the intercourse 
of life proceeds—such a music as no one who had once caught its harmonies would 
willingly jar” (249).  Marius himself echoes this language, reflecting that the old 
Greek morality “was certainly a comely thing.—Yes! a harmony, a music, in men’s 
ways, one might well hesitate to jar” (262).  In part, these tropes evoke the late 
Victorian belief in music’s special capacity for influence, its distinctive ability to play 
upon the consciousnesses of its hearers.  As we have seen, Pater employs this 
metaphor of being played upon in “The Child in the House,” when he describes 
Florian yielding himself to the stimuli in his home “to be played upon by them like a 
musical instrument” (12).  He uses the same figure in Plato and Platonism to describe 
those paragons of militarist discipline, the Spartans, as also “like some perfect musical 
instrument, perfectly responsive to the intention, to the lightest touch, of the finger of 
law” (Plato and Platonism 72).  In this context, Pater’s musical metaphorics seem an 
unpromising place to locate an attempt to reconcile the negative liberty of perception 
with the plucking finger of law.  Yet Pater’s musical tropes are more than just a simple 
figure for being played on.  Music, as I argue above, became especially charged with 
anxiety over compromised autonomy in the late Victorian period partly because its 
ostensible lack of represented content made its inscrutable workings on its hearers all 
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the more insidious and unpredictable.  In “The School of Giorgione,” however, Pater 
employs music as the type of a particular form of aesthetic representation: that which, 
having achieved a “union” of form and content, presents them both as “one single 
effect to the ‘imaginative reason’” (The Renaissance 88).   
Music provides Pater not with a figure for involuntary aesthetic response, nor 
with a type of pure formalism, but rather a model for perceptual synthesis, the 
cognitive act that organizes disparate mental contents into a unity.  Music, as Pater 
suggests again and again in Plato and Platonism, realizes a “unity in variety,” an 
“order…within apparent chaos” (52).  In Marius, Heraclitus, in whose thought radical 
skepticism is but the first and “easiest step,” similarly locates the possibility of an 
order amid chaos using musical figures.   
In this ‘perpetual flux’ of minds and things, there was, as Heraclitus conceived, 
a continuance, if not of their material or spiritual elements, yet of orderly 
intelligible relationships, like the harmony of musical notes, wrought out in 
and through the series of their mutations—ordinances of the divine reason, 
maintained throughout the change of the phenomenal world : and this harmony 
in their mutation and opposition, was a principle of sanity and reality in things.  
(132) 
Heraclitus’ harmony likewise functions as a principle of order by aiding the 
conceptualization of a unity-in-variety.  Harmony here denotes the combined effect of 
discrete moments, the unity of categorically separate and heterogeneous experiences 
that are nonetheless best understood when brought into relation to each other.  
Although Pater does not spell it out here, harmony seems nothing so much as a 
perceptual economy that heightens the experience of any given moment by gathering 
up into it the memories of past experiences.  In the first flush of his Epicureanism, 
Marius assumes that his new aesthetic philosophy, having filed down knowledge to 
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one’s immediate sense impressions of “what is near at hand,” will also lay down rules 
by which to intensify his sensory experience through a harmony of heterogeneous 
moments amid the flux. 
 Such a theory, at more leisurable moments, would, of course, have its precepts 
to propound, on the embellishment, generally, of what is near at hand, on the 
adornment of life; till, in a not impracticable rule of conduct, one’s existence 
from day to day, would come to be like a well-executed piece of music; that 
‘perpetual motion’ in things (so Marius figured the matter to himself, under the 
old Greek imageries) according itself to a kind of cadence or harmony.  (150) 
Marius may be employing figures drawn from Pythagoras, but the tacit suggestion that 
one embellishes aesthetic experience through a kind of cadence or harmony equally 
recalls Wundt’s description of apperception, in which the mind gathers together the 
separate beats of a metronome into the cumulative impression of a rhythm.  The 
intensification of experience made possible through the harmonic synthesizing of 
multiple, heterogeneous moments seems a means of fulfilling Pater’s famous 
exhortations in the “Conclusion.”  Charging any given moment with the experiences 
of multiple, disparate moments is certainly one way to maximize the relatively small 
number of moments given to us mortals, to achieve a “quickened, multiplied 
consciousness” by “getting as many pulsations as possible into the given time” (R 
153).  Marius therefore recognizes that refusing to harmonize his own perception with 
the aesthetico-moral order would be “untrue to the well-considered economy of life he 
had brought to Rome with him” (270).  If experience, and not the fruit of experience, 
is the end, Pater nonetheless suggests in Marius that, through a kind of harmonic 
perception, one of the fruits of experience is the capacity for the intensification of 
experience.   
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 Pater’s exploration of the tension between the negative liberty of perception 
and common sense needs to be re-considered in the context of his use of harmony—in 
line with late Victorian cognitive science—as a figure for this heightened perceptual 
economy.  Fronto’s argument and Marius’ reflection that participation in an 
aesthetico-moral sensus communis makes possible a “harmony, a music in men’s 
ways” are consonant with the claims elsewhere that this participation enables the 
aesthete to appropriate and tap into “the world’s experience” (262, 268).  To adapt the 
phrase from “The Child in the House,” common sense provides us with “a 
complimentary strain or burden, applied to our every-day existence, whereby the stray 
snatches of music in it re-set themselves, and fall into the scheme of some higher and 
more consistent harmony” (15).  Thus Marius finds in his visit to the Christian 
community that, animated by the new aesthetico-moral order, much of what he most 
values in the world has been preserved but “heightened and harmonized by some 
transforming spirit which, in its dealing with the elements of the old world, was 
guided by a wonderful tact of selection, exclusion, juxtaposition” (353).  While this 
harmony with a common sense influences and constrains the aesthete’s sensory 
experience, harmony by definition also presupposes a degree of difference, of 
heterogeneity, between the aesthete’s sensory impressions and the body of impressions 
that make up the sensus communis.  This heterogeneity provides the theoretical 
grounds for the preservation of the negative liberty of perception, for the autonomy 
and unique particularity of one’s own concrete sensory experience, even while that 
experience is set to the larger, encompassing music of one’s social environment.  
Hence, Pater’s narrator claims, Epicureanism can be “harmonised” with an aesthetico-
moral common sense, despite their formal opposition (266).  Using the language of 
theology, the narrator argues that Epicureanism’s absolute rejection of common sense 
renders it a heresy—a willful and misguided exaggeration of ideas or values already 
 197 
present in the prevailing body of doctrine.  Were it but harmonized, did it but have “its 
proper complement,” were it but referred “as a part to the whole, to that larger, well-
adjusted system of the old morality,” Epicureanism, in both its ancient and modern 
form, would be not a heresy but a “counsel of perfection,” a freely permitted special 
emphasis on a particular aspect of the common life (268-9, 266).  Similarly, the 
individual Epicurean who has harmonized his own perception with the aesthetic-moral 
order still “finds his special apprehension of the fact of life, amid all his own personal 
colour of mind and temper—finds himself again—though it be but as a single element 
in an imposing system, a wonderful harmony of principles, exerting a strange power to 
sustain—to carry him and his effort still onward to perfection” (269).  Harmony, in 
short, provides Pater with a model for perception capable of at least tentatively 
reconciling the negative liberty of perception with the authority of common sense.  
Through harmony, the aesthete’s individual sensory experience is at once distinct from 
and encompassed by the aesthetico-moral order.106  If Marius does not finally foreclose 
the possibility of new influences and new aesthetic and moral values by definitively 
embracing Christianity, he yet recognizes that liberty of perception is invariably 
defined in relation to the common sense that provides its necessary context and 
condition. 
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 In this respect, the dynamics of harmony resemble Pater’s concept of aesthetic poetry, which, 
according to Williams, “imitates a former age and poetic style, not with the mimetic aim of reproducing 
the former age, but with the antithetical aim of differentiating it from, and the synthetic aim of 
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